For those of you who follow copyright law reform developments on certain blogs and social media sources you might find her speech will resonate with you.

For fun, I have taken extracts of her speech reported in the Toronto Star and have substituted the words “administration of justice” with the words “copyright law”; “the judiciary” with “legislative process”; and “constitutional decision” with “copyright reform process”. Here is how the report of her speech would read:

But she says newspapers, radio and television are “old technology” at a time when anyone with a keyboard can create a blog and call themselves a journalist.

She wondered whether fairness and accuracy might be lost in the world of Facebook, tweets and instant messaging, which she says are part of a profound, cultural shift in how people communicate.

“Some bloggers will be professionals and academics providing thoughtful commentary and knowledge,” she said. “Others will fall short of basic journalistic standards. Will accuracy and fairness be casualties of the social media era?

“What will be the consequences for public understanding of copyright law and confidence in the legislative process? How can a medium such as Twitter inform the public accurately or adequately in 140 characters or less of the real gist of a complex copyright reform process?”

The Chief Justice could not have given her speech at a more opportune time.

Michael Geist’s blog post was cunningly timed to coincide with the launch of RIM’s BlackBerry PlayBook and the current federal election campaign. Unfortunately, he has misled Canadian consumers while doing a disservice to an excellent new tablet product from one of Canada’s most important technology leaders, RIM. His use of the term “tax” is clearly inaccurate and designed to maximize the political impact of his blog post which has more to do with promoting his own copyright proposals than being factually accurate.

Bill C-32 died when the election was called so the debate is about a Bill that does not exist. Nevertheless, let us look at the actual facts pertaining to what the effects of Bill C-32 would have been on the BlackBerry PlayBook across the music, e-book and video markets.

Music

Music can be consumed on the PlayBook either by copying music from existing media such as CDs or music downloads onto the PlayBook or by streaming music content to the PlayBook. In almost all cases there would be no “new cost to consumers” and no “barriers” to the adoption of the PlayBook.

When it comes to selling CDs or music downloads, most digital vendors do so without any form of copy protection. iTunes has been selling TPM-free music for more than two years; Amazon MP3 was selling TPM-free tracks before then.[1] (The PlayBook also comes preloaded with an icon to RIM’s new MusicStore, which also sells TPM free music.)

Songs bought on iTunes come in AAC format while Amazon sells MP3 files. The PlayBook will play content in both these formats as well as in AVI, WAV, WMA, WMV, ASF, MP4, MPEG-4, MOV, M4V, M4A, 3GP2 and 3GP formats.

Music CDs can easily be converted into the MP3 format for listening on the PlayBook. Music already downloaded from services including iTunes can also be transferred and played on the PlayBook with no “taxes”. The ease with which this can be done on the PlayBook was noted in the review from the same newspaper that syndicated Geist’s blog, the Ottawa Citizen:

RIM deserves applause for making it easy to get content on to the device. As opposed to many competitors, PlayBook doesn’t need extra software (such as iTunes) to put files onto the device. Plug PlayBook into a computer and it shows up as a drive. Users can simply drag-and-drop files right on to it.

Music streaming services are usually protected from unauthorized copying by TPMs. The most popular music streaming service in Canada today is Slacker Radio. Any iPad user who decides to upgrade to the PlayBook would not lose a dime on their Slacker subscription. The Slacker Radio app for PlayBook comes pre-loaded on the PlayBook. Even if another music streaming service is being accessed from another device, users can simply cancel their old accounts without incurring any sort of “PlayBook Tax”.

E-Books

Geist is also inaccurate when it comes to e-books. He claims that “Consumers with Amazon Kindles or other e-book readers who have invested in e-books that have digital locks…will find that they are unable to legally transfer the content to their new device.”

In fact, consumers who have purchased e-books through Toronto-based Kobo Books will have the capability of transferring their collections to the PlayBook. Like Slacker Radio for music, a Kobo eReading app comes pre-loaded on the PlayBook. The app will enable full transferability of purchased e-books – it will even remember which page you were last reading on your Kobo eReader when you access the book on the PlayBook. Kobo users are also able to sync their e-book library on the PlayBook through the tablet’s Wi-Fi connection.

According to RIM:

“Kobo also offers free reading applications for BlackBerry® smartphones, computers and other devices, which all sync together across a user’s account.  Kobo members can pick up and read on any device without ever losing their place.”

As for the Kindle, Amazon has announced that it is working on a PlayBook app that will allow users to transfer their Kindle books from one device to the PlayBook:

“Like all Kindle apps, the Kindle app for the new BlackBerry PlayBook will let customers Buy Once, Read Everywhere—on Kindle, Kindle 3G, Kindle DX, iPad, iPod touch, iPhone, Mac, PC, BlackBerry, Android-based devices, and in the coming months, the new BlackBerry PlayBook. Amazon’s Whispersync technology syncs your place across devices, so you can pick up where you left off.”

Accordingly, e-books purchased from leading bookstores and vendors including Amazon, Kobo, Borders, Chapters, Indigo and Barnes & Nobles will be transferable and playable on the PlayBook – without switching costs contrary to what Geist asserted. Kindle compatibility may also enable Canadians to borrow e-books from their local libraries and read them on their PlayBooks when this service becomes available in Canada.

Videos

Geist also contends that individuals will be deterred from buying a PlayBook because they cannot make copies of DVDs they own that are protected from piracy by the Content Scrambling System (CSS). The idea that consumers will be dissuaded from purchasing PlayBook tablets because of an alleged inability to transfer their DVD collections onto the PlayBook is ridiculous. DVDs have been sold with CSS anti-copying technology for more than 15 years. This did not stop the adoption of iPads, nor did it hinder the adoption of Blu-Ray players, On-Demand video, iTunes or other digital video services. An inability to instantly scan books into a Kobo e-Reader also did not create a “Kobo Tax” or prevent the runaway success of Kobo. (It is of course also unreasonable to expect studios to make major investments to create motion pictures and other programming and not protect them by using TPMs or other means to prevent massive file sharing over internet file sharing sites and services.)

In any event, Geist is engaging in speculation when he makes the statement that consumers would “immediately also face the PlayBook tax since Bill C-32 would block them from making digital copies of their DVDs to play on the PlayBook” and that “they would similarly be forced to repurchase the same content again”. Beginning in 2007 and 2008, the major motion picture studios including Disney, Paramount, Warner-Bros., 20^th Century Fox, Sony Pictures, and Universal began selling DVDs together with portable Digital Copies. The bundle gives the DVD purchaser the right to make a digital copy for play on personal computers and portable devices. Given the PlayBook’s importance as a platform, it is reasonable to expect that it is only a matter of time before Digital Copies will be playable on the PlayBook.

Geist asserts that individuals will be unable to transfer their own video library unto other devices because “the presence of a digital lock will mean that the content is legally locked down to the original device or format”. It is true that Apple contractually prohibits the transfer of a downloaded video to another device other than to one of its own devices or personal computers. It enforces this restriction through its fair play DRM. Geist claims the switching costs to a consumer would “effectively double” the cost of the PlayBook. But, he provides no source or data to support this exaggerated contention. It is highly unlikely that the average user will have anywhere near the paid for video downloads that Geist claims. Moreover, given the increasing trend toward digital rentals, it is likely that a major portion of purchases from iTunes was for short term rentals rather than purchases.

In any event, Geist’s unqualified statement that individuals will be “unable to transfer their own video library unto other devices” because “the presence of a digital lock will mean that the content is legally locked down to the original device or format” is purely speculative and unwarranted. Most of the other popular video download services do not restrict the type of device that video files are copied onto. For instance movies purchased through Best Buy’s CinemaNow service may be played on “5 Devices including Portable Players”. Cineplex also recently launched a digital download and video on demand service. Digital downloads purchased from Cineplex.com can be played on personal computers and other compatible devices including mobile devices. RIM’s PlayBook supports video formats which include 3GP, 3GP2, M4A, M4V, MOV, MP4, MPEG-4, ASF, WMV, WMA and F4V. It is reasonable to expect that it will only be a matter of time before these various services work with the PlayBook.

The PlayBook also has some of the most advanced mobile video streaming technology which can take advantage of the tremendous growth in this digital market. Unlike Apple’s iPad, RIM did not shy away from providing full support for Adobe Flash 10.1, Adobe AIR and HTML 5. This means that a huge amount of online video content will be unlocked for PlayBook users compared to users of mobile devices without native Flash support, like the iPad. PlayBook users in Canada will not have to wait for the development of a specialized app before viewing commercial TV shows and other videos from sites like Youtube, CTV, CBC, GlobalTV and the Comedy Network. With the addition of Flash support for the PlayBook, it is likely that PlayBook users will have a greater choice of providers for movie streaming providers than iPad users as well.[2]

Of course, Geist’s main point about digital locks on DVDs and video content also ignores the increasing trend towards device interoperability, all of which are supported by DRM systems that enable this consumer friendly way of enjoying entertainment products. For example, under Ultraviolet, Canadian families will soon be able to access content purchased from UltraViolet media – such as Blu-ray, DVDs or Internet download – and get the enduring right to access it from any UltraViolet device registered to the household account. This includes obtaining it via streaming through devices at home or on the go.

 Conclusion

Michael Geist has disseminated inaccurate and misleading blog posts and articles about Bill C-32 and its TPM and other provisions to support his own copyright proposals before. See, for example, Separating copyright fiction from facts about C-32’s TPM provisions, Separating facts from hype about C-32, Turning up the rhetoric on C-32’s TPM provisions, Are the TPM provisions in C-32 more restrictive than those in the DMCA?, A Response to Professor Michael Geist’s Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion,  Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist?,  Legends and reality about the 1996 WIPO Treaties in the light of certain comments on Bill C-32, Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist? His recent blog post does this again.

Geist’s proposal is to legalize circumventing TPMs that protect copyright content from digital piracy to enable individuals to make free and uncompensated copies of content for any purpose that is not intended to cause an additional separate act of infringement. If this proposal was incorporated into a successor to Bill C-32, it would make Canada the only country in the industrialized world to permit this and it would contravene our treaty obligations. See, An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32.

Importantly, Geist’s proposal would also undermine existing and future digital business models that rely on TPMs including streaming music services such as Slacker Radio and Spotify, e-book download services such as those offered by Chapters/Indigo and Amazon, e-book library lending from companies such as Sony and Amazon, video download and streaming services such as those offered by Cineplex, CinemaNow and Netflix, household video access to be enabled through Ultrasviolet, as well as the numerous and existing business models that use TPMs in the entertainment software and software industries. Ultimately, Geist’s proposal would undermine access to and the dissemination of digital content to the Canadian public and hurt everyone involved in the digital industries including the consumers he professes to represent.

While Bill C-32 died on the Order Paper with the election call, most agree that it is essential for Canada to update it’s copyright laws to keep pace with technological change and legislative changes in other jurisdictions. When Canada’s copyright legislation is re-introduced in the next Parliament, let us be sure that Canadian consumers and their representatives are well informed about the facts.

[2] In fact, one early PlayBook reviewer has praised the PlayBook’s ability to play streaming videos from Amazon’s new Instant Video service (not currently available in Canada) as compared to other devices like the iPad:

I tested Amazon’s Instant Video and Cloud Player services on the PlayBook. Both worked like a charm. As a user of both services (I have three Sony Blue-ray players in my house that are Amazon Instant Video-enabled) this alone may make the PlayBook worth keeping long term.

To my knowledge (and please correct me if I’m wrong), the PlayBook is now the first tablet to play nice with Amazon’s Instant Video service. Some Nokia phones can playback Amazon Instant Videos, but Amazon’s PC software Amazon Unbox is required to download a special version of the program and then transfer it to the phone. With the PlayBook, no software is required; video simply streams to the device. Wow, it seems like I have waited years for this development.

Prof. Geist’s claims are misleading. It is clear that Prof. Geist’s objective in this recent spate of activity is to persuade policy makers and the public that the new proposed enablement cause of action is not needed because Canada’s copyright laws are already robust enough to deal with what Minister Clement calls “the wealth destroyers” like IsoHunt. However, for years Prof. Geist has consistently and repeatedly been writing and telling the public that Canada’s laws related to authorization might not be effective against pirate sites and services and that Canada does not have contributory liability laws that can be used against these sites and services.

Prof. Geist’s current opposition to the proposed enablement amendment in C-32 must be judged having regard to his long standing views about the state of current Canadian law as it relates to authorization and contributory liability. In order to oppose laws intended to create or clarify rights against wealth destroyers like IsoHunt, he argues that Canadian law is adequate and that no changes are needed. However, when considering whether rights holders have the means to enforce their rights against peer-to-peer file sharing sites and services and other wealth destroyers, he says that rights holders do not have contributory infringement rights such as inducement and that reliance on the authorization right would be suspect.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from a review of his writings is that he has either changed his long standing opinion about the state of Canadian law – now believing it is effective enough to shut down the wealth destroyers like IsoHunt- or that he is inaccurately describing what he believes Canadian law to be to oppose the amendments in Bill C-32 that are intended to give rights holders the tools needed to close down wealth destroyers.

Prof. Geist’s Claims

Prof. Geist claims about the IsoHunt case and the lack of any need for reforms to the law have recently been made in his blogs, newspaper articles and in testimony before a Parliamentary Committee. In a widely disseminated article, Weak Copyright Laws? Recording Industry Files Massive Lawsuit Against isoHunt, he stated the following:

While the notion of a “legislative holiday” appears to be the impetus for some of the provisions on Bill C-32, my weekly technology law column (homepage version,Toronto Star version) notes that what is left unsaid – and thus far unreported – is that 26 of the world’s largest recording companies launched a multi-million dollar lawsuit against isoHunt using existing Canadian copyright law just three weeks before the introduction of the bill [PDF of May 2010 claim, PDF of August 2010 amended claim]…

As the isoHunt lawsuit demonstrates, the legal power to combat online infringement has existed within Canadian copyright law for years…

The claims in the isoHunt lawsuit must still be proven in court (as would any case using the new powers contemplated by Bill C-32), but past cases suggest that Canadian law is hardly toothless…

The question is not whether Canadian law is equipped to deal with these sites – recent history and the latest lawsuit demonstrate that it is – but rather why the industry has opted for a strategy of damaging Canada’s reputation by loudly claiming that it is unable to address online infringement using existing law while it quietly files court documents that suggest that the opposite is true. (emphasis added)

Prof. Geist elaborated his claims in an interview with the Globe and Mail’s Jeff Gray in an article entitled The case against isoHunt.  In the article he is quoted as stating the following:

…University of Ottawa law professor and prolific blogger Michael Geist has accused CRIA of purposely keeping quiet its lawsuit against isoHunt, even as it calls for reforms to the copyright law.

“It has the feel of doing and saying one thing and then doing something else,” Dr. Geist said in an interview. “Claiming that the site’s causing enormous harm, claiming that Canadian copyright law can’t deal with it and so we need changes to the law – and at the same time filing repeated court documents that claim that the site is operating illegally under the law as it stands today.”

He said the industry did not want to highlight the fact that it was making use of the current law, in order to keep up pressure up on the government to reform it: “I think they waited and they kept it hidden because they wanted to paint Canada as a piracy haven and use it as a method to encourage the government to move forward with copyright reform.”

Dr. Geist insists the details of who filed suit first are irrelevant to his larger point about whether the recording industry believes Canada’s current laws are strong enough to close sites that violate copyright. “At the end of the day, you can focus on timing or you can focus on what the arguments actually are.” (emphasis added)

On February 15, 2010 Prof. Geist appeared before the Standing Committee on International Trade in relation to the proposed Canada EU Trade Agreement (CETA). At that hearing he testified as follows

I’d also just quickly note that we shouldn’t underestimate the ability of copyright law, in its basic principles, to deal with some of these issues. I’ll give you an example. The current bill [C-32] provides a specific provision to deal with what are called enabler sites, sites that are designed to deal with clear pirate websites. Everybody says, well, of course we need to be able to deal with that.

Last year, three weeks before the bill was introduced, 26 record labels secretly filed a massive lawsuit against the largest known alleged pirate site in Canada, a site called isoHunt. They used existing Canadian copyright law. They’re looking for millions of dollars in damages, they’re looking for a full shutdown of the site, and they’re using the law today.

The lawsuit suggests that all these claims that they are powerless and that we need reforms mistake a little bit where we really stand, because in fact there is the ability to use, in many instances, basic copyright principles that have been in place for decades to deal with some of these issues. It’s in a sense old wine in new bottles, but it can still effectively apply.”[1]

The validity of Prof. Geist’s claims

Prof. Geist’s claims that the record labels secretly started the litigation with isoHunt is incorrect. CRIA did send a cease and desist letter to isoHunt on behalf of certain record labels in May 2008. However, it was IsoHunt that started the litigation by filing a lawsuit against CRIA and certain record labels in the BC Supreme Court – some four months later – seeking a declaration that its operations are legal in Canada. That suit was widely publicized including by Prof. Geist. The labels brought a motion to convert IsoHunt’s lawsuit (commenced by way of application) into a regular action. The BC Supreme Court granted the relief requested by the labels in a judgement rendered on March 11, 2009.[2] IsoHunt brought a motion to the BC Court of Appeal for leave to appeal that decision. That motion was dismissed on July 30, 2009.[3] IsoHunt then re-started its lawsuit by filing a Statement of Claim in November 2009, again seeking a declaration from the BC Supreme Court that its operations are legal in Canada. In May 2010, the labels filed their statement of defence and, on the same day, their counter suit alleging that IsoHunt infringed copyright. On agreement of the parties IsoHunt’s action and the counter suit by the labels will be tried together.

Liberal MP Dan McTeague has already pointed out that Prof. Geist’s claims that the labels secretly started the litigation with IsoHunt are misleading in two blogs here and here.

Professor Geist argues that the isoHunt lawsuit demonstrates “the legal power to combat online infringement has existed within Canadian copyright law for years”. As a law professor, however, he must know that what is alleged about the law in court documents is not proof of the state of the law on any issue. Yet he uses this to support his argument that no changes are needed in Canadian liability law. This claim would likely be misleading to the general readers of Prof. Geist’s blogs and other writings. Dan McTeague pointed this out in his recent rebuttal to Prof. Geist commenting that “This, too, is a specious argument and indeed surprising coming from a law professor”; “Nonetheless, if it will serve as an excuse to oppose meaningful copyright reform, it seems that there are some people will try to cite the recording companies’ pleadings as a statement of Canadian law.”

The most surprising aspect of Prof. Geist’s recent public statements that no amendments to Canadian law are needed to address sites and services like IsoHunt is that he has consistently expressed the opinion that Canada’s copyright laws are too weak or uncertain to make sites and services like IsoHunt liable for copyright infringement. The direct contradiction of his own public statements on this topic — where it has served his arguments that rights holders may not be able to successfully assert their rights under Canadian law or agree to international treaties because to do so would require changes to Canadian law — can be seen from the following articles and blogs he has written over the course of many years.

