The answers to all of these questions is yes according to a recent study published by Dr George Barker, the Director, Centre of Law and Economics, at ANU College of Law, Australian National University. What’s more, the study was done based on survey evidence conducted by Decima Research on behalf of Industry Canada.

Here is how the abstract summarizes the study:

This report examines data on the effects of Internet peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing activities on music purchasing which was obtained from a survey commissioned by Industry Canada. The survey was designed to ―inform Industry Canada’s policy development work‖ 2 and ultimately therefore support better policy decisions regarding the copyright law in Canada. In order to support its policy decisions regarding the copyright regime in Canada, Industry Canada commissioned a survey by Decima Research in 2006 which was designed to measure the extent to which peer to peer (P2P) file-sharing activities act as substitutes or complements to music purchases. Given this purpose the Decima survey asked respondents to comment on their behaviour in the absence of P2P file-sharing, as follows:

Considering the songs that you downloaded for free through P2P networks during 2005