In March of 2004, Prof. Geist wrote an article commenting on the Supreme Court decision in the The Law Society of Upper Canada v. CCH case. He noted that the decision “instantly ranks as one of the strongest pro-user rights decisions from any high court in the world”. He then went on to opine that the court’s analysis of the law related to authorization could open the door to arguments that could legalize the operations of p2p sites and services in this country.

The court also adopted an important new standard for authorization, which has long been used by copyright owners to hold parties accountable for allowing others to infringe copyright. On this issue, the court ruled authorization should be taken to mean “sanction, approve or countenance” and concluded “a person does not authorize copyright infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment (such as photocopiers) that could be used to infringe copyright.”

This finding will have an immediate impact on copyright issues involving the Internet.

By adopting an approach that allows the providers of equipment to presume their equipment will be used lawfully, the court has opened the door to Internet service providers and even peer-to-peer providers to argue they legitimately presume their subscribers act lawfully and thus cannot be said to authorize copyright infringement. (emphasis added)

In 2005 Prof. Geist wrote a blog in which he considered whether Canadian copyright law is as robust as Australia’s copyright law and could be used to enjoin peer to peer file sharing services like Kazaa. In commenting on an Australian decision which found Kazaa liable for authorizing infringement Prof. Geist doubted whether Canadian law could be used to achieve the same result.

From a Canadian perspective, the case highlights a growing divergence between Canadian and Australian copyright law such that the outcome of a similar case in Canada could potentially be much different (more on that at our comparative conference later this month in Ottawa).

Some of the differences between our two laws are obvious; for example, the existence of a making available right in Australia but only proposed here in Bill C-60. The more important distinction in this case, however, involves the question of authorization (or authorisation).  Critical to today’s Kazaa decision was reliance on the test developed in Moorhouse, an Australian case, for determining authorization.  The court concluded that Sharman Networks, along with several of its directors, met that standard.  While acknowledging the existence of legal warnings against copyright infringement, the court was troubled that “Sharman took no steps to include a filtering mechanism in its software, even in software intended to be provided to new users.”

The Supreme Court of Canada considered the authorization issue last year in CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada.  The Canadian court explicitly rejected the Moorhouse test, concluding that “Moorhouse is inconsistent with previous Canadian and British approaches to this issue. In my view, the Moorhouse approach to authorization shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of the owner’s rights and unnecessarily interferes with the proper use of copyrighted works for the good of society as a whole.”

As for the application of authorization test, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that “a person does not authorize infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment that could be used to infringe copyright. Courts should presume that a person who authorizes an activity does so only so far as it is in accordance with the law. This presumption may be rebutted if it is shown that a certain relationship or degree of control existed between the alleged authorizer and the persons who committed the copyright infringement.”

In other words, under Canadian law, Kazaa would be entitled to presume that its services are being used lawfully consistent with its legal terms. Could the music industry rebut the presumption against a Canadian Kazaa?  Hard to say. It might prove to be a challenge given questions about whether downloading for personal purposes constitutes copyright infringement in Canada and the evidence needed to show a relationship or degree of control that rises to the level of authorization under Canadian law.[4] (emphasis added)

In 2006 Prof. Geist published a blog Does YouTube Deal Foreshadow Licensed P2P? In the blog he discussed the liability of the p2p file sharing site Napster. In the blog he claimed that unlike the US, Canada has no contributory infringement doctrines that could be used against sites like Napster operating in Canada:

First, the differences in legal status of Napster and YouTube may have contributed to the different approach. Napster’s peer-to-peer model raised the spectre of contributory copyright infringement (a legal concept absent from Canadian copyright law), whereas YouTube’s Web-based distribution of user-generated content – much of which does not infringe copyright – likely qualifies for legal protection under U.S. copyright law.

In February 2007, Prof. Geist wrote a blog in which he criticized the efforts of the Entertainment Software Association to stop the sale and distribution of mod chips in Canada. Mod chips are tools that are used to circumvent technical measures that are employed by console manufacturers and game publishers to protect their works against infringement.[5] In his blog he expressed the opinion that the sale of these circumvention tools was legal in Canada and specifically relied on the lack of any inducement liability in Canada as a reason for saying so.

A blog reader has passed along a legal demand letter they recently received from Smart & Biggar, a leading Canadian IP law firm, representing the Entertainment Software Association.  The letter focuses on the sale of modification devices – frequently referred to as “mod chips” that can be used to modify or alter store-bought video games or play infringing copies of those games.

The letter argues that the ESA has both trademark and copyright rights in the video games.  In addition to pointing to Section 27 of the Copyright Act as governing the sale or distribution of unauthorized software, the applicability of criminal offences under Section 42 of the Copyright Act, and the fraud provisions of the Criminal Code, it claims:

“any use, offer for sale or sale of modification devices, or ‘mod chips’ to permit circumvention of our clients’ consoles security systems to play pirated or counterfeit software, is also an offence and constitutes direct or indirect infringement of our clients’ intellectual property rights by inducing and procuring infringement by others of our client’s aforesaid rights.”

Given that the letter makes no reference to patent rights, the intellectual property referred to in this sentence is presumably copyright.  This raises at least two issues.

First, while the ESA makes no secret about the fact that it would like Canada to follow the U.S. model, this letter suggests that it isn’t bothering to wait for the law to change. It is trying to apply U.S. law in Canada today since the doctrine of inducing infringement does not exist here (if it sounds familiar, it is because the U.S. Supreme Court raised inducement in the Grokster case). Moreover, I believe that it is simply wrong to argue that the use of a mod chip alone constitutes an infringing act in Canada…. (emphasis added)

In October 2007 Prof. Geist wrote a blog commenting on a court decision in the US in which the court awarded statutory damages against a downloader. He noted that the Canadian and US statutory regimes are much different and that Canadian courts would be “a bit more reasonable” when it comes to such damages. He then went on to comment on a cease and desist letter CRIA had sent to Demonoid, one of the largest BitTorrent sites which was then operating in Canada.  Relying on his previously expressed interpretation of the scope of authorization in Canada, he argued that the rights of CRIA’s members to shut down that BitTorrent site were “suspect”.

Third, the Canadian music industry is far more divided on the issue of these lawsuits.  Indeed, Canadian musicians have come out vocally against such lawsuits as have leading labels such as Nettwerk.

These differences may help account for the fact that we have not seen file sharing suits in Canada since CRIA was soundly defeated in its attempt to sue 29 alleged file sharers several years ago.  Instead, CRIA has gone after intermediaries, as the recent demand notice against Demonoid demonstrate.  Even those claims are suspect, however, since the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that providers of equipment (including websites) are entitled to presume that their equipment will be used lawfully and therefore not rise to the level of authorizing infringement. (emphasis added)

In October 2007 Prof. Geist wrote another blog criticizing ISPs for using packet shaping on their networks which he argued had the effect of limiting “the amount of available bandwidth for certain services such as peer-to-peer file sharing applications”. One of his objections to the practice was that these peer-to-peer file sharing applications are legal in Canada.

This raises many issues but I would like to focus on just two in this posting.  First, not only is BitTorrent legal in Canada, but a growing percentage of the file swapping on BitTorrent clients is authorized…

In January 2010 Prof. Geist wrote a blog in which he argued that Canadians should oppose the draft ACTA accord. Among the many reasons he gave for opposing the then current draft of the ACTA treaty was that it would force Canada to amend its laws to introduce inducement, the contributory infringement liability doctrine he admits was used to shut down the p2p file sharing site Grokster in the United States.

Third party liability. The third party liability provisions focus on copyright, though an EU document notes that it could (should) be extended to trademark and perhaps other IP infringement.  The goal of this section is to create an international minimum harmonization regarding the issue of what is called in some Member States “contributory copyright infringement”.  The U.S. proposal would include “inducement” into the standard, something established in the U.S. Grokster case, but not found in many other countries. This would result in a huge change in domestic law in many countries (including Canada). (emphasis added)

As can be seen, Prof. Geist’s current opposition to the enablement amendment in C-32 is based on a stated opinion that contradicts his repeated previous opinions about Canadian law. To oppose laws intended to create or clarify rights against wealth destroyers like IsoHunt, he argues that Canadian law is adequate. But, he previously argued that existing laws related to authorization are “suspect”; that the “door” has been “opened” to peer-to-peer providers to argue that their services are legal; and that it is “hard to say” and “might prove to be a challenge” to find them liable. He also previously argued that contributory infringement is “a legal concept absent from Canadian copyright law” and that the “doctrine of inducing infringement does not exist here” and, accordingly, cannot be used against wealth destroyers like peer-to-peer file sharing sites and services.

So are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Canada’s Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law? His writings suggest it depends on the circumstances.

[2] IsoHunt Web Technologies Inc. v. EMI Group Canada, 2009 BCSC 1837 (CanLII)

[3] IsoHunt Web Technologies Inc. v. EMI Group Canada Inc., 2009 BCCA 618

[4] The Moorehouse decision referred to by Prof. Geist was codified in Australia’s copyright law in 2000 by inserting into s. 101 a new subsection 1(A) to provide a practical enforcement regime for copyright owners in the online environment. Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005); Universal Music Pty Ltd. v. Cooper, [2005] FCA 972 (Aust. F.C.).

[5] Prof. Geist has long opposed effective protection for TPMs that can be used to protect entertainment software products. His policies for weak protection for TPMs are frequently cited by organizations like the CCER that represent Canadian mod chip distributors because they would enable them to stay in business. See, The Owens analysis of the Canadian copyright consultations: what are the implications? which exposed how the CCER attempted to game the copyright reform consultations with its letter writing wizard in an attempt to persuade the government to introduce weak anti-circumvention copyright legislation. See also, The Owens analysis of the Canadian copyright consultations: what are the implications?

These revelations about the FTA and NAFTA were part of Prof. Geist’s prepared opening remarks to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on International Trade on the subject of CETA, the Canada EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Prof. Geist appeared before the Committee on February 15, 2011 to warn them against including copyright as part of a potential trade agreement with the EU.

Prof. Geist told the Committee that “The inclusion of intellectual property policy marks a dramatic shift for Canadian trade negotiations, which conventionally addressed market entry, investment, and tariff issues.” He went on to testify that:

“copyright provisions were not part of the Canada – US FTA or NAFTA. They were largely excluded or kept very minor in our other more recent trade agreements. CETA represents a very significant change that is part of a broader effort to pressure Canada to change its copyright laws.”

Prof. Geist’s testimony to the Parliamentary Standing Committee about the FTA and NAFTA was inaccurate. Both the FTA and NAFTA deal with copyrights and other intellectual property rights.

The FTA, which was agreed to in 1987, has two provisions dealing with copyright. Article 2006 of the FTA requires each Party to provide copyright holders with a right of equitable remuneration for retransmissions of copyrighted programming to the public. See, CTV Television Network Ltd. v. Canada (Copyright Board ), [1993] 2 F.C. 115, Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Assn. v. SOCAN, 2008 FCA 6 which explain the FTA’s role in the legislative history of the Copyright Act.

Under Article 2004, the Parties also agreed to cooperate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and in other international forums to improve intellectual property. The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of Multilateral trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These trade negotiations resulted in the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPs agreement which Canada has ratified includes many provisions requiring member states to protect copyrights and other intellectual property rights.

NAFTA, which came into force in January 1994, contains very important provisions related to copyright and other intellectual property rights. For example, Articles 1705 and 1706 prescribe minimum levels of protection for works and sound recordings. Article 1714 prescribes minimum standards for enforcement of copyrights and other IP rights. Articles 1716, 1717, and 1718 deal with provisional measures, criminal remedies, and border enforcement related to copyrights and other IP rights. See, the following cases which used NAFTA as an aid to construing the Copyright Act because of Canada’s international copyright obligations arising from this treaty: Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc.v. American Business Information, Inc.) 134 F.T.R. 80, CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada 2002 FCA 187, Édutile Inc.v. Automobile Protection Assn, 181 F.T.R. 160.

Was Prof. Geist accurate when he told the Parliamentary Standing Committee that “copyright provisions were not part of the Canada – US FTA or NAFTA”? Clearly not.

Was Prof. Geist accurate when he told them that “The inclusion of intellectual property policy marks a dramatic shift for Canadian trade negotiations”? No he was not. The facts prove otherwise. The FTA, NAFTA, and TRIPS, are three examples showing that Canada has a history of including copyright and other intellectual property rights as part of major international trade agreements. Canada’s trading partners including the EU also legitimately view intellectual property as important and want to make harmonization of intellectual property rights part of bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade agreements. Would it be a dramatic shift in Canada’s trade policy to include such provisions in CETA? No it would not.

Our law, which was designed to deal with player pianos and renegade printing presses, and later traditional broadcast techologies like radio and TV, is occasionally called upon to deal with illegal filesharing on the Internet. But the legal tools to protect intangible property have not kept pace with the advances in technologies and services that are used to facilitate infringement on the Internet.

While the 1911 law targeted centralized distribution of infringing books, peer-to-peer distribution networks create a situation that could not have been imagined at that time. Now, when a user in Canada illegally downloads an album, software, game, book or film, that person benefits from a situation where other users contribute tiny fragments of that work in a swarm crossing the world, where every personal computer is its own printing press, and where a single memory stick, MP3 player, or tablet can warehouse inconceivable amounts of information.

Critically, unlike 1911, the primary profiteers often do not themselves directly infringe copyright. Instead they take a series of preparatory steps to faciliate and encourage and to aid infringements by others. These activities take many different forms, many of which mutate considerably whenever legal pressures are applied. Sites such as isoHunt or Pirate Bay index and foster illegal copying and distribution of content using the BitTorrent protocol. Cyberlocker providers such as MegaUpload or RapidShare provide storage space for petabytes of information comprising many hundreds of thousands of copyright works that can easily be downloaded by others, and have been known to pay cash rewards to those users whose works are most commonly downloaded. Linking and leech websites gather together links to infringing content stored remotely throughout the world. Even old technologies such as the Usenet are still being deployed to create relatively anonymous means of large-scale file sharing. These sites profit from the distribution of infringing content, at the expense of artists, writers, and other creators, publishers, distributors and everyone else that invests in or supports the creative industries.

Canada has thus far been a haven for such activities. In 2010, Canada was placed on the USTR Priority Watch List because of weak IP laws and the number of pirate sites and services operating within its borders. Earlier this week, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) recommended in its Section 301 submission to the USTR that Canada remain on the Priority Watch List. A January 2011 study shows the British Columbia-based IsoHunt as one of the top BitTorrent sites in the world, with an estimated 12,000,000 unique monthly visitors. IsoHunt is just one of the many pirate sites and services still operating in Canada.

IsoHunt views Canada’s laws against secondary infringement as being so anorexic that, in September 2008, it commenced an application in the British Columbia courts seeking a declaration that its operations are legal here and do not infringe the copyrights of record labels. This proceeding is being defended by the labels. (Contrary to the suggestion of Prof. Geist, the record labels brought proceedings against IsoHunt for copyright infringement only after being sued by IsoHunt. The suit brought by IsoHunt has been widely reported since its filing including by Prof. Geist. The responding lawsuit has also been public since it was filed.)

The current Copyright Act aims almost exclusively at direct infringers, supplemented by an authorization right and a narrow set of activities that comprise secondary infringement. Now, with the introduction of Bill C-32 into Parliament, Canada is taking a serious step to deal with the issue of enablement. Following Minister Clement’s publicly stated desire to target “the wealth destroyers”, the Government has included within Bill C-32 a brand-new “enablement” remedy that would expand the existing remedies against secondary infringement.

If passed in its present form, s. 27(2.3) would make it “an infringement of copyright for a person to provide, by means of the Internet or another digital network, a service that the person knows or should have known is designed primarily to enable acts of copyright infringement”. Courts are given criteria to assist in their determinations, including economic benefit from the infringements, overt promotion of the service’s infringing capabilities, knowledge of actual infringements, the presence of significant non-infringing aspects for the service, and acts taken to limit copyright infringement.

This cause of action would override certain exceptions for onlines service providers, such as the network services exception, but would not expressly override other exceptions, such as the hosting exception.

Despite the Government’s goal of targeting the “wealth destroyers”, statutory damages are not available against persons who have been found liable for enabling infringement.

While the new enablement right is a good first step, it has some technical drafting defciencies that need to be fixed to ensure that the new cause of action can be used against the intended pirate sites and services.

• First, Parliament must recognize that pirate sites and services often are “not designed primarily to enable” acts of copyright infringement. The design is very often neutral, but the site or service is run to induce, aid or abet infringing activities, or is primarily used for infringing purposes.
• Second, Parliament must ensure that this provision clearly trumps all all of the online service provider exceptions to avoid a circumstance in which enablers like wealth destroying pirate hosting sites can avoid liability for enablement.
• Third, to provide an adequate and effective remedy against enablement, Parliament should confirm that rightsholders may rely on the full scale of statutory damages against those who are liable for enablement, regardless of whether such persons were operating for commercial purposes. (The experience of the Internet shows that certain enablers can have a devastating effect on the marketplace without acting with profit in mind.)

Bill C-32 offers many important amendments to the Copyright Act that need to be made to bring our legislation into the 21st century. The enablement provision is an example of one such provision. However, like many of the proposed amendments, it has technical drafting flaws. These need to be addressed at the Parliamentary Legislative Committee to ensure that the Bill accomplishes the objectives set by the government.

 Résumé

• La création d’œuvres protégées par le droit d’auteur pour fins pédagogiques est une entreprise importante et complexe, particulièrement dans un pays aussi vaste, diversifié et peu peuplé comme l’est le Canada. Il faudrait mener une réflexion approfondie avant d’instituer des règles d’utilisation équitable qui menaceraient l’édition pédagogique.
• L’équité est un concept subjectif qui doit être examiné au cas par cas. Six ans seulement après la décision historique de la Cour suprême dans la cause CCH concernant l’utilisation équitable, la voici saisie à nouveau !
• En laissant soumise à un vague critère d’équité toute forme de copie ayant un rapport quelconque avec l’«éducation», le Canada risque de violer les accords internationaux dont il est signataire. Nulle part chez nos principaux partenaires commerciaux ne trouve-t-on un libellé aussi général et ambigu. 
• Dans son désir de promouvoir les nouvelles technologies dans le cadre pédagogique, le gouvernement serait mieux de cibler des exceptions qui ne seront pas sujettes aux abus.

 *Dan Glover est un associé au sein du Groupe sur le droit de la propriété intellectuelle chez McCarthy Tétrault LLP. Ce commentaire est écrit à titre personnel.

* PDF @

1)       Introduction

Sous le titre «Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion: Fair Dealing and Bill C-32» (Pour démêler la confusion à l’égard du droit d’auteur: l’utilisation équitable et le projet de loi C-32), le professeur Michael Geist publiait sur son blogue un commentaire quant à l’ajout proposé d’un nouveau droit d’utilisation du type «utilisation équitable à des fins…  d’éducation».  Il en vient à conclure que cette réforme n’affectera en rien l’équilibre entre les créateurs de matériel pédagogique et leurs utilisateurs.

De tous les amendements d’une importance capitale proposés par le projet de loi C-32, celui-ci pourrait avoir le plus d’impact. En effet, monsieur Geist souligne lui-même que les institutions d’enseignement et les étudiants dépensent annuellement plus d’un milliard de dollars en livres et des centaines de millions pour l’accès à des banques de données pédagogiques. De plus, lors de son témoignage devant un comité parlementaire, une représentante d’Access Copyright, une association de titulaires de droits, indiquait que plus d’un demi-milliard de pages étaient reproduites pour des fins pédagogiques au Canada. Or, sous la loi actuelle, la rétribution des auteurs pour ces copies vient de ce que seules celles faites aux fins de recherche ou d’étude privée sont exemptées de paiement. Cependant, avec la nouvelle loi, toute copie effectuée à des fins d’éducation le serait pour une fin permise par la loi, laissant à la justice le soin de déterminer si l’utilisation est équitable. Même si l’évaluation des pertes éventuelles subies par les éditeurs en conséquence des changements proposés n’est pas une science exacte, les estimations déposées devant le comité parlementaire variaient de 40 millions de dollars par année (Carole Lavallée et Serge Cardin, députés bloquistes) à 60 millions par année (Access Copyright). À cause de l’ampleur de la réforme, à la fois le parti Libéral et le Bloc québécois ont indiqué qu’ils verraient à amender cette disposition.

Il faut également garder en mémoire que le marché pédagogique canadien est un écosystème complexe dont les caractéristiques sont absentes des marchés plus importants comme ceux des États-Unis. Au Canada, certains titres seront largement distribués alors que plusieurs autres sont destinés à des marchés beaucoup plus restreints. Tout règlement législatif doit tenir compte de ces écarts de manière à ne pas décourager les auteurs et les éditeurs de publier du nouveau matériel pédagogique pour ces petits marchés, comme ceux des minorités linguistiques ou culturelles. Avec tout ce qui est en jeu, il est essentiel de bien évaluer les conséquences de cette disposition.

Je ne partage malheureusement pas la conviction du professeur Geist voulant que cet amendement favorise la promotion des nouvelles technologies sans pour autant nuire aux intérêts des auteurs et des éditeurs. Je suis convaincu, en particulier, que le professeur Geist sous-estime grandement l’impact éventuel de la nouvelle exception pour fins d’éducation de l’utilisation équitable. Cela tient en partie à ce qu’il prête une trop grande foi dans la capacité de la deuxième étape du test d’utilisation équitable à régir les comportements sur le marché. De plus, le relevé des autres lois que fait le professeur Geist omet de faire une analyse de principe quant à savoir si l’exception proposée risque de mettre le Canada en porte à faux à l’égard de ses engagements internationaux, particulièrement en ce qui a trait au test en trois étapes enchâssé dans les ADPICS et dans la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques.

Quoique le présent texte soit le reflet d’une opinion personnelle et qu’il ait été écrit durant mes heures de loisir, une bonne part de mon expertise a été acquise à titre d’avocat-conseil pour plusieurs organismes représentant des titulaires de droits d’auteur. J’ai également conseillé plusieurs utilisateurs institutionnels sur leurs droits à l’utilisation équitable et je suis conscient qu’ils ont un véritable souci de bien gérer l’utilisation des ouvrages protégés dans un contexte technologique complexe.

Comme dernier élément introductif, j’aimerais préciser qu’il n’est pas toujours facile de répondre au professeur Geist principalement à cause de sa tendance à faire des déclarations percutantes sans explication ni source. Ainsi cet énoncé qui dit que : «Les institutions d’enseignement et les étudiants dépensent plus d’un milliard de dollars annuellement pour des livres et des centaines de millions en droit de licence pour des banques de données. Cette situation ne changera pas si l’on inclut l’éducation dans l’usage équitable.» [ Traduction ] Le professeur Geist ne donne aucune source ni ne fournit aucune raison justifiant cette prédiction d’importance capitale. De surcroît, il ne tenait pas le même discours lors de son témoignage devant le comité parlementaire alors qu’il admettait que la réforme de l’utilisation équitable pour l’éducation ferait perdre des revenus aux auteurs et aux éditeurs :

M. Pablo Rodriguez (Honoré-Mercier, Libéral) :

En ce qui a trait à l’éducation, ne pensez-vous pas que l’exemption  priverait de revenus certains des créateurs, des auteurs ou des producteurs?

Professeur Michael Geist :

Oui. Comme je le mentionnais dans mes remarques liminaires, je pense que toute copie, y inclus celle sous la nouvelle exception pour l’éducation, doit être équitable. Ce serait mentir que de plaider qu’il n’y aura pas de copie aujourd’hui compensée qui pourrait dorénavant tomber sous la notion d’utilisation équitable, mais, par définition, toute copie qui se qualifierait en fonction de l’analyse de la cour serait équitable. [Traduction – Nous soulignons]

Au vu de telles contradictions dans les messages, tout comme de l’accusation ad hominem disant que les titulaires de droits ont fait «des déclarations trompeuses quant à des pertes éventuelles, des commentaires inexacts sur le droit d’auteur et le matériel Internet, et apporté des arguments douteux en ce qui a trait à la conformité des réformes en regard du droit international», il est devenu nécessaire de répondre dans le détail aux articles, entrées de blogue et témoignages de monsieur Geist.

2)                   L’importance de l’édition pédagogique

Le Canada n’est pas le premier pays à considérer sérieusement la création d’exceptions au droit d’auteur afin de réduire les dépenses publiques en éducation. Si le professeur Geist prend l’exemple des États-Unis et d’Israël à l’appui du résultat qu’il souhaite, l’expérience vécue au Royaume-Uni illustre bien pourquoi une telle exception peut mener à des résultats imprévus et peu souhaitables.

Dans ce pays, les arguments en faveur de ne pas traiter différemment l’édition pédagogique des autres secteurs d’édition ont été avancés dans le Rapport Whitford dès 1977. Des décennies avant l’arrivée de l’internet, les auteurs du rapport ont reconnu qu’une friction permanente existait entre la volonté des éducateurs de promouvoir de «nouvelles méthodes d’enseignement» et les droits des éditeurs et des auteurs. La conclusion du comité Whitford, qu’il vaut la peine de citer longuement, fut que les gouvernements devraient résister à la tentation de réduire les dépenses en éducation au détriment des auteurs et des éditeurs en raison du fait que cela va à l’encontre du but recherché :

Les besoins en éducation sont en mutation dans la société moderne. Dans le contexte éducatif actuel […] on ne considère plus comme opportun de fournir des manuels à chaque élève. On nous a dit que les nouvelles méthodes pédagogiques exigent que l’on utilise un large éventail de matériel pédagogique pour satisfaire les besoins de chaque étudiant ou groupe d’étudiants. On nous dit que cette notion d’«apprentissage basé sur les ressources», qu’elle s’applique à une activité individuelle ou en classe, exige d’avoir à disposition une variété de matériel issu d’une pluralité de sources.

[…]

Au vu du problème que pose l’accroissement de la reprographie pour le système d’éducation depuis l’époque du comité Gregory, nous nous sommes d’abord penchés sur la question de savoir s’il devrait y avoir des exceptions particulières en faveur des établissements d’éducation. Le fait que l’«éducation» soit une bonne cause ne constitue pas en soi une justification pour priver les titulaires de droit d’auteur d’une rémunération. Personne ne suggère que les fabricants de cahiers, de compas et de règles fournissent gratuitement ces produits aux établissements d’éducation. Quoique le genre de matériel utilisé de nos jours dans ces établissements soit très différent et beaucoup plus diversifié que les manuels d’antan, l’éducation dépend encore en large part du travail des auteurs, des artistes et des compositeurs. L’éducation dépend tout autant du travail des éditeurs qui, les premiers, ont produit le matériel que les autorités veulent reproduire à des fins pédagogiques. [ Traduction ]

(Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1977, §§ 254-56, 268-69)

Lors de son évaluation de problèmes similaires dans un récent litige entre éducateurs et auteurs, le tribunal britannique du droit d’auteur a réaffirmé les conclusions du rapport Whitford et prévenu que de traverser cette ligne pourrait mener à la destruction d’une relation symbiotique de longue date entre les éditeurs et le système d’éducation :

En refusant de créer une exception généralisée en faveur des institutions d’enseignement, la législature a trouvé un équilibre entre les intérêts des titulaires de droit d’auteur, d’une part, et ceux du secteur pédagogique d’autre part. La santé de l’industrie de l’édition est importante en général, mais elle est d’une importance particulière pour ceux qui sont dans le secteur de l’éducation. Une exemption tous azimuts des droits d’auteurs pour les institutions d’enseignement serait dommageable pour l’industrie de l’édition et, en conséquence, pour l’éducation. D’un autre côté, l’industrie de l’édition dépend des auteurs pour une grande part du matériau de base. Si le secteur éducatif se trouve trop accablé par des restrictions sur le droit d’auteur, l’enseignement et le savoir s’en trouvent découragés au détriment de l’intérêt public en général et de l’industrie de l’édition en particulier. Ceci est un bon exemple d’une relation symbiotique. [ Traduction ]

(Universities UK Ltd vs Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R. 35)

Comme je le préciserai à la fin du présent commentaire, cette relation symbiotique serait mieux instituée au Canada en mettant en place une série d’exceptions ciblées pour atteindre des objectifs concrets, un chemin qui réduirait l’impact sur le secteur de l’édition pédagogique tout en appuyant les intérêts des enseignants dans le développement de nouvelles méthodes pour rejoindre les étudiants.

3)                   La loi canadienne dispose-t-elle de règles fermes pour gérer l’utilisation équitable?

L’hypothèse de loin la plus importante sous-jacente aux propos du professeur Geist dans son blogue est que la réforme n’aura pas ou peu d’effet sur le droit d’auteur parce que ce droit se limite aux transactions dites «équitables». Dans son esprit, les auteurs seront protégés parce que les juges sont « tenus d’évaluer l’équité de toute utilisation – incluant celle à des fins d’éducation  – avant qu’elle ne soit déclarée utilisation équitable ». Puisque la réforme touchant l’«éducation» n’affecte que la première portion du test d’utilisation équitable, celle des «fins admissibles», il en conclut que rien ne changera. (Sur cette question, voir également le blogue de septembre du professeur Geist.) 

L’immuabilité des règles établies par les cours a également été un important sujet de discussion de la part du gouvernement. Témoignant devant le comité parlementaire chargé d’examiner le projet de loi C-32, le ministre de l’Industrie Tony Clement déclarait:

Je veux apaiser le comité en ce qui concerne l’éducation, parce qu’il s’agit d’une autre question qui sera soulevée: le fait que nous avons ajouté l’éducation dans le concept d’utilisation équitable. Encore une fois, je sais que je suis à une séance qui porte sur le droit d’auteur; je vais donc attribuer mes observations au professeur Geist, qui m’a appris qu’utilisation équitable n’est pas synonyme d’utilisation gratuite et qu’en fait, il y a une grande différence entre les deux.

« Utilisation équitable » signifie que l’oeuvre doit être employée à une fin non commerciale, que la version originale a été acquise légalement et que l’utilisation de la version originale ne nuira pas aux ventes de l’oeuvre. C’est très différent que de dire simplement que parce qu’on a inclus l’éducation dans le concept de l’utilisation équitable, il n’y a plus de règles. C’est faux: les règles existent toujours et elles visent à établir l’équilibre. Encore une fois, je tiens à vous en assurer.

Cette affirmation requiert des éclaircissements. D’une importance capitale, les trois «règles» évoquées dans le deuxième paragraphe de cette déclaration ne reflètent pas la loi canadienne. Dans sa décision historique CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13,  la Cour suprême a unanimement statué que (i) l’utilisation commerciale et à but lucratif pouvait être considérée comme une utilisation équitable (§ 51) et que (ii) l’effet de l’utilisation sur le marché pour le détenteur de droit n’est ni le seul ni le plus important facteur à considérer pour déterminer si une utilisation est équitable (§ 59). Dans cette décision, la Cour suprême, ni aucune autre instance d’ailleurs, ne stipule pas que l’œuvre originale doit être légalement acquise. Finalement, la Cour suprême statue qu’il n’y a aucun test reconnu pour déterminer l’utilisation équitable : l’utilisation équitable étant une question de fait, elle dépendra chaque fois des faits (§§ 52-53).

Nonobstant ces remarques, les justifications du professeur Geist à l’égard de la réforme reposent sur l’hypothèse que les «règles» d’équité établies par les cours éviteront de perturber le marché. Avec tout le respect qui lui est dû, il s’agit là d’une profession de foi douteuse au vu du passé canadien et américain.

Le premier problème que l’on rencontre est l’instabilité notoire du test d’équité de la CCH. Cette instabilité a été soulignée dans la décision de la Cour suprême acceptant d’entendre l’appel de la SOCAN qui contestait un jugement dans une cause d’utilisation équitable où le tribunal avait statué que «l’utilisation équitable pour fins de recherche» pouvait inclure des extraits de chansons vendues commercialement. Dans sa demande d’autorisation d’appel, la SOCAN arguait que la Cour d’appel fédérale était considérablement divisée sur la façon dont le droit canadien considérait le test d’équité. Nombre de commentateurs ont aussi prédit que l’appel de la SOCAN sera suivi d’un appel d’une autre décision de la Cour d’appel fédérale statuant que l’utilisation en classe de matériel pédagogique n’entrait pas dans la définition d’utilisation équitable aux fins de recherche ou d’étude privée.

Ainsi, l’assurance et les garanties offertes par le ministre Clement qui trouvent écho chez le professeur Geist ne relèvent pas de l’évidence légale. Puisque le test d’équité relève d’une analyse discrétionnaire, sans cesse renouvelée et au cas pas cas, il ne fournit pas les règles fermes qu’ils évoquent. Le test d’équité est notoirement mou et subjectif. Il relève presque toujours du jugement de celui qui copie. Cette indétermination explique pourquoi le réformateur américain bien connu Lawrence Lessig a qualifié l’usage équitable de système «étonnamment mauvais» équivalant à peu de choses près au seul «droit d’embaucher un avocat» [ Traduction ] (Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, p. 187).

La position canadienne pour contrebalancer la mollesse du test d’équité a toujours été de maintenir un test ferme de «fins admissibles» comme seuil au droit d’utilisation équitable.  Si quelqu’un ne peut pas dire que son œuvre est faite expressément à des fins de recherche, d’étude privée, de critique, de compte-rendu ou de communication de nouvelles, le débat est clos. L’œuvre n’est tout simplement pas considérée au titre d’utilisation équitable. Ceci s’oppose à ce qui prévaut aux États-Unis où les utilisateurs souhaitant reproduire gratuitement une œuvre peuvent offrir n’importe laquelle justification  « équitable » et, dans les faits, défier les titulaires de droits de les poursuivre en justice.

C’est précisément le besoin de stabilité dans la détermination du seuil au droit d’utilisation équitable qui justifie pourquoi le gouvernement devrait réfléchir mûrement avant d’utiliser un terme à la portée aussi vaste comme une des « fins admissibles ». Comme le note le professeur Geist à l’item 10 de son blogue,  la Cour suprême a interprété le terme «éducation» de manière large de façon à inclure «des initiatives d’apprentissage plus informelles comme en formation dynamique de la vie, ou en fournissant des informations pratiques». En appliquant cette formulation au test d’utilisation équitable, le seuil critique serait éliminé eu égard à toute personne «fournissant des informations pratiques». Tout ce qui resterait serait le test mou en matière d’équité et l’utilisateur, seul devant la photocopieuse.

4)                   La réforme proposée est-elle trop ambigüe?

Au deuxième article de son blogue, le professeur Geist s’en prend à l’affirmation faite par l’auteur Douglas Arthur Brown lors de son témoignage devant le comité législatif et voulant que «… jusqu’à présent, personne ne sait vraiment ce que signifie « utilisation équitable aux fins d’éducation » — à part davantage de copies sans rémunération pour les créateurs et plus de poursuites en justice onéreuses.» Plutôt que de discuter des mérites de l’argument de Monsieur Brown, le professeur Geist les rejette d’emblée citant un mémoire de demande d’autorisation à la Cour suprême de la part d’Access Copyright. Cette tactique de désamorçage lui permet de passer par-dessus une objection de taille à sa prétention voulant que le test d’équité fournisse des garanties suffisantes aux créateurs.

Le professeur Geist insinue à plusieurs reprises que parce que les tribunaux seront en mesure de distinguer entre les utilisations équitables et non équitables, la stabilité s’ensuivra. Les utilisations équitables resteront gratuites et l’on traitera des utilisations illicites de manière appropriée sous forme de dommages ou de tarifs. Grâce à cette stabilité, les institutions et autres utilisateurs d’importance développeront des politiques pour informer précisément les gens sur ce qui est équitable ou non et ces principes seront suivis couramment.

Du point de vue d’un avocat qui pratique le droit, ces prétentions  apparaissent désespérément naïves, et ce, parce qu’il est impossible de modeler un comportement de manière constructive à partir d’une règle dont la nature même est ambiguë.

Le droit d’utilisation proposé contient trois ambiguïtés fondamentales. La première concerne le sens du mot «éducation» et la seconde, le sens du mot «équitable». La troisième ambiguïté engage toutes les institutions qui jouent un rôle dans la copie des œuvres pour d’autres utilisateurs : même si la preuve peut être faite que ces tiers utilisateurs en ont fait une utilisation inéquitable, l’institution ayant fait la copie peut néanmoins réclamer l’immunité en arguant que ses pratiques et ses politiques en matière de copie étaient «équitables et à des fins d’éducation». Tout avocat de pratique sait que les ambiguïtés sont (i) interprétées selon le propre intérêt de chaque partie et (ii) extrêmement coûteuses en temps et en argent.

Si le projet actuel devenait loi, la première ambiguïté aurait comme résultat qu’un grand nombre d’utilisateurs plaideraient le fait que leurs copies ont été faites à des fins d’éducation, que ceux-ci tombent dans la catégorie des enseignants rémunérés par les provinces et qui copient des extraits importants d’une œuvre aux fins d’analyse en classe, ce qui est l’intention probable du projet de loi, ou qu’ils tombent dans la catégorie des «professeurs de yoga», ce qui n’est pas l’intention probable du projet de loi. Inévitablement, ces derniers s’en réfèreront à la décision de la Cour suprême dans la cause de la CCH et celle de la Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R. pour appuyer les revendications les plus farfelues.

La deuxième ambiguïté permet à  tout utilisateur d’un ouvrage protégé par le droit d’auteur ayant un rapport quelconque avec l’éducation de déterminer l’équité d’une utilisation. Si une utilisation «équitable» est gratuite et qu’une utilisation «non équitable» entraîne des coûts administratifs et financiers importants, il est tout naturel que tout utilisateur d’œuvre protégée en conclue que son utilisation est «équitable». La tentation devient encore plus grande quand on s’aperçoit qu’il est pratiquement impossible pour les titulaires de droits de s’attaquer à plus petit que les plus grosses institutions.

Cette deuxième ambiguïté menace également de mener à des résultats contradictoires lorsqu’une cause est soumise à un tribunal, alors que les avocats vont mettre à profit leur ingéniosité et leurs recherches considérables pour déterminer ce qui est équitable et ce qui ne l’est pas. La bataille est ouverte au Canada depuis que la Cour suprême a maintenu que les conséquences commerciales d’une utilisation d’une œuvre originale n’étaient pas le premier critère d’évaluation de l’équité. Cela déroge considérablement de la norme qui prévaut sous d’autres juridictions. Que l’on compare par exemple aux causes américaines Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) et Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens LP, (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010)  au § 13, où l’on dit que les conséquences commerciales sont « l’élément le plus important pour déterminer l’utilisation équitable». Aux États-Unis, où la seule préoccupation est de savoir si une utilisation est équitable, les spécialistes ont démontré que les tribunaux ont statué de façon contradictoire à cet égard ce qui rend la prédiction d’un verdict à peu près impossible. La conséquence évidente d’une telle incertitude est que la loi ne parvient pas à servir de guide ni aux titulaires de droits, ni aux utilisateurs, et ce, à un coût social exorbitant.

Le jugement dans la cause CCH soulève une troisième ambiguïté importante en ce qui a trait aux circonstances en vertu desquelles une institution sera responsable des copies faites par des gens agissant sous son autorité ou profitant de ses installations et services. Cela parce que la Cour suprême a créé une défense généralisée de la violation des droits d’auteur en disant : «La personne ou l’établissement qui invoque l’exception prévue à l’art. 29 doit seulement prouver qu’il a utilisé l’œuvre protégée aux fins de recherche ou d’étude privée et que cette utilisation était équitable.  Il peut le faire en établissant soit que ses propres pratiques et politiques étaient axées sur la recherche et équitables, soit que toutes les utilisations individuelles des ouvrages étaient de fait axées sur la recherche et équitables.» (§63) Pour CCH, cela voulait dire que la Grande Bibliothèque ne pouvait être responsable des utilisations non équitables par ses usagers, mais qu’elle pouvait s’appuyer sur une défense absolue voulant qu’elle ait elle-même des pratiques et des politiques équitables.

Si le projet de loi venait à passer, il appert que les institutions d’enseignement pourraient s’appuyer sur le même concept dans le cas de la copie pour fins d’éducation. Devant une telle occasion, il serait sage que les institutions se dotent immédiatement de politiques et de pratiques «équitables» comme bouclier contre des poursuites pour violation des droits d’auteur ou pour le paiement de compensations financières. Les institutions pourront alors lever ces boucliers et ce, que les utilisateurs eux-mêmes agissent équitablement ou non. Un détenteur de droit le moindrement rationnel hésitera longtemps avant de dépenser des sommes considérables, si tant est qu’il en ait, pour tenter de convaincre un tribunal qu’une certaine politique «équitable» ne masque en fait qu’une pratique inéquitable.

La possibilité que ces ambiguïtés mènent à une série de batailles juridiques onéreuses n’est pas simplement théorique. Comme je le mentionnais, la Cour suprême procédera cette année à la demande de la SOCAN au réexamen d’une décision d’utilisation équitable que la Commission du droit d’auteur au Canada et la Cour d’appel fédérale avaient jugée applicable dans le cas de services commerciaux offrant à d’éventuels acheteurs des extraits numériques de trente secondes à titre d’illustration. La SOCAN arguera que la portée sémantique de la notion de «recherche» a été étendue largement au-delà des limites courantes, alors que les distributeurs argueront que la «recherche» est une notion neutre et flexible qui peut être appliquée à ce genre d’activité. La seule certitude que l’on ait c’est qu’en bout de piste le procès aura coûté des millions de dollars. Les deux parties vont se réclamer abondamment de la décision CCH rendue en 2004 par la Cour suprême, laquelle portait également sur l’utilisation équitable aux fins de recherche, mais qui a laissé en place une foule d’incertitudes quant aux limites de la «recherche» et à la nature de l’«équité».

Le simple fait que la Cour suprême devra à nouveau se pencher sur la même petite clause de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur prouve que cette combinaison d’ambiguïtés est dangereuse et coûteuse. Aux États-Unis, les complexités reliées à l’usage équitable ont mené à quatre visites à la Cour suprême, un résultat que ridiculisait l’expert en droit d’auteur David Nimmer qui écrivait qu’il s’agissait «d’un système dont le résultat final aurait été le même… si le Congrès avait mis en place une cible de jeu de fléchettes plutôt que ces quatre facteurs d’usage équitable inscrits dans la Loi sur le droit d’auteur» [ Traduction ] (David Nimmer, “‘Fairest of them All’ and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use” (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 263 à p. 280. D’autres impacts sont discutés abondamment dans Sookman & Glover, “Why Canada Should Not Adopt “Fair Use” (2009) Osgoode Hall Rev.L.Pol’y 139, qui conclue qu’un système trop ouvert risque de nuire autant aux titulaires de droits qu’aux usagers.

5)                   La portée sémantique d’«éducation» se voit-elle ailleurs?

Les titulaires de droits inquiets de la réforme ont souligné que le terme «éducation» pouvait signifier différentes choses pour différentes personnes, une équivoque que l’on ne souhaite pas pour un terme ayant un tel poids juridique. En conséquence, le parlement devrait s’interroger sur l’opportunité d’introduire dans la loi canadienne un terme pouvant s’appliquer dans son acception étroite à l’enseignement en classe ou, dans une acception large, à toute activité reliée à de l’apprentissage formel ou informel.

Tout en reconnaissant que la Cour suprême a interprétée terme «éducation» de manière très large dans la cause de la Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R., le professeur Geist prétend que le changement proposé par le projet de loi C-32 donnerait lieu à une évolution et non à une révolution. Par ailleurs, il est incapable de mentionner un seul système législatif sur toute la planète qui serait allé aussi loin que d’adopter un droit d’utilisation équitable pour des fins d’«éducation» plutôt que pour des activités pédagogiques mieux définies.

Ceux que le professeur Geist cite comme s’en rapprochant le plus étant Israël, qui approuve comme fin admissible les activités spécifiques «d’enseignement (instruction) et d’examen par une institution d’enseignement», et les États-Unis, qui considèrent comme fins admissibles : «l’enseignement (teaching) (incluant les multiples copies pour l’utilisation en classe», le «scholarship» et la «recherche».

Une étude attentive de la Loi israélienne du droit d’auteur  montre que sa notion d’exception pédagogique est beaucoup plus limitée que ne le propose la réforme canadienne. La section 19 de la Loi ne s’applique pas à toute activité pédagogique, mais plutôt à celles que le législateur considère comme équitables, soit l’«enseignement» (instruction) et l’«examen». Ces copies ne peuvent être faites par n’importe qui, mais seulement par les institutions d’enseignement relevant du ministère de l’Éducation telles que définies à la section 67 de la Loi israélienne sur le droit d’auteur.

Les termes utilisés dans le U.S. Copyright Act ont également une portée étroite. Cela, non seulement parce qu’«enseignement» (teaching), «scholarship» et «recherche» sont des aspects spécifiques de l’«éducation», mais aussi par ce que, de façon générale, les tribunaux américains ont résisté à la tentation d’en élargir la portée. Dans des causes comme American Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 734 F. 2d 3 (3d. Cir. 1984) et Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F. 2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981) on a interprété «enseignement», «scholarship» et «recherche» de manière raisonnable en se demandant si l’«étudiant» nommé à titre de bénéficiaire recevait un diplôme, une certification ou une qualification quelconque à l’issue du cours, ou s’il se servait de ce cours comme prérequis à une formation ou à une éducation plus poussée. À l’opposé, il n’est pas évident que quelque tribunal inférieur que ce soit au Canada pourrait en faire autant sur la foi, d’une part, de la déclaration de la Cour suprême dans la cause CCH qui dit que l’utilisation équitable est « un droit d’usager… qui ne doit pas être interprété de manière restrictive » et, d’autre part, étant donnée son interprétation très large du terme «éducation» dans la cause de la Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.

L’exemple américain engage également à la prudence dans la mesure où l’on continue à y voir d’importants litiges en matière d’équité. Alors que dans son blogue le professeur Geist déclare que «les juridictions ayant des dispositions beaucoup plus générales quant à l’utilisation et à l’usage équitables ne voient que rarement des litiges d’importance entre les éditeurs et les institutions d’enseignement»  [ Traduction ] et donne en exemple «les États-Unis, beaucoup plus procéduriers» [ Traduction ], un coup d’œil au fouillis du registre des procédures dans la cause hautement contestée intentée par les éditeurs contre l’université d’état de la Georgie prouve le contraire.  Cette saga laisse entendre que la doctrine américaine de l’usage équitable continue à soulever des questions épineuses et à un coût élevé pour les titulaires de droit et les utilisateurs. Après deux ans de litige, l’impasse règne toujours entre les parties et les analystes sont loin d’être convaincus que la cause ne fournisse jamais des critères stricts quant à une activité acceptable en milieu académique.

Peut-être inquiets du modèle américain, la majorité des législateurs du reste du monde ont procédé avec plus de prudence en restreignant plusieurs exceptions pédagogiques à des exceptions ciblées comme dans le cas de l’Union européenne. L’approche de la Nouvelle-Zélande est typique à cet égard alors que sa Loi sur le droit d’auteur nouvellement amendée indique à la section 44A que les institutions d’enseignement n’enfreindront pas le droit d’auteur si elles mettent en mémoire la copie «d’une œuvre rendue disponible sur un site web ou un autre système électronique de récupération» seulement si le matériel en question est : a) est archivé pour des fins pédagogiques ; b) présenté sous un identificateur ou dans un cadre différent ; c) identifie le nom de l’auteur lorsqu’il est connu de même que la source de l’œuvre ; d) identifie l’institution d’enseignement et la date de l’archivage ; et e) est disponible uniquement pour les usagers autorisés. [ Traduction ]  Si la mise en place de ce type de dispositions exige plus de temps et de soin, elle a le mérite de baliser clairement les règles tant pour les éditeurs que pour les usagers des œuvres et sans imposer des barrières technologiques insurmontables. De la même manière la législation sur le droit d’auteur en Australie (voir les parties VA et VB) et au Royaume-Uni (voir les sections 32-36) penchent en faveur d’une approche graduelle et ciblée des exceptions pédagogiques.

6)                   La réforme canadienne satisfera-t-elle aux exigences du test en trois étapes ?

Le Canada, en tant que signataire de la Convention de Berne et de l’accord ADPIC et engagé dans des négociations de libre-échange avec l’Union européenne qui toucheront les questions de propriété intellectuelle, doit se demander si ses politiques respectent les normes et pratiques internationales. On ne trouve qu’une analyse minimaliste de cette question sur le blogue du professeur Geist dans lequel il conclut que puisqu’il n’y a pas eu de poursuite entreprise à l’encontre des régimes américains et israéliens, plus étroits, l’éventualité d’une contestation internationale à l’encontre de la loi canadienne est «extrêmement improbable» [ Traduction].

Une réponse complète au professeur Geist exige de faire un survol des obligations canadiennes en vertu des traités internationaux. Conformément au test des trois étapes de Berne-ADPIC, les droits exclusifs d’un auteur, comme le droit de reproduire ou de communiquer une œuvre, sont la norme. À l’opposé, les droits des usagers doivent être modulés de façon à s’assurer qu’ils visent un bien particulier en nuisant le moins possible aux droits des auteurs. Le libellé du test en trois étapes est le suivant :

Convention de Berne, Article 9 (2) :

« Est réservée aux législations des pays de l’Union la faculté de permettre la reproduction desdites œuvres dans certains cas spéciaux, pourvu qu’une telle reproduction ne porte pas atteinte à l’exploitation normale de l’œuvre ni ne cause un préjudice injustifié aux intérêts légitimes de l’auteur.»

Accord  sur les ADPIC, Article 13 :

«Les Membres restreindront les limitations des droits exclusifs ou exceptions à ces droits à certains cas spéciaux qui ne portent pas atteinte à l’exploitation normale de l’œuvre ni ne causent un préjudice injustifié aux intérêts légitimes du détenteur du droit.»

Un exemple de la façon dont cet équilibre est maintenu se trouve dans la Directive européenne sur le droit d’auteur où l’on explique pourquoi le droit exclusif des auteurs ne devrait pas être ébranlé, même légèrement :

«Toute harmonisation des droits d’auteurs et des droits voisins doit se fonder sur un niveau de protection élevé car ces droits sont essentiels à la création intellectuelle. Leur protection contribue au maintien et au développement de la créativité dans l’intérêt des auteurs, des interprètes ou exécutants, des producteurs, des consommateurs, de la culture, des entreprises et du public en général. La propriété intellectuelle a donc été reconnue comme faisant partie intégrante de la propriété.»

En se demandant si le projet de loi C-32 est une «évolution» plutôt qu’une «révolution» quant à l’utilisation équitable, le Canada devrait se demander si le fait d’inclure une telle exception dans sa législation domestique ne pourrait pas être cause d’une contestation sous le régime de l’OMC.

Même si le professeur Geist n’en fait pas mention, il existe des causes de droit international qui prouvent que des lois domestiques peuvent empêtrer les pays dans de longs et coûteux litiges commerciaux. En 1999, la Communauté européenne a intenté une contestation à propos d’une exception imposée par les États-Unis dans leur Fairness in Music Licensing Act de 1998. Cette loi créait une exception au droit d’auteur permettant à une variété de bars et de restaurants d’offrir des spectacles sans que les auteurs d’œuvres musicales protégées aient donné leur aval. La Communauté européenne a plaidé que l’exception visait trop large pour répondre au test en trois étapes.

En 2000, un panel de l’OMC statuait (résumé) que l’introduction de cette exception dans la loi américaine violait les articles 11bis (iii) et 11(1) (ii) de la Convention de Berne, contrevenant par le fait même à l’article 9.1 de l’Accord des ADPIC, ce qui a mené à une entente entre les États-Unis et l’UE pour le versement de millions de dollars à un fonds destiné aux titulaires de droits. Conséquence supplémentaire de cette dispute, les États-Unis sont également tenus de soumettre à l’OMC des rapports d’étape quant aux efforts faits pour remédier à cette violation de la loi sur le commerce international.

Le panel a également statué que l’«exemption pour raisons d’affaires» adoptée par les États-Unis recouvrait une catégorie importante d’institutions essentielles pour les titulaires de droits ce qui ne satisfaisait aucune des exigences du test en trois étapes défini par la Convention de Berne et l’Accord des ADPIC. Cela est d’un intérêt particulier pour le Canada puisque, de la même manière que dans la réforme canadienne, l’«exemption pour raisons d’affaires» retranche une part trop importante du marché pour les titulaires de droits et n’établit aucune licence obligatoire pour le secteur ciblé.

Pour des raisons identiques de portée, le Canada doit dès lors se demander si son emploi du terme «éducation» à des fins d’utilisation équitable respecte le test en trois étapes. Même en disposant en arrière-plan un test d’«équité», de nombreuses raisons suggèrent que la réforme canadienne pourrait subir le même sort que l’«exemption pour raisons d’affaires» américaine.

Premièrement, de manière littérale, il est faux de prétendre que l’«utilisation équitable» n’est pas une «utilisation gratuite». Toute exception d’utilisation équitable permet de nombreuses utilisations gratuites en ce qu’elle accorde une défense absolue au droit exclusif des titulaires, permettant ainsi aux utilisateurs de faire sans frais une ou des copies d’une œuvre. Le résultat de toute utilisation équitable est – à tout le moins potentiellement – une perte de redevances. En retranchant ces utilisations de l’exercice par le titulaire de ses droits exclusifs, tout gouvernement créant un tel type de droit pour les utilisateurs, se place d’emblée dans la «zone rouge» du test en trois étapes Berne/ADPIC puisqu’il  transfère la richesse du créateur vers l’utilisateur. Si l’on interprète de manière large la portée du terme «éducation» pour y inclure toute utilisation à des fins d’apprentissage, le transfert de richesse pourrait être très important.

Deuxièmement,  l’interprétation des facteurs d’«équité» faite par la Cour suprême dans le cas CCH est un amalgame unique du droit américain et britannique qui ne semble pas avoir intégré les obligations canadiennes en vertu des traités internationaux. Aux États-Unis, par exemple, dans la cause Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 au 566 (1985) , la Cour suprême a statué que «la conséquence de l’utilisation sur le marché potentiel ou sur la valeur de l’œuvre protégée… est sans conteste l’élément le plus important de l’«utilisation équitable». [ Traduction ] Cet argument, appliqué correctement par les tribunaux, satisferait en large part les deuxième et troisième étapes du test en trois étapes. À l’opposé, dans la cause CCH, LA Cour suprême du Canada a statué que la conséquence sur le marché «n’est ni le seul ni le plus important facteur qu’un tribunal doit prendre en compte pour décider si une utilisation est équitable». Il s’ensuit que les cinq autres facteurs décrits par le professeur Geist, lesquels ne s’accordent pas facilement au test en trois étapes, auraient un rôle égal ou plus important dans la détermination d’une utilisation équitable. Il apparaîtrait donc que certaines utilisations pourraient être admissibles aux termes de la loi canadienne, même si elles devaient avoir des effets perturbateurs sur l’exploitation normale de l’œuvre ou sur les intérêts légitimes de l’auteur. Un tel résultat risquerait de créer une dichotomie entre les standards nationaux du Canada et ses obligations internationales.

Troisièmement, dans la cause CCH, un des six facteurs relevés, à la seconde étape du test, concerne le but de l’utilisation. Une utilisation identifiée comme «équitable» à la première étape jouira d’une présomption avantageuse à la seconde étape. Une exception d’utilisation équitable de large portée compte sans doute double, ce qui menace de la voir s’appliquer au-delà des «certains cas spéciaux» requis par Berne et ADPIC.

Quatrièmement, n’oublions pas que la première étape du test canadien d’utilisation équitable joue un rôle crucial dans la préservation des intérêts du détenteur de droits. Quand l’utilisateur d’une œuvre protégée ne peut faire entrer de manière plausible les fins de son utilisation dans l’une des catégories acceptées que sont la recherche, la critique, le compte-rendu ou la communication de nouvelles, ou qu’il ne peut d’autre manière profiter d’une exemption ciblée en vertu de la loi canadienne, il doit obtenir l’autorisation de reproduire une partie importante d’une œuvre. Cela procure une certaine assurance tant aux utilisateurs qu’aux titulaires de droits et réduit les défenses désespérées «tous azimuts» lors de recours pour violation du droit d’auteur. Comme le montrent les causes récentes à l’égard de la signification acceptable des fins de «recherche», un terme équivoque peut provoquer la zizanie puisqu’un plaignant l’interprétera toujours étroitement et un défendeur, largement. Cela donne lieu à des procès coûteux et (possiblement) à des décisions judiciaires contradictoires qui n’éclairent personne.

Finalement, nombre d’observateurs neutres et respectés ont conclu qu’une acception large de l’exception à des fins d’éducation ne passerait pas le test en trois étapes, particulièrement s’il s’agissait d’une exception pure et simple plutôt que d’une licence rémunérée. Dans World Copyright Law, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) au § 529, J.A.L. Sterling, expert réputé et respecté, émet l’opinion que :

La référence à «certains cas spéciaux» a pour intention d’indiquer les limites et les exceptions générales du droit de reproduction (serait par exemple inadmissible, une limite qui permettrait que la ‘’reproduction de toute œuvre soit faite pour n’importe quelle fin reliée à l’éducation). [ Traduction ]

L’expert australien reconnu, le professeur Sam Ricketson, en est venu essentiellement aux mêmes conclusions. Dans une étude menée pour l’OMPI, il concluait que toute exception mettant en cause les bibliothèques, les archives ou les institutions d’enseignement devait être clairement précisée, à l’intérieur de limites définies. Il conclut également (voir p. 76) que dans ces conditions, une licence statutaire et rémunérée pourrait passer le test des trois étapes. De la même manière, dans un article cosigné avec l’experte américaine bien connue Jane Ginsberg et intitulé International Copyright & Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), le professeur Ricketson conclut, au paragraphe 13, pages 782-783, qu’une exception aux fins d’enseignement ne passerait pas le test des trois étapes et qu’une exception large de «copie aux fins d’enseignement» fondée sur les étudiants pourrait se justifier en vertu de Berne/ADPIC seulement si elle était soumise à des limites et à une compensation pour les auteurs.

Au vu de ces conclusions, la défense pleine et large envisagée par le projet de loi C-32 apparaîtrait en violation des engagements canadiens en vertu des traités internationaux.

7)                   Les réformes sont-elles vraiment un moyen terme ?

Dans son blogue, le professeur Geist laisse entendre que les nouvelles dispositions en matière d’utilisation équitable dans le projet de loi C-32 sont un «moyen terme» en ce qu’elles ajoutent deux catégories réclamées par les créateurs et une catégorie réclamée par les groupes d’utilisateurs.

En tout respect, cela semble être un argument spécieux. Tous les droits d’utilisation équitable sont des exceptions au droit de propriété exclusive. Ils sont au bénéfice des personnes qui utilisent une œuvre existante. Dans le cas de la parodie ou de la satire, un doit d’utilisation équitable permettra à un créateur d’utiliser l’œuvre d’un autre créateur à son propre compte sans payer de droits au détenteur d’iceux. Il s’agit d’une catégorie spéciale des droits d’utilisation visant un type bien précis de créateurs.

Mais l’erreur fatale consiste à traiter ces trois types de droits comme des entités indistinctes et ayant des conséquences indifférentes. La parodie et la satire sont de l’ordre des droits transformationnels au sens où ils n’autorisent pas l’utilisation gratuite d’une œuvre, mais plutôt l’utilisation d’une œuvre préexistante pour créer une nouvelle œuvre. À ce titre, la nouvelle œuvre ne drainera pas le marché pour l’œuvre originale. Elle pourrait même dans certains cas faire revivre l’œuvre originale ou provoquer un regain d’intérêt ce qui amènerait des redevances qui n’auraient pu être autrement perçues. Ces utilisations sont à l’évidence bonnes pour les deux parties.

A contrario, le droit d’utilisation à des fins d’éducation est un droit de consommation qui ne se traduit pas par la création d’une nouvelle œuvre, mais qui se solde par un usage gratuit et un transfert de richesse du titulaire vers l’utilisateur. Les conséquences ne se font sentir qu’à sens unique. Elles peuvent aussi être importantes si on se fie aux chiffres avancés devant le comité, lesquels se situent entre 40 et 60 millions de dollars.

Ainsi, lorsque l’on mesure les véritables conséquences de ces exceptions, il semblerait que le projet de loi tel que rédigé aurait comme résultat de faire subir des pertes importantes aux créateurs. Vu de manière critique, la prévision faite par le professeur Geist d’un futur inchangé contredit les propos qu’il tient dans son récent blogue quand il écrit : « Il y a un sentiment grandissant sur les campus canadiens voulant qu’il soit temps pour le secteur de l’éducation postsecondaire de décliner les licences de reproduction offertes par Access Copyright » [ Traduction ] et les tarifs proposés par la société de gestion pour le secteur postsecondaire.

Comment y parvenir ? Le professeur Geist suggère que les institutions, les professeurs et les étudiants peuvent  «s’appuyer sur les licences de bases de données existantes, les licences libre accès pour la recherche et l’utilisation équitable» (c’est nous qui soulignons). [ Traduction ] Avant même que l’exception pour «utilisation équitable pour fins d’éducation» soit acceptée, le professeur Geist a identifié (ici, ici, et ici) plusieurs institutions qui ont mis de l’avant cette pratique. À l’évidence, si la notion d’utilisation équitable devait s’appliquer au-delà des limites actuelles et s’étendre à toutes les activités pédagogiques de nature «équitable», cela augmenterait de façon notable la possibilité pour les institutions d’adopter une attitude ferme à l’égard de leurs obligations. Cela pourrait aller jusqu’à les voir se retirer du paiement de tarifs ou encore défier les titulaires de droits de les poursuivre pour non-paiement. Obligés de s’en remettre à l’arbitraire de la deuxième étape du test sur la nature « équitable » des utilisations, les éditeurs auront une grosse côte à remonter.

8)                   Les réformes favorisent-elles ou nuisent-elles aux nouvelles technologies ?

Dans son blogue, le professeur Geist argue que l’ajout de l’éducation en tant que fin acceptable «ouvrira la porte à l’utilisation de nouvelles technologies en classe sans craindre d’éventuels problèmes de responsabilité». [ Traduction ] Pour illustrer le fait que l’utilisation équitable peut être une valeur ajoutée en éducation, il prend l’exemple d’un collègue qui, lors de son exposé en classe, se sert d’une photo tirée de documents déposés au tribunal.

Si cet exemple semble tout à fait raisonnable, le professeur Geist omet de tenir en compte comment le droit d’utilisation équitable affecterait les investissements en millions consentis par les éditeurs pour soutenir les technologies qui ont pour but de transformer l’expérience en classe en une expérience multimédia interactive. À titre d’exemple, les éditeurs ont investi des sommes considérables dans CourseSmart, une réserve électronique à l’échelle de l’Amérique du nord pour des milliers de manuels d’utilisation courante provenant de multiples maisons d’édition pour l’éducation supérieure. Les enseignants peuvent utiliser cette ressource pour chercher et examiner l’information dont ils ont besoin pour choisir leurs manuels et leur matériel didactique, et les étudiants peuvent se procurer en ligne lesdits manuels à une fraction du coût des versions imprimées. D’autres avenues prometteuses sont à être développées grâce à des partenariats entre des éditeurs et, comme tiers partis, des opérateurs de gestion de cours comme SymText, eConcordia et WebCT/Blackboard. Ce sont des environnements éducatifs virtuels, vendus aux institutions d’enseignement et utilisés pour l’apprentissage en ligne. Le contenu de ces environnements est fourni sous licence par les éditeurs.

Les éditeurs consentent également des investissements considérables pour créer du contenu numérique soit comme supplément en ligne de manuels imprimés, soit comme contenu autonome destiné au secteur de l’éducation. Ce travail exige une refonte importante des opérations traditionnelles et suppose la mise en place de services numériques spécialisés dotés de leur propre personnel.

Le Parlement devrait s’interroger sérieusement à savoir si le droit d’utilisation équitable minerait ces services et ces technologies en plein développement en autorisant une offre gratuite, ce qui enverrait le message aux éditeurs et aux développeurs de ces nouvelles initiatives de ne pas investir dans ces nouveaux systèmes. Le résultat serait contraire au but avoué du gouvernement qui est «d’enrichir l’expérience pédagogique et favoriser l’utilisation des technologies les plus récentes».

9)                   Est-ce que la Gowers Review britannique a appuyé ce type de réformes ?

Dans son argumentation à l’égard du «moyen terme», le professeur Geist évoque que l’utilisation équitable du droit d’auteur favorise l’économie sans nuire aux intérêts des titulaires de droits. Il réfère en cela à la très respectée Gowers Review of Intellectual Property en citant un passage de la section sur l’utilisation équitable: « l’utilisation équitable d’œuvres protégées peut créer une valeur économique sans nuire aux intérêts des titulaires de droits» [ Traduction ].

Un examen plus attentif de la Gowers Review montre que ce commentaire ne portait pas sur une utilisation équitable ressemblant de près ou de loin à l’exemption pédagogique proposée par le projet de loi C-32, mais bien sur les droits transformationnels des œuvres relevant de la parodie et de la satire permettant de créer des œuvres qui «ne sont pas nécessairement des substituts d’œuvres existantes». Ce passage ne portait pas sur une utilisation équitable ressemblant de près ou de loin à l’exemption pédagogique proposée par le projet de loi C-32 et ne peut s’interpréter comme une approbation d’un droit général d’utilisation des œuvres. De fait, le rapport Gowers recommandait spécifiquement que les questions pédagogiques soient traitées par le biais d’amendements aux exceptions ciblées pour les établissements d’enseignement contenues dans le Copyright, Designs and Patents Act de 1988.  Même si le gouvernement britannique a toujours gardé un œil sur le système américain d’usage équitable,  aucun rapport gouvernemental n’en a recommandé l’adoption.

10)               Comment satisfaire au mieux les intérêts des titulaires de droits et ceux des usagers ?

Certes, les batailles sur les ambiguïtés de l’utilisation équitable donnent lieu sur le plan juridique à des causes fascinantes. On doit cependant se demander si elles servent vraiment le système de droit d’auteur. Si le souhait du gouvernement est de favoriser l’implantation des nouvelles technologies dans le cadre pédagogique, la création d’exceptions ciblées, avec des buts spécifiques, serait un moyen plus prudent d’accommoder les droits actuels en matière d’utilisation équitable. C’est ainsi que le Canada a procédé antérieurement dans le cas des institutions d’enseignements, des  bibliothèques, des archives et des musées. L’Union européenne, avec laquelle le Canada tient d’importantes négociations commerciales, procède de la même façon, tout comme le font des lois d’importants pays du Commonwealth comme l’Australie (voir les parties VA et VB), la Nouvelle-Zélande (voir les sections 44-49) et le Royaume-Uni (voir les sections 32-36).

En encadrant de telles exceptions, le gouvernement devrait reconnaître que les lois servent d’abord au public, ensuite aux avocats. Peu importe ce qu’il entend précisément par l’énoncé actuel «aux fins d’éducation», il doit être conscient que toute décision judiciaire fera son chemin dans des directives, des paraphrases et des légendes urbaines qui seront ou non dans le voisinage d’une interprétation correcte, Chaque interprétation ayant comme résultat la copie d’œuvres par des institutions ou des individus. Plus vagues sont les termes clés, plus grande est la possibilité que des copies soient faites que le Parlement ne souhaitait pas inclure dans la loi. C’est précisément pourquoi la Nouvelle-Zélande a rédigé son récent amendement de manière à être précis quant aux activités pédagogiques permises – et quant aux conditions requises pour profiter des bénéfices de cette exception – mais neutre à l’égard des mécanismes utilisés pour exercer ces activités. Une telle approche a beaucoup plus de chances de satisfaire aux exigences du test en trois étapes que l’approche à grands traits proposée par le projet de loi C-32.

Pour atteindre les objectifs qu’il s’est fixés à travers ce mécanisme législatif plus raffiné, le Canada devrait s’engager à réviser ces exceptions ciblées lorsqu’elles tombent en désuétude. Une façon de garantir la mise à jour de ce type d’exceptions pourrait être de réglementer de manière précise les mécanismes d’application de ces exceptions ciblées, comme le Canada l’a déjà fait dans le cas de la tenue de registres pour les exceptions existantes pour l’éducation, les bibliothèques, les archives et les musées, de même que dans le cas de la gestion du régime de retransmission. Cela apaiserait les inquiétudes de plusieurs titulaires de droits et d’utilisateurs à l’égard de la lenteur de la réforme du droit d’auteur au Canada, incluant celle à l’égard des exceptions pédagogiques contenues dans la Loi sur le droit d’auteur.

·               The creation of copyright works for educational uses is a complex and substantial endeavour, particular in a country as large, diverse and sparsely populated as Canada. Careful thought should be given before adopting fair dealing rules that threaten the health of educational publishing.

·               “Fairness” is an eye-of-the-beholder concept that must be revisited on the facts of every new case. Only six years after the landmark CCH case on “fair dealing”, this issue is returning to the Supreme Court for a second review!

·               By exposing all copying with any connection to “education” to a vague fairness assessment, Canada risks violating its international treaty commitments. Such a broad and ambiguous phrasing would be unparalleled among the world’s major trading partners.

·               The government’s stated desire to promote new technologies in the educational setting would be far better achieved by implementing targeted exceptions that will not be vulnerable to abuse.

French translation is published here, Jan. 26, 2011.

1)            Introduction*

In mid-December, Professor Michael Geist published a blog entry entitled “Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion: Fair Dealing and Bill C-32”, a comment on the government’s proposed addition of another user right in the form of “fair dealing for the purpose of … education”. He concludes that this reform would not affect the balance between creators of educational materials and the users of such materials.

Of all of the critically important amendments proposed in Bill C-32, this reform may have the largest measurable impact. Professor Geist himself has noted that educational institutions and students currently spend more than a billion dollars a year on books and hundreds of millions of dollars on access to educational databases. A representative of the rightsholder collective Access Copyright testified before a Parliamentary committee that Canada’s education sector alone reproduces more than half a billion pages of text for use in classrooms. Currently, authors are compensated for much of this copying because only a percentage of these copies is made for allowable “research” or “private study” purposes. Under the new regime, any educational purpose would be an allowable purpose, leaving it up to courts to decide whether or not the dealing is fair. While estimating the potential future losses to publishers resulting from the change will never be an exact science, projections raised in committee have ranged between $40-million per year (Bloc MPs Carole Lavallée and Serge Cardin) and $60-million per year (Access Copyright). Due to concerns about the breadth of this reform, both the Liberal Party and the Bloc Québecois have suggested that they will seek to amend this provision.

It must also be remembered that the educational marketplace in Canada is an intricate ecosystem with characteristics that are not present in larger marketplaces such as the United States. While certain popular texts will receive wide circulation in Canada, many other texts will be aimed at far smaller marketplaces. Any legislative rule must be calibrated to avoid disincentives for authors and publishers to publish new educational works for these smaller marketplaces, such as those aimed at cultural and linguistic minorities. With so much at stake, the importance of correctly evaluating the policy implications of this particular provision cannot be overstated.

Unfortunately, I do not have the same confidence as Professor Geist that the effects of the proposed amendment will promote new technologies while minimally impairing the interests of authors and publishers. In particular, I am convinced that Professor Geist significantly understates the potential impact of the proposed new educational fair dealing exception, in part because he places too much faith in the second “fairness” stage of the fair dealing test to govern behaviour in the marketplace. Further, Professor Geist’s survey of other laws omits a principled analysis of whether the proposed exception risks putting Canada offside its international treaty commitments, in particular the three-step test enshrined by TRIPS and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.

In responding to Professor Geist, I offer the disclaimer that although this blog entry is my personal opinion and was prepared in my private time, part of my understanding has been developed through retainers as counsel for a number of rightsholder organizations in this field. (As counsel, I have also advised numerous institutional users of copyright on their fair dealing rights, and appreciate that users have real concerns with respect to managing use of copyright works in a complex technological landscape.)

As a final introductory point, I should note that it is not always easy to respond to Professor Geist, primarily due to his a tendency to make bold pronouncements without explanation or support. A representative example is Professor Geist’s statement that “Educational institutions and students spend over a billion dollars each year on books and hundreds of millions of dollars on licencing [sic] for access to databases.  That will not change with the inclusion of education within fair dealing.” Professor Geist does not provide a source or a rationale for this critically important prediction. Furthermore, he tells a different story elsewhere in testimony before a Parliamentary Committee, where he admitted that the fair dealing for education reform would result in lost revenues for authors and publishers:

Mr. Pablo Rodriguez (Honoré-Mercier, Lib.):

Regarding the education example, don’t you think that the exemption, as it is now, would cost revenues to some of the creators, writers, or producers?

Prof. Michael Geist:

Right. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I think that any copying that takes place, including under the new exception for education, must still be fair. It would be disingenuous to argue that there is going to be no copying that’s currently compensated for that might now fall within fair dealing, but by definition any copying that does indeed qualify through the court’s analysis is fair. [Emphasis added.]

Given such disparities in message, and given Professor Geist’s ad hominem complaint that rightsholders have made “misleading claims about potential losses, inaccurate comments on copyright and Internet materials, and dubious arguments about the compliance of the reforms under international copyright law”, it has been necessary to respond at length to the main contentions in Professor Geist’s blog entries, articles and testimony.

2)            Why Is Educational Publishing Important?

Canada is not the first country to step to the brink of considering creating broad exceptions to copyright to reduce public expenditures for education. While Professor Geist tells the story of the United States and Israel to promote his desired result, the experience of the United Kingdom explains why passing such an exception may lead to unanticipated and undesirable results.

In the United Kingdom, the case for not treating educational publishing differently than other sectors of the publishing industry was made by the Whitford Report as long ago as 1977. Decades before the age of the Internet, the makers of the Report recognized that there was an ongoing friction between the educator’s desire to promote “new methods of teaching” and the rights of publishers and authors. The Whitford Committee’s conclusion, which is worth quoting at length, was that governments should resist the temptation to save on education funding by draining the resources of publishers and authors, on the grounds that it was a self-defeating exercise:

The needs of education in modern society are changing. In the new teaching situation […] it is no longer considered appropriate for text books to be issued to each pupil. We were told that new methods of teaching and learning require the use of a wide range of teaching material to meet the particular needs of a student or group of students. This concept of ‘resource-based learning’, whether applied to independent or class activity, was said to require the availability of a diversity of material, extracted from a great variety of sources.

[…]

In view of the growth of reprography as a problem in the educational field since the time of the Gregory Committee, we have considered first the question whether there should be any express exceptions in favour of educational establishments at all. We feel that the fact that “education” is a good cause is not in itself a reason for depriving copyright owners of remuneration. Nobody suggests that the makers of notebooks, compasses and rulers should supply these products to educational establishments free of charge. Although the types of material used in such places today are very different from the text books of the past and indeed are much more diverse, education is still in a large measure dependent upon the work of authors, artists and composers. Education is equally dependent upon the work of the publishers who first produced the material which the authorities want to copy for educational purposes.

(Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1977) at paras. 254-56, 268-69)

In evaluating the same issues recently in a copyright dispute between educators and authors, the UK Copyright Tribunal affirmed the Whitford Report, and warned that crossing this line could destroy a longstanding symbiotic relationship between publishers and the education system:

In declining to create a wide generalised defence for educational establishments the legislature has struck a balance between the interests of copyright owners on the one hand, and the interests of education and scholarship on the other. A healthy publishing industry is important in general, but of particular importance to those in education. Wholesale exemption from the copyright laws for educational establishments would be damaging to the publishing industry, and in consequence damaging to education. On the other hand the publishing industry depends on academic authors for much of its raw material. If education is burdened too heavily with copyright restrictions, teaching and scholarship is discouraged, to the disadvantage of the public interest in general, and the publishing industry in particular. It is a good example of a symbiotic relationship.

(Universities UK Ltd v Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd [2002] E.M.L.R. 35)

As I discuss in the final section of this comment, this symbiotic relationship for Canada might be better achieved by implementing a targeted series of exceptions to promote concrete goals, a path that would minimally impair the educational publishing sector while promoting the interests of educators in developing new means of reaching out to students.

3)            Is There a Stable Set of Rules to Govern Fair Dealing in Canadian Law?

By far the most important assumption underlying Professor Geist’s blog entry is that the new reform will have little or no effect on authors’ rights because the right is limited only to those dealings that are “fair”. In his view, authors will be protected because judges are “required to assess the fairness of any use – including education – before it was treated as fair dealing”. Since the reform respecting “education” affects only the threshold “allowable purposes” portion of the fair dealing test, nothing will change. (See also Professor Geist’s September blog on this point.)

The stability of rules established by the courts has also been a prominent talking point of the government. In testimony before the Parliamentary committee charged with examining Bill C-32, Industry Minister Tony Clement  stated:

I want to give some comfort to this committee on education, because that’s another issue that’s going to come up, the fact that we’ve added education to the fair dealing concept. Again, I’m conscious that I’m at a copyright hearing, so I will attribute my remarks to Professor Geist, who educated me that fair dealing is not free dealing, and there’s a big difference between the two.

Fair dealing means that the work must be for a non-commercial purpose, that the original material was lawfully acquired, and that the use of that original material must not harm the market for that material. That’s a very different concept from just saying, because we’ve added education to fair dealing, all the rules are gone. That’s not true: the rules are still in place and they seek to create that balance. Again, I want to give you that assurance.

This endorsement requires a few clarifications. Critically, the three “rules” stated in the second paragraph of the statement above do not reflect the state of the law in Canada. Rather, in the landmark decision CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, a unanimous Supreme Court found (i) a commercial, for-profit purpose can qualify as a fair dealing (para. 51), and that (ii) the effect of the dealing on the market of the copyright owner is neither the only factor nor the most important factor that a court must consider in deciding if the dealing is fair (para. 59). In that decision, the Supreme Court made no finding that the original material must be lawfully acquired, nor have any other Canadian courts. Last, the Supreme Court found that there is no set test for fair dealing: whether a dealing is fair is a question of fact and will depend on the facts of each case (paras. 52-53).

These points aside, Professor Geist’s justifications for the reform also rely on the proposition that fairness “rules” established by the courts will avoid disruption to this marketplace. With the greatest of respect, this is a faith proposition that appears unsound in light of experiences in both Canada and the United States.

The first problem with relying on fairness alone is the notorious instability of the CCH fairness test. This instability was highlighted by the December 23 decision of the Supreme Court to hear SOCAN’s appeal of a fair dealing decision that found that “fair dealing for the purpose of research” could include previews of songs sold for commercial profit. SOCAN’s leave application argued that the Federal Court of Appeal has divided considerably on how to treat the test for fairness in Canadian law, and a number of commentators have predicted that the SOCAN appeal will be accompanied by an appeal from another Federal Court of Appeal decision affirming that classroom use of educational materials was not fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study.

Accordingly, the “assurance” and “comfort” that are offered by Minister Clement and echoed by Professor Geist are not evident in the case law. Since the fairness test is an open-ended, case-by-case discretionary analysis, it does not provide the hard rules they describe. Rather, the fairness test is notoriously soft and subjective, an eye-of-the-beholder test that will be left in almost every case to the judgment of the copier. This uncertainty was why the well-known U.S. reformist Lawrence Lessig described fair use as an “astonishingly bad” system amounting to little more than “the right to hire a lawyer”. (Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, at 187.)

The Canadian counterbalance to the soft fairness test has always been to maintain a hard “allowable purposes” test at the threshold of the fair dealing right. If a person cannot plausibly say his or her copy is made for the purpose of research, private study, criticism, review, or news reporting, the inquiry is over. The copy is simply not a fair dealing. This is a sharp contrast to the United States, where users who seek to make a copy for free may offer any soft “fairness” justification and (effectively) dare rightsholders to sue them.

The need for the stability of the threshold test is precisely why the government should consider carefully before using an unprecedentedly expansive term at the hard “allowable purposes” threshold. As Professor Geist states at point 10 of his blog entry, the Supreme Court has construed “education” in broad terms to include “more informal training initiatives, aimed at teaching necessary life skills or providing information toward a practical end”. If this language were applied to the fair dealing test, the critical threshold test would be eradicated in respect of any person “providing information toward a practical end”. All that would be left is the soft fairness test and the user standing alone at the copy machine.

4)            Is the Proposed Reform Too Ambiguous?

At point 2 of his blog entry, Professor Geist takes on the contention of the writer Douglas Arthur Brown in his committee testimony that “no one at this point really knows what fair dealing for the purpose of education really means – except more copying without compensation to creators, and more costly lawsuits.” Rather than confront the merits of Mr. Brown’s argument, Professor Geist dismisses it altogether by quoting from an Access Copyright leave memorandum to the Supreme Court. This bait-and-switch tactic allows Professor Geist to gloss over a dangerous challenge to his central claim that the fairness test alone provides certainty to creators.

Professor Geist implies repeatedly that stability will emerge because courts and tribunals can distinguish between fair dealings and unfair dealings. Fair dealings will remain free, and unfair dealings will be addressed appropriately, with a royalty in the form of damages or tariff monies. Thanks to this stability, institutions and other significant users will develop policies that will accurately instruct individuals what is fair and what is not, and these policies will be routinely followed.

From a practicing lawyer’s perspective, this aspiration appears hopelessly naïve, specifically because it is impossible to constructively model behaviour on a rule whose very nature is ambiguous.

There are three primary ambiguities within the proposed user right. The first is what is meant by “education”. The second is what is meant by “fair”. The third ambiguity involves all institutions who have a role in copying works for others: even if it is proved that certain dealings of those other persons were unfair, the institution may nonetheless claim immunity on the basis that its policies and practices were “education-based and fair”. All practicing lawyers know that ambiguities will (i) be interpreted in self-interested ways by adverse parties; and (ii) cost unimaginable amounts of time and money to clarify.

If the law is enacted in its current form, the first ambiguity will result in a vast series of users claiming that their copies were made for “educational” purposes, whether they are within the (likely intended) category of provincially funded teachers copying a substantial part of a work for classroom analysis or the (likely unintended) category of yoga instructors. Inevitably these users will refer to the Supreme Court’s decisions in CCH and in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R. to support even the most far-fetched of claims.

The second ambiguity allows any user of a copyright work with an educational connection to calculate whether a given dealing is fair or not. If “fair” is free and “unfair” bears significant financial and administrative costs, it is only natural for any given user of a copyright work to conclude that his use falls on the fair side of the line, a temptation that will only increase when it is observed that it is pragmatically impossible for copyright owners to target anyone beyond the largest institutional users.

The second ambiguity also threatens inconsistent results whenever a case makes it to a court or tribunal, where lawyers will exercise their considerable ingenuity and research to argue what is fair and what is not. This is now a wide-open battle in Canada given that the Supreme Court has held that the effect of a dealing on the marketplace for the original work is not the primary consideration for fairness, a significant departure from the norm in other jurisdictions. (By contrast, see the U.S. cases Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) and Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens LP, (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010) at 13, calling the effect on the market the “single most important element of fair use”.) In the United States, where the only consideration is whether a use is fair, scholars have shown that courts have ruled with tremendous inconsistency in this area of the law, with the result that outcomes become nearly impossible to predict at the outset. The obvious consequence of such uncertainty is that the law fails to serve as a guide to either rights holders or users, at a great societal cost.

CCH also leaves behind a third real ambiguity in terms of the circumstances in which an institution will be held responsible for copies made by others acting under its authority or benefitting from its facilities and services. This is because the Supreme Court created a generalized defence to infringement when it held: “Persons or institutions relying on the s. 29 fair dealing exception need only prove that their own dealings with copyrighted works were for the purpose of research or private study and were fair.  They may do this either by showing that their own practices and policies were research-based and fair, or by showing that all individual dealings with the materials were in fact research-based and fair.” (para. 63). In CCH, this meant that the Great Library was not held responsible for any unfair dealings by its patrons, but could rely on the absolute defence that it had “fair” policies and practices.

If the amendment is passed, it would appear that educational institutions may be able to rely on the same concept in terms of educational copying. Given such an opportunity, it would only be prudent for institutions to immediately adopt “fair” policies and practices as shields against infringement lawsuits or copyright tariffs. Institutions can raise these shields whether or not the persons making the actual copies are acting fairly, with rational rightsholders thinking very hard before spending significant amounts of money (if they have the money to spend) to take a shot at convincing a court that a given “fair” policy is only a mask for an unfair practice.

The prospect for ambiguities leading to a series of expensive court battles is not just theoretical. As I have mentioned, this year the Supreme Court will consider a SOCAN judicial review on the fair dealing purpose of “research”, which the Copyright Board and the Federal Court of Appeal deemed applicable to commercial services providing 30-second digital previews of music to potential purchasers.  SOCAN will argue that the concept of “research” has been stretched far beyond its natural bounds; the music services will argue that “research” is a neutral and flexible concept that can be fairly applied to such activities; the only certainty is that this case will have cost millions of dollars to litigate by the time of its resolution. Both sides will refer extensively to the Supreme Court’s prior decision in CCH, the 2004 case that was also fought in respect of “fair dealing for the purpose of research”, but which has left behind many uncertainties with respect to the bounds of “research” and the nature of “fairness”.

The fact that the Supreme Court will now be dealing twice with the same tiny clause in the Copyright Act proves the cost and danger of this particular combination of ambiguities. In the United States, the complexities of “fair use” have led to four separate visits to the Supreme Court, an outcome derided by the leading copyright scholar David Nimmer as “a system whose upshot would be the same … had Congress instituted a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors embodied in the Copyright Act” (David Nimmer, “‘Fairest of them All’ and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use” (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 263 at 280). Other policy impacts of such ambiguities are detailed at length in Sookman & Glover, “Why Canada Should Not Adopt “Fair Use” (2009) Osgoode Hall Rev.L.Pol’y 139, which concludes that a system that is too open-ended risks damage to copyright owners and users alike.

5)            Is the Breadth of the Term “Education” Mirrored Elsewhere?

Rightsholders concerned by the proposed reforms have pointed out that the word “education” can mean many different things to many different people, a quality rarely desired in a term bearing such legal weight. As a consequence, Parliament should consider whether it is wise to introduce into Canadian legislation a term that may apply narrowly to classroom instruction or broadly to any formal or informal activity related to learning.

Although he concedes that the Supreme Court has construed the term “education” in very broad terms in the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R. case, Professor Geist contends that the change proposed in Bill C-32 would be “evolutionary”, not “revolutionary”. Yet he is unable to point to a single legislative system across the entire world that has gone as far as adopting a fair dealing right for the purpose of “education” rather than narrower educational activities.

The closest outliers Professor Geist can cite are Israel, which approves as an allowable purpose the specific activities “instruction and examination by an educational institution”, and the United States, which considers “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use)”, “scholarship”, and “research” to be acceptable purposes.

A close look at Israel’s Copyright Act demonstrates that its educational exception is far narrower than the proposed reforms in Canada. Section 19 of the Act does not broadly apply to all educational activities, but rather identifies the activities legislators consider fair (“instruction”, “examination”). Such copies cannot be made by anyone, but are available only to an “educational institution”, whose definition is controlled by the Minister of Education under s. 67 of the Israeli Copyright Act).

The language used in the U.S. Copyright Act is also narrower, not only because “teaching”, “scholarship”, and “research” are more closely defined aspects of education, but also because the courts of the United States have generally resisted calls to broaden these terms. Cases such as American Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 734 F. 2d 3 (3d. Cir. 1984) and Rubin v. Boston Magazine Co., 645 F. 2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981) have interpreted teaching, scholarship, and research in a common-sense fashion by looking to whether the “students” named as the beneficiary of the right received a degree, became qualified or certified as a result of the course, or used the course as a prerequisite for further education and training. By contrast, it is not clear that any lower court in Canada could do the same given the Supreme Court’s statement in CCH that fair dealing is “a user right… that must not be interpreted restrictively”, and given its broad construal of the term “education” in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.

The United States is also a cautionary example in the sense that it continues to produce extensive litigation on fairness issues. While Professor Geist states broadly in the current blog entry that “jurisdictions with even broader fair dealing or fair use provisions rarely experience significant litigation between publishers/authors and educational institutions”, and cites the “far more litigious U.S.” as an example, a look at the tangled docket in the highly contested test case launched by publishers against Georgia State University shows otherwise. The Georgia State saga suggest that the U.S. “fair use” doctrine continues to raise difficult questions for decision, at great cost to rightsholders and users alike, with the parties largely locked at a standstill following two years of litigation, and commentators leery that the case will ever provide true guidance for acceptable activities in an academic setting.

Perhaps wary of the U.S. model, the bulk of other legislators worldwide have proceeded with more caution, confining many educational exceptions to targeted exceptions (as in the European Union). A characteristic approach is that of New Zealand, whose newly amended Copyright Act provides at s. 44A that educational establishments will not infringe copyright if they store a copy of “a work that is made available on a website or other electronic retrieval system” only if the material: (a) is stored for an educational purpose; (b) displayed under a separate frame or identifier; (c) identifies the author (if known) and the source of the work; (d) identifies the educational establishment’s name and the date when the work was stored; and (e) available only to authenticated users. While provisions like New Zealand’s take more time and care to craft, they provide exact guidance to publishers and users alike without imposing undue technological barriers. Similarly, copyright legislation in Australia (see Parts VA, VB) and the United Kingdom (see ss. 32-36) prefers to take a targeted incremental approach to educational exceptions.

6)            Will the Proposed Reform Satisfy Canada’s Three-Step Test Obligations?

As Canada is a member of Berne and TRIPS, and is currently engaged in free-trade negotiations with the European Union that will touch on intellectual property matters, it must ask itself whether its policies fall in line with international standards and practices. Professor Geist’s blog analysis makes only a bare analysis of this issue, concluding that because no trade action has yet been filed against the narrower Israeli and U.S. regimes, the likelihood of an international challenge to Canada’s law is “incredibly remote”.

A full response to Professor Geist requires a review of Canada’s international treaty obligations. Under the Berne-TRIPS “three-step test”, an author’s exclusive rights such as the right to reproduce or the right to communicate a work are the norm. By contrast, user rights must be carefully calibrated to ensure they target a specific good while minimally impairing the author’s right. The specific expression of the three-step test is as follows:

Berne Convention, Article 9(2):

“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”

TRIPS Agreement, Article 13:

“Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.”

An example of how this balance is maintained elsewhere is set out in the European Copyright Directive, which explains why the exclusive right of the author should not be lightly disturbed:

EU Copyright Directive, Recital 9:

“Any harmonisation of copyright and related rights must take as a basis a high level of protection, since such rights are crucial to intellectual creation. Their protection helps to ensure the maintenance and development of creativity in the interests of authors, performers, producers, consumers, culture, industry and the public at large. Intellectual property has therefore been recognised as an integral part of property.”

In asking whether the C-32 fair dealing exception is “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary”, Canada should ask itself whether incorporating such an exception into domestic legislation could form the basis for a trade challenge under the WTO regime.

Though Professor Geist does not mention it, there is existing international case law demonstrating that ambitious domestic legislation can entangle countries in lengthy and expensive international trade disputes. In 1999, the European Community initiated a trade challenge to an exception imposed by the United States in its Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998. This Act created an exception to copyright that permitted a wide variety of eating and drinking establishments to publicly perform copyrighted musical works without the authorization of the owners of those works. The EC contended that the exception was too broadly targeted to survive the three-step test.

In 2000, a WTO panel found (full decision; summary) that by introducing the exception into domestic law, the United States had violated Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention, thereby also violating Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. This led to a settlement arrangement between the U.S. and EC that involved the payment of millions of dollars into a rights-holders’ fund. As a further consequence of this dispute, the U.S. is also required to file ongoing status reports with the WTO respecting its efforts to remedy the violation of international trade law.

Of particular interest to Canada is the Panel’s finding that because the United States’ “business exemption” covered a major category of establishment critical to rightsholders, it could not meet any of the stages of the three-step test set out in TRIPS and Berne. Like the proposed reform in Canada, the “business exemption” cut out too broad a swath of the rightsholders’ market, and did not provide for a compulsory licence in the targeted area.

Canada must therefore ask whether its use of the term “education” as a fair dealing purpose risks violating the three-step test as well by reason of a similar broadness. Even with a backstop “fairness” test, there are a number of reasons that Canada’s reform could meet the same fate as the U.S. “business exemption”.

First, taken literally, the contention that “fair dealing” is not “free dealing” is not true. Any fair dealing right permits many free dealings, as it grants an absolute defence to an exclusive right, thus allowing users to make a copy or copies of a work without payment to the owner of the copyright. The result of any fair dealing is – at least potentially – a lost royalty. Any government creating such a user right places itself in the Berne-TRIPS “three-step test” red zone: it has carved out an exception to the core exclusive rights, transferring wealth from the creator of a work to the users of a work. If the scope of “education” is interpreted broadly to include any fair dealing involving learning, the amount of the intended transfer of wealth could be profound.

Second, the Supreme Court’s expression of the CCH “fairness” factors is a unique amalgamation of Commonwealth and U.S. law that does not appear to have been constructed with an eye on Canada’s international treaty obligations. For example, in the United States, the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 at 566 (1985) stated that “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work … is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”. If applied appropriately by U.S. courts, this statement arguably goes a long way to satisfying the second and third stages of the three-step test. By contrast, in CCH, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the effect on the market “is neither the only factor nor the most important factor that a court must consider in deciding if the dealing is fair”. Accordingly, the other five factors described by Professor Geist, which do not map easily onto the three-step test, would appear to have an equal or even more important role in deciding whether a given dealing is fair. It would thus appear that certain dealings may be deemed permissible in Canadian law even if they have a disruptive effect on the normal exploitation of the work or the legitimate interests of the author. Such a result would risk disharmony between Canada’s domestic standards and its international obligations.

Third, one of the six factors cited in CCH at the second “fairness” stage of the test is the purpose of the dealing. A dealing identified as “fair” at the first stage will attain a presumptive advantage at the second stage. A broad fair dealing exception is arguably double-counted, raising the risk that it will apply beyond the “certain special cases” required by Berne and TRIPS.

Fourth, it must be remembered that the first “threshold” stage of the fair dealing test in Canada plays a critical role in preserving rightsholder interests. Whenever a user of a copyright work cannot plausibly fit the purpose of his or her activities into one of the acceptable purposes of research, criticism, review, or news reporting, and cannot otherwise take advantage of a targeted exception under the Canadian Act, that user must seek authorization to copy a substantial part of a given work. This provides certainty to both users and rightsholders, and cuts down on “Hail Mary” defences in infringement actions. As recent cases on the meaning of the acceptable purpose of “research” demonstrate, a term that can be interpreted in several ways can give rise to mischief, as a plaintiff will always construe it narrowly and a defendant will always construe it broadly, giving rise to expensive litigation and (potentially) inconsistent decision-making by courts that leave no one certain of where the law stands.

Last, a host of respected neutral observers have concluded that an expansive education exception could not pass the three-step test, particularly if it is a pure exception as opposed to a remunerative licence. In World Copyright Law, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) at 529, the respected expert J.A.L. Sterling expresses the opinion that:

The reference to ‘certain special cases’ is intended to indicate the general limitations and exceptions to the reproduction right (for instance, a limitation which provides that ‘reproduction of any work may take place for any purpose connected with education’) would not be permissible.

The esteemed Australian expert Professor Sam Ricketson has expressed the same essential conclusions. In a study conducted for WIPO, he concludes that any exception involving libraries, archives or educational institutions needs to be clearly specified, with defined limits. In these circumstances, he concludes that a paid statutory licence for such works might pass the three-step test (see p. 76). Similarly, in a text co-authored with the well-known American expert Professor Jane Ginsberg, International Copyright & Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Professor Ricketson concludes at paragraph 13.36 (pages 782-783) that an exception for teaching purposes could not pass the three-step test, and that a broad student-based “copying for instructional purposes” might be justifiable under Berne-TRIPS only where it was made subject to appropriate limitations, and subject to compensation for authors.

Given these conclusions, the broad full defence envisioned by Bill C-32 would appear to violate Canada’s international treaty commitments.

7)            Are the Reforms Truly a “Middle Ground “?

In his blog entry, Professor Geist suggests that the new fair dealing provisions in Bill C-32 are a “middle ground” because they add two categories requested by creator groups and one requested by user groups.

With respect, this seems to be a disingenuous argument. All fair dealing rights serve as exceptions to an exclusive right. They benefit persons who use a pre-existing work. In the case of parody and satire, a fair dealing right will allow one creator to use the work of a predecessor creator to his or her benefit without paying that predecessor. It is a special kind of user right focused on a class of creators.

But the fatal error is to treat these three rights as indistinguishable units with indistinguishable impacts. The parody and satire rights are transformative rights, in the sense that they do not permit free consumption of a work, but rather the use of an old work in creating a new work. As such, the new works will not necessarily sap the market for the original works, but may in some cases lead to works that revive or enhance interest in the originals, leading to royalties that would not otherwise have been reaped. These dealings are, arguably, a win-win for creators and users.

The educational fair dealing right is, by contrast, a consumptive right. It does not result in the creation of new works, but results in royalty-free uses that transfer wealth directly from rightsholders to users. The impact goes in only one direction, and that direction may be profound indeed, judging from the $40 million to $60 million estimates raised in testimony at Committee.

Accordingly, when the true impacts of these exceptions are measured, it would appear that the Bill as drafted would result in a considerable loss to creators. Considered critically, Professor Geist’s account of an unchanged future is inconsistent with the story set out in his own recent blog entry, where he suggests that there is a “growing sentiment on Canadian campuses that it is time for post-secondary education to decline the coverage by walking away from Access Copyright” and its proposed post-secondary tariff.

How can this be done? Professor Geist suggests that institutions, professors and students can decline coverage “by relying on site database licences that are already in place, open access licences to scholarly research, and fair dealing.” [Emphasis added.] Even prior to the passage of a “fair dealing for education” exception, Professor Geist has catalogued (here, here and here) a series of schools that are acting on this suggestion. Clearly, if fair dealing is expanded beyond its current bounds to all educational activities that are “fair” in nature, it would dramatically increase the ability of institutions to take a tough stance on liability, including by opting out of such tariffs and challenging rightsholders to sue for failure to pay. Forced to rely on the unfairness stage of the test alone, publishers will face an extreme uphill battle.

          Do the Reforms Support or Suppress New Technologies?

In his blog entry, Professor Geist argues that the addition of education as an acceptable purpose “will open the door to the use of new technologies in the classroom without fear of potential liability”. He cites the example of a colleague who uses a photograph from court documents as part of his classroom discussion as an example of how the fair dealing right would enhance the educational experience.

While Professor Geist’s example seems eminently reasonable, Professor Geist omits any consideration of how the proposed fair dealing right would affect publishers’ multi-million dollar investments to support classroom technologies that are meant to transform the educational experience into a collaborative, multi-media endeavour. For example, publishers have invested significantly in CourseSmart, a North America-wide electronic repository of thousands of the most commonly used textbooks from a variety of higher education publishers. Instructors can use these resources to find and review the information they need to choose their textbooks and course materials, and students can purchase online access to these textbooks at a considerable discount from the print editions. Other promising new environments are being developed via partnerships between publishers and third-party course management operators such as SymText, eConcordia, and WebCT/Blackboard. These systems involve an online proprietary virtual learning environment system that is sold to educational institutions and used in e-learning. Content for these environments is provided via licence agreements with publishers.

Publishers are also making significant investments in creating original digital content, either as an online-access supplement to existing print textbooks, or as standalone material specifically dedicated to the educational sectors. These investments require a considerable reworking of traditional publishing operations, including the establishment of specialized digital departments with dedicated employees.

Parliament should consider very carefully whether the fair dealing right would undercut these developing technologies and services by offering a free alternative, thus sending a perverse signal to publishers and technology innovators not to invest in these new delivery systems. The result would be exactly contrary to the government’s stated goal of “enriching the educational experience and facilitating use of the latest technologies”.

9)            Did the UK Gowers Review Support These Kinds of Reforms?

As part of Professor Geist’s middle ground argument, he suggests by way of a reference to the well-respected Gowers Review of Intellectual Property that fair uses of copyright are good for the economy and will not damage the interests of copyright owners. He quotes the fair dealing section of the Gowers Review as stating that “fair uses of copyright can create economic value without damaging the interest of copyright owners”.

A close look at the Gowers Review shows that it was not commenting on any fair dealing right that remotely resembled the education right proposed in Bill C-32, but rather on transformative parody/satire rights that would enable works to be created that are not “not necessarily substitutes for the original work”. This passage did not comment on any fair dealing right that remotely resembled the education right proposed in Bill C-32, and cannot be taken as approving a far-sweeping consumptive fair dealing right. Indeed, the Gowers Report specifically recommended that educational issues be dealt with by the way of incremental amendments to the existing targeted educational exceptions in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. While the UK government has continued to monitor the U.S. fair use system, no government report has recommended that it be adopted.

10)          How Can We Best Accommodate Both Rightsholder and User Interests?

While fights over ambiguities in fair dealing disputes provide for fascinating case law, it must be asked whether they are healthy for the copyright system. If the government’s wish is to boost new technologies in the educational setting, a far less risky means of supplementing the current fair dealing rights would be to create targeted exceptions meant to achieve specific goals. This is the way Canada has done it in the past with its exceptions for educational institutions, libraries, archives and museums. This is also the way it is done in the European Union, with whom Canada is in significant trade talks, and in the legislation of major Commonwealth countries such as Australia (see Parts VA, VB), New Zealand (see ss. 44-49), and the United Kingdom (see ss. 32-36).

In framing such exceptions, Parliament should recognize that laws are used by people primarily, and lawyers secondarily. Whatever the government means specifically by the currently proposed phrase “for the purpose of education”, it must recognize that any new legislative pronouncement will find its way into guidelines, paraphrases, and urban legend, some of which will be in the neighbourhood of a correct interpretation, and some of which will not. Both the correct and the incorrect interpretations will result in the making of copies by individuals and institutions. The broader the key terms, the greater the chance that there will be copies made that Parliament never intended to permit. This is precisely why New Zealand drafted its recent amendment to be specific about the educational activities it was blessing, and the conditions required to obtain the benefits of the exception, but neutral about the exact delivery mechanisms used to perform such activities. Such an approach is far more likely to satisfy the three-step test than the current broad-brush approach in Bill C-32.

To achieve the stated purposes of the government through this more refined legislative mechanism, Canada would have to commit to freshen up these targeted exceptions when they grow less relevant. One way to ensure a continued up-to-date approach to these kinds of exceptions might be to push the exact mechanics of the target exceptions into regulation, as Canada has done with its management of the record-keeping process for its existing education, libraries, archives and museums exceptions, as well as its management of the retransmission regime. This would allay the concern of many rightsholders and many users about the slow pace of copyright reform in Canada, including in respect of the existing educational exceptions in the Copyright Act.

*A copy of this article is posted in PDF format here.

*Dan Glover is an associate in the Intellectual Property Group at McCarthy Tétrault LLP. This comment is written in Mr. Glover’s personal capacity.

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Welcome. I hope everyone is having a good day so far. Michael Geist and I are going to talk about the legal protection of technological protection measures (TPMs).

I am going to explain how the TPM provisions in Bill C-32 work and highlight some of the areas where there has been confusion in interpreting them. I will also address some of the proposals being made for amending C-32 as it relates to TPMs. In particular, I will provide my views on the merits of Michael’s two main proposals for amending the Bill’s TPM provisions.

Michael says the Bill should only prohibit circumventing TPMs when the purpose is for infringement. He also says a person should be able to hack a TPM to make private copies and that rights holders should not be compensated for such copying such as through a private copying levy. I do not agree with his proposals and will tell you why.

It is interesting that I am speaking before Michael today. I will be anticipating some of the things he might say based on his blogs and our recent appearance before the legislative committee reviewing Bill C-32 on December 1, 2010. If I get Michael’s positions wrong, I am sure he will tell us.

Frequently asked questions about legal protection for TPMs

The topics I will canvass are set out in my slides in more detail. They are organized by a series of questions that people who are involved in the debate about TPMs need to consider. They are:

• Whether Bill C-32 properly implements the WIPO Treaties consistent with the practices of our trading partners.
• Whether the Bill permits copying for fair dealing, educational, and other purposes.
• Whether the circumvention exceptions in the Bill are flexible enough to deal with unforeseen or unintended consequences.
• Whether Canada can properly implement the WIPO Treaties by limiting the prohibition on circumvention to an infringing purpose.
• Whether other jurisdictions limit protection of TPMs to circumvention for an infringing purpose.
• Whether circumvention of TPMs for the purposes of format shifting, time shifting, and making back-up copies for private purposes (private copying) ought to be permitted. Related to this question is the notion of “user rights”; what that term means; whether “user rights” trump authors’ rights; and whether “user rights” should trump legal protection for TPMs.
• Given that one of the goals behind the Bill is to follow international standards, whether other jurisdictions permit exceptions for private copying to trump TPMs.
• Whether an exception for private copying that permits circumvention of TPMs for such purpose would comply with the Berne Three Step Test?
• Do the WIPO Treaties which Canada is committed to ratifying permit circumventing TPMs for private copying?
• My last topic is whether Michael’s two proposals for amending the TPM provisions in Bill C-32 have any precedents internationally. Michael points to Bill C-60, New Zealand and Switzerland as precedents. But are they really precedents we can or should follow? They are not and I will tell you why.

Does C-32 properly implement the WIPO Treaties?

Let me begin with the question as to whether Bill C-32 properly implements the WIPO Treaties. If you look at my slides you will see a quote from the WIPO Guide which sets out what the treaties require. WIPO itself says that to implement the treaties a contracting party must put in place several measures. The first are measures that prohibit acts of circumvention including prohibiting acts of access control circumvention. The second are measures that prohibit providing circumvention services and trafficking in circumvention tools.

Bill C-32 meets these requirements. The Bill has a definition of “technological protection measure”. It describes two types of TPMs.  Paragraph (a) defines access control TPMs; paragraph (b) defines copy control TPMs.  There is a definition of “circumvent”.  The actual prohibition against circumvention which is in Section 41.1(1) only apply to access control TPMs within the meaning of paragraph (a). There is no general prohibition against circumventing copy control TPMs. The provisions dealing with trafficking in circumvention tools or offering services to circumvent apply to both access control and copy control measures.

Does C-32 have exceptions that permit circumvention of TPMs and is there a flexible means of adding to them if needed?

The Bill has a number of exceptions, some of which are misunderstood or have been inaccurately described. There are, for example, exceptions for law enforcement, interoperability, encryption research, personal information and network security testing. There are also exceptions that permit trafficking in tools and providing circumvention services to facilitate the exercise of these exceptions.

Michael has said there are no exceptions for the blind. He is wrong. There is one that permits circumvention by or for persons with perceptual disabilities such as the blind. He also says that the exception for the blind does not include an exception that permits providing circumvention tools or services to enable people to circumvent TPMs for the blind. This too is wrong. Section 41.16(2) has an exception for this.

Michael also says there is no exception that permits jail breaking phones to use them on other networks. That is dealt with in radio apparatus exception. He also says there is no ability to jail brake a smartphone for the purpose of application interoperability. That also is wrong. To the extent a person needs to circumvent a TPM to make an application work with a phone’s operating system e.g., Apple’s iPhone OS, that is permissible under the general exception that enables people to circumvent TPMs for interoperability purposes.

If you compare the circumvention prohibitions in Bill C-32 with what exists internationally, you will see that they are less protective of TPMs than in the EU under the Copyright Directive. That directive requires Member States to prohibit the circumvention of access and copy control TPMs. Bill C-32 only prohibits circumvention of access control TPMs. Under C-32 it is permissible to circumvent a copy control TPM for a fair dealing or other purpose including education. Statements made by Michael to the effect that the TPM provisions in C-32 are more strict than in the U.S or that they completely trump fair dealing and education are not, therefore, true.

Michael has also challenged the processes in the Bill to establish new exceptions to address unintended consequences and new technologies. He claims the Bill is inflexible in this respect. However, if you look at the Bill you will see that the government has the power to enact regulations in three categories of situations to deal with unintended consequences and new technologies.

Under  S.41.21(1) there is a power to make regulations in the event TPMs are used to restrict competition in the aftermarket sector. This power was intended to deal with the few cases in the U.S. where entities tried, unsuccessfully, to use TPMs to stop competition in interoperable products such as garage door openers and printer cartridges.

The Governor in Council also has a broad power to make regulations to deal with other situations in Section 41.21(2) having regard to specific open ended criteria set out in the subsection. Subsection (i), takes into account a situation where a TPM could adversely affect the use a person may make of a work. This is very broad factor and would cover regional coding and other potential impediments to the use of a work. Subsection (iii) takes into account a situation where a TPM could adversely affect fair dealings for criticism, review, news reporting, commentary, parody, satire, teaching, scholarship or research. Accordingly, if TPMs hamper fair dealings including a dealing for educational purposes, a regulation could address the problem. Subsection (v) takes into account a situation in which a work is not commercially available in a form that is appropriate for educational uses. Last, the subsection requires taking into account any other relevant factor.

Section 41.21(2)(b) also gives the government the power by regulation to require the owner of a copyright to provide access to people who are entitled to the benefit of an exception, where for some reason the copyright owner is not making it possible to exercise the exception.

As my slides show, these processes provide mechanisms to address unintended consequences and new technologies in a broader and more flexible way than what exists internationally. For example, the U.S. has only one process to expand the scope of the exceptions. It is one that Michael has criticised. The U.S. has a tri-annual review process before the U.S. Copyright Office to exclude classes of works for certain purposes. The Canadian regulation power is broader. It applies at any time and is not subject to the same standard of proof. In the EU under Article 6(4) the EU Copyright Directive, Member States have to take appropriate measures, in the absence of voluntary agreements with rights holders, to make the exercise of certain exceptions possible.

Can a prohibition on circumvention that is limited to an infringing purpose comply with the WIPO Treaties?

I would like now to turn to the question of whether the WIPO Treaties can be implemented by limiting protection to circumvention for the purposes of infringement. I raise this because Michael has said on numerous occasions, most recently before the legislative committee examining Bill C-32, that Canada can implement protection for TPMs in this way and comply with the minimum requirements of the WIPO Treaties.

There has been an exchange of views across the Atlantic between Michael and Dr. Ficsor concerning the minimum requirements of the WIPO Treaties. Last December Dr. Ficsor published several papers in which he disagreed with Michael’s views about the WIPO Treaties. After C-32 was tabled Michael published a paper in a book edited by him, which I am sure he will show you as he did to the legislative committee. In the paper Michael took issue with Dr. Ficsor’s views about the WIPO Treaties. Dr. Ficsor read the paper and wrote a major rebuttal to Michael’s paper which he published on IP Osgoode’s blog. He thoroughly and meticulously examined every argument and conclusion that Michael made and found them wanting.

Dr. Ficsor agrees that there is certain flexibility as to how the treaties can be implemented. But he disagrees with Michael’s opinion that the treaties mean “whatever you want them to mean”.  Dr. Ficsor provides a detailed analysis of what the treaties do require. He shows that the treaties cannot be properly implemented by linking the prohibition against circumvention to an infringing purpose, as Michael contends. I recommend you read Dr. Ficsor’s paper.

Dr. Ficsor knows something about the WIPO Treaties. He was the Assistant Deputy General of WIPO at the time the WIPO Treaties were negotiated. There is probably no one who knows more about the requirements of the WIPO Treaties than he does.

Do other countries link circumvention of TPMs to an infringing purpose?

No, our trading partners do not prohibit circumventing TPMs only if the purpose of the circumvention is for an infringing purpose. There would be no point to such limited protection and it could hardly be argued that such protection provides “adequate legal protection” for TPMs, as the WIPO Treaties require.

Michael points to Bill C-60, New Zealand, and Switzerland as precedents for limiting protection for TPMs to circumvention for the purposes of infringement. He repeated that claim again before the legislative committee. Let us look at these supposed precedents.

At the time Bill C-60 was being considered, there were many people who believed that its TPM provisions would not have complied with the WIPO Treaties. An example, is Glen Bloom who expressed this view in a paper referred to in my slides. Mr. Bloom is the Chair of the IPIC Copyright Technical Committee. In this capacity he recently testified before the legislative committee about Bill C-32. He knows his copyright. Mr. Bloom states in his paper, quoted in my slides, that Bill C-60’s TPM provisions would not have met Canada’s obligations under the WIPO Treaties.

Michael also relies on New Zealand as a precedent. New Zealand permits circumvention of TPMs unless it is for an infringing purpose. Michael says that shows that the treaties can be implemented in this way. But, New Zealand has not ratified the WIPO Treaties and is hardly a country that can evidence what the treaties require.

Michael also refers to Switzerland as a precedent because Switzerland links a prohibition on circumventing TPMs to an infringing purpose. But, Switzerland is a known case of a Contracting Party that simply did not do it right. Dr. Ficsor says, “it does happen time and again that certain Contracting Parties do not fulfil their treaty obligations. Switzerland is such a country.”  Of the 88 countries that have ratified the WCT and the 87 countries that have ratified the WPPT, Michael picks as a model a country that has failed to provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention of TPMs. He does not pick any of Canada’s major trading partners as examples for Canada to follow.

Moreover, although Michael refers to Switzerland as a model, he hasn’t, to my knowledge, pointed out that Switzerland has a private copying levy to compensate rights holders for unauthorized copying. Michael told the legislative committee last week that he does not support a levy to compensate authors for unauthorized copying. So even Switzerland is not a precedent for the overall form of implementation Michael proposes.

Should circumvention of TPMs for private copying be permitted?

I now want to address whether circumvention of TPMs should be permitted for private copying. Bill C-32 has exceptions for format shifting, time shifting and making backup copies. These exceptions only apply where TPMs are not hacked to do these acts.

In my view, the conditions against hacking TPMs in the new private copying exceptions are important. TPMs support new business models that would be undermined if people could hack TPMs to make private copies. The conditions are also important because Bill C-32 permits private copying without any compensation to rights holders. Removing these conditions would undermine legitimate markets for the legal sale of copyright content and further increase uncompensated copying.

Michael says we should drop these conditions. He says we should permit people to hack TPMs to copy for format shifting, time shifting and back-up copying purposes. But, doing so could undermine many current and future service offerings which depend on protecting copy and access control TPMs. These include subscription, rental, and rent to own services.** Examples of these services are music streaming subscription services such as Napster and Spotify; video streaming subscription services like Netflix; ad supported music; internet radio; certain digital downloads services, and digital movies rentals from Blockbuster. My slides depict how these and other models could be detrimentally affected by a legal right to hack a TPM for private copying purposes.

Here are just a couple of examples of the problems:

• On demand rent or buy models: If you rent, you pay (say) $3.99 and if you buy, you pay (say) $17.99. If a person could circumvent the TPM that protects the rent/buy model, wouldn’t some people just pay the rental fee and make permanent copies without paying for them?
• A music or movie subscription service that has copy controls that prevents copying: If a person could stream the sound recording or movie and legally circumvent the TPM to make a permanent copy, wouldn’t some people pay a monthly subscription fee and make permanent copies without paying for them?
• Music downloads like iTunes where you buy a song today for $0.99, its TPM free: A person could subscribe to a monthly subscription service and legally circumvent the copy control TPM that prevents copying to make permanent copies. Wouldn’t some people make permanent copies without paying for them?
• Software and gaming: A person could obtain a 5 day trial with an option to buy if the person likes the software or game. However, if a person can legally hack the TPM that limits access for the trial period and which prevents other copying, wouldn’t some people hack the TPM and avoid paying the purchase price to obtain permanent copies?

All of these things could be done without infringing copyright under Michael’s proposals.

Michael said to the legislative committee that private copying is a “user right”. He says if a user acquires content the user ought to have the right and does have the right to hack the TPM to make copies for format shifting and other purposes without the consent of the owner of the copyright – and without paying for the copies.

Michael is wrong that people have or should have a reasonable expectation that they can obtain content for free, or on a limited basis for some reduced consideration, hack the protections rights holders place on the content, and make copies or obtain access they had not bargained or paid for. If a person pays a rental fee, the person should not expect a right to obtain a permanent copy without paying for the permanent copy. If a person pays a monthly subscription fee for temporary access to content streams, the person cannot reasonably expect the right to make permanent copies without paying for them.

If C-32 is amended as proposed by Michael, once a person has legal access to a work, the person could legally hack the TPM protecting the work, legally make permanent copies, and effectively avoid paying for what is purchased. This is an unreasonable proposal. No person could reasonably ask for this broad right. It is unjustifiable and unsupportable. It would reduce investment in digital products and new distribution models. It would result in the loss of revenues and jobs in the digital sector. It would also substantially undermine the Government’s stated goal of enabling e-commerce in digital products in Canada.

Michael’s views about “user rights” confuses the rights a person has in the tangible thing her or she buys with the copyright in the thing. When you buy a song, you do not buy the label. When you buy a movie, you do not buy the studio. When you buy a video game or book, you are not buying the publisher. A person acquires a right to use an object he or she buys. But, the person does not acquire any legal right to make copies that have not been expressly or implicitly authorized by the copyright owner.

The metaphor of “user rights” expressed by the Supreme Court in the CCH case makes clear that copyright rights, and exceptions like fair dealing, are of paramount importance in construing the Copyright Act. But, as the Supreme Court made clear in CCH, fair dealing is only an affirmative defence to a claim of copyright infringement. It is not a concept that provides legal rights that can be asserted against copyright owners or be used to trump authors’ legal rights. “User rights” under copyright provide no basis for claiming that a person who rents copyright content such as a movie or game, or who merely subscribes to view it, has a right to hack a TPM in order to make permanent copies without authorization and payment.

A number of European decisions, in examining the legal inter-relationship between private copying and the use of TPMs, have similarly concluded that exceptions for private copying do not trump author’s rights in their works. In particular, in Europe there have been claims brought against copyright owners of content such as music and movies alleging they have a legal duty to remove TPMs to enable individuals to make private copies. These claims have been rejected in the cases referred to in my slides.

Would an exception for circumventing TPMs for private copying comply with the Three Step Test?

I now turn to the question of whether Canada could create an exception for private copying that permits circumvention of TPMs for such purposes and comply with our obligations under the Berne Convention and WTO TRIPS. These agreements, as you know, require that the Three Step Test be applied to copyright exceptions and limitations. The Three Step Test requires that an exception be a certain special case; that it not undermine the market or potential market for a work; and that it not unreasonably prejudice authors or copyright owners.

The interrelationship between private copying and protection for TPMs was considered by the French Supreme Court in the Mulholland case. A key question in the case was whether French copyright law could allow circumvention of a TPM for private copying. The French Supreme Court stated it could not. It held that a law that prevents rights holders from using TPMs on their products in the digital environment would violate the Three Step Test. Central to its decision was the concern that TPM-free products would promote unlicensed copying. That is a precedent of pretty high authority. The Paris Commercial Court in the Henry v. Warner Bros case expressed similar statements about the need for TPMs in the digital environment.

Would an exception for circumventing TPMs for private copying comply with the WIPO Treaties?

Another question is whether the WIPO Treaties can be complied with by permitting circumvention of TPMs for private copying? Dr. Ficsor also deals with this in his paper that is posted on IP Osgoode’s web site. He suggests that an adequate level of protection cannot take the form of allowing circumvention of TPMs so as to permit everyone to make private copies. The WIPO Treaties require an adequate level of protection. But, how can legal protection for TPMs be adequate if a right to circumvent TPMs for private copying would violate the Berne Three Step Test as the Mulholland case suggests?

Are there international precedents for an exception for private copying, that permits circumventing TPMs, where authors receive no compensation for the unauthorized copying?

I will now address the question of international practice and standards. In particular, I want to challenge Michael’s assertions that there are international precedents for what he proposes. I have already addressed whether there are international precedents for limiting the prohibition on circumventing TPMs to an infringing purpose. I now ask whether any of our trading partners that have private coping exceptions permit private copying to trump TPMs as is being proposed by Michael?

In the EU the answer is no. In the EU private copying is permitted only if it is subject to fair compensation. The scope of any private copying exception must be subject to the Berne Three Step Test. Moreover, Member States have no right to permit circumvention of TPMs to enable private copying. Member states may take measures to enable certain private copying where voluntary measures by rights holders are not in place. Importantly, however, even these measures do not apply to works that are available on demand through an online subscription basis. They essentially apply to CDs and other physical media.

As I already mentioned, Michael says we should look to Switzerland and New Zealand as examples. But neither of them are precedents for what is being proposed. New Zealand, to my knowledge, does not even have a broad exception for private copying. Switzerland permits circumvention of TPMs for private copying. It is a country, which as pointed out before, did not properly implement its treaty obligations. But, even putting that aside, Switzerland compensates its authors and other creators for private copying through a levy. So it is no precedent for Canada given the clear direction that the existing private copying levy on audio-recording media will not be expanded to digital audio recorders (DARs) like iPods and other devices.

Michael has not pointed to any other country that has broad rights of private copying such as those in Bill C-32, a right to hack TPMs for this purpose, and which does not provide authors and other rights holders with compensation for such copying. His proposals, essentially, ask Canadians to chart a new course in violation of our convention and treaty obligations in a way that, when properly understood by Canadians, would be viewed as unreasonable and unjustifiable, and which would seriously undermine the rights of authors and other creators and their ability to exploit and to be compensated for their creative endeavours.

Thank you.

* The talk was edited and augmented for this blog.

** I use the word “rent” in the colloquial sense. The format shift exception does not permit making a private copy where the source copy has been borrowed or rented.  It is unclear whether a download that may be viewed for a limited period is a  “rental” in the legal sense.

For convenience my slides are set out below.

Insight_Slides_on C-32 and TPMs

A case in point is a blog posting by Prof. Geist in which he reported on comments made by NDP MP Charlie Angus in the House of Commons on TPMs Angus Files Petition, Comments on C-32 & Digital Locks.  Prof. Geist’s posting is reproduced below:

This week NDP MP Charlie Angus used debate on the anti-spam bill to sound off on copyright reform and Bill C-32:

the present government’s plan with digital locks would actually lock down content unnecessarily and criminalize individuals who have legal rights, for example, librarians or blind people who need to be able to access educational works through digital locks. They will be treated the same as an international counterfeiter under the Conservatives, not surprisingly of course because the Conservatives have a dumb-down approach on pretty much everything. A blind student will be treated the same as an international counterfeiter if he or she has to break a digital lock to access digital works.  The Conservatives do not get it on the issue of copyright.

Earlier in the same session, Angus filed a petition in the House from people concerned with the digital lock provisions, calling on Parliament to restore balance on the issue.

After reading the statement made by Mr. Angus quoted by Prof. Geist without correction, one would conclude that C-32’s anti-circumvention provisions would actually criminalize individuals who circumvent TPMs for their own purposes or criminalize “librarians or blind people who need to be able to access educational works through digital locks”. But, these assertions about C-32 are not accurate.

Bill C-32 creates civil liability for circumventing access control TPMs and for trafficking in, or for providing circumvention services, for access control or copyright control TPMs. Bill C-32 does not prohibit or create any civil liability for circumventing TPMs which protect against making unauthorized copies of a work for any purpose including to engage in fair dealings for research, private study, criticism, or review, or for use by people with perceptual disabilities or by libraries.*

BillC-32 also contains specific exceptions from the generally applicable anti-circumvention provisions including those that prohibit circumventing access control TPMs. For example, there are exceptions for security and encryption research, creating interoperable programs, accessing personal information, unlocking cells phones, and law enforcement.

Bill C-32 also has a broad exception which permits breaking technological locks by persons with perceptual disabilities such as blind persons or by other persons at their request including not for profit institutions. It would also be legal for entities to offer services, or to manufacture, import, or provide tools, which facilitate circumventing TPMs to enable works to be made perceptual for blind people and for other persons with perceptual disabilities.

So the statement by Mr Angus repeated without correction by Prof. Geist that C-32 would make it a criminal offense for a blind person to break a TPM is not accurate. It would not violate any civil or criminal prohibition in C-32.

Bill C-32 does have a criminal sanction. But it applies only to a person who violates the anti-circumvention provisions of Bill C-32 “for commercial purposes”. So it would apply to entities like counterfeiters who engage in commercial scale illegal activities, but not otherwise.  So even if there wasn’t a specific exception permitting circumvention of TPMs for persons with perceptual disabilities, breaking a technological lock by or for a blind person would still not be a criminal offense under C-32.

Moreover, new Section 42(3.1) of C-32 which creates the new criminal sanction expressly exempts “a person who acts on behalf of a library, archive, or museum, educational institution”.  So, the statement by Mr. Angus, repeated without correction by Prof. Geist, that C-32’s anti-circumvention provisions could criminalize acts of librarians is also not accurate.

As we get closer to debating Bill C-32’s measures to protect TPMs, it would be productive to do so based on what the bill actually says. Unfortunately, critics of legal protection for TPMs often use misleading or inaccurate descriptions of Bill C-32’s TPM provisions in order to criticize it. See, Separating facts from hype about C-32;  Are the TPM provisions in C-32 more restrictive than those in the DMCA? Dr. Ficsor is right; Prof. Geist is wrong about the WIPO Internet Treaties; Legends and reality about the 1996 WIPO Treaties in the light of certain comments on Bill C-32. Or, as with the case of Prof. Geist’s recent blog, critics widely disseminate plainly inaccurate statements about the Bill’s TPM provisions without correction or comment further misleading the public about what the Bill actually does. These tactics are regrettable as the public requires accurate information to make appropriate judgments about the Bill.

* Typo corrected Oct 26.

The original opinion in the case was issued by the panel on July 20, 2010. However, following a petition for rehearing en banc, and treating that petition as one for a panel rehearing, the Court granted the petition in part, withdrawing a controversial portion of the ruling in which the Court had concluded that “[m]erely bypassing a technological protection that restricts a user from viewing or using a work is insufficient to trigger the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision” and that  “[t]he DMCA prohibits only forms of access that would violate or impinge on the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners”.

It was this portion of the decision which lead Prof. Geist to argue in multiple blogs that the TPM provisions of the DMCA are “far less restrictive than Bill C-32.” See, The U.S. DMCA vs. Bill C-32: Comparing the Digital Lock Exceptions, U.S. Developments Demonstrate Canada’s C-32 Digital Lock Rules More Restrictive Than DMCA,  Bill C-32: My perspective on the key Issues, and CRIA Goes To Washington:

I pointed out earlier this week in a blog posting, Separating facts from hype about C-32 that Prof. Geist made numerous errors in comparing Bill C-32 and US law with respect to TPMs. In this and another posting,  MGE v GE-what did the 5th Circuit decide about the scope of the DMCA TPM provisions and was it right?, I also argued that Prof. Geist’s conclusions about the MGE case were neither accurate nor complete. I contended that the case was inconsistent with the leading cases interpreting the DMCA, with the legislative history of the DMCA, and with the administrative practice under that statute. I argued that the MGE case did not support Prof. Geist’s categorical statement that in the US “The DMCA prohibits only forms of access that would violate or impinge on the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners”. The Fifth Circuit, in withdrawing that portion of the decision clearly agreed.

I wasn’t the only person who took issue with the original opinion of the Fifth Circuit in the MGE case. The US government disagreed with the decision as well. To make its case, it filed an Amicus Brief on the petition for rehearing. In it, the government forcefully argued that the Court should withdraw the controversial portion of the decision because it was wrong.

The following is a summary of what the US Government had submitted to the Court:

“The United States respectfully urges the Court to grant panel rehearing and revise its opinion to omit its unnecessary discussion of the types of “access” prohibited by 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). The panel concluded that “[m]erely bypassing a technological protection that restricts a user from viewing or using a work is insufficient to trigger the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision. * * * The owner’s technological measure must protect the copyrighted material against an infringement of a right that the Copyright Act protects, not from mere use or viewing.”  Slip op. 6.  As we explain below, that conclusion is inconsistent with the text, structure, and legislative history of the DMCA.  The panel’s decision threatens to frustrate Congress’s purpose in section 1201(a)(1), which was to provide a federal prohibition against bypassing passwords, encryption, and other technologies that regulate access to a copyrighted work in circumstances in which the copyright owner would not otherwise have a remedy under the Copyright Act. The panel’s decision is of particular concern to the United States, moreover, because it essentially renders pointless the administrative authority that Congress granted to the Librarian of Congress under the DMCA to promulgate exemptions to Section 1201(a)(1)’s anti-circumvention prohibition for particular classes of copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)…”

After quoting the relevant parts of the DMCA, the US brief went on to describe the scope of section 1201(a)(1)(A):

“The plain language of section 1201(a)(1)(A) thus restricts any unauthorized access to a copyrighted work that is protected by an access control, just as breaking-and-entering laws prohibit any access to a locked house, even if nothing inside is stolen. Nothing in the text of the statute links “access” with infringement of the underlying copyright. The phrase “protected under this title” grammatically modifies the noun “work,” not “access”; it defines the types of works to which access is prohibited, not the type of access prohibited.

Nonetheless, in the panel’s view, “[t]he DMCA prohibits only forms of access that would violate or impinge on the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.” Slip op. 6.  The panel thus held that MGE’s claim under section 1201(a)(1) failed because “MGE has not shown that bypassing its dongle infringes a right protected by the Copyright Act.” Slip op. 7. This reasoning makes the DMCA’s anti-circumvention rule essentially redundant of the Copyright Act’s substantive protections: if the “access” prohibited under section 1201(a)(1)(A) must “infringe[] a right protected by the Copyright Act,” slip op. 7, then the DMCA only prohibits what the Copyright Act already prohibits. That cannot be correct.

Indeed, the panel’s reading of the statute conflates technological access controls with infringement controls, which Congress addressed in a different section of the DMCA. Section 1201(b) of the Act prohibits trafficking in devices or services “primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). By construing section 1201(a)(1)(A) to encompass only forms of access that “violate or impinge on the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners,” slip op. 6, the panel collapsed Congress’s distinction between access controls and infringement controls and thereby drained the DMCA’s prohibition against circumventing access controls of all independent significance.  See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing access controls from infringement controls under the DMCA); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440-41 (2d Cir. 2001) (same).”

The US government then went on to explain why linking the access control prohibitions to acts of the infringement would undermine the strong public policy reason for protecting TPMs:

“The panel’s decision also threatens to frustrate Congress’s purposes in enacting section 1201(a)(1). The entire point of that provision was to provide a federal prohibition against bypassing passwords, encryption, and other technologies that regulate access to a copyrighted work in circumstances in which the act of obtaining access would not by itself violate the copyright laws. Congress was concerned that, absent a strong federal prohibition on circumventing such technological locks, copyright owners would be unwilling to release digital versions of their works in online marketplaces.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 105-551, Part II, at 23 (1998).  Congress determined that by prohibiting unauthorized access — separate from and in addition to unauthorized copying — it could give copyright owners the confidence to distribute their works in new and powerful ways (e.g., streaming video over the internet, digital “rentals” that expire after predetermined periods of time, music files playable only on certain devices, and so on).  Congress specifically sought to foster such “use-facilitating” business models by enacting section 1201…

The panel’s decision, however, would appear to allow the intentional hacking of password protections and other technological locks without penalty, provided the hacking is designed to enable what the panel called “mere use or viewing.” Yet the ability of copyright owners to exercise fine-tuned control over use and viewing — often with different prices associated with different degrees of access, such as digital movie rentals that expire after a specified period — is exactly what has enabled the proliferation of digital media products in the decade since the DMCA was enacted.”

Those policy reasons are as true today as they were when the DMCA was enacted in the US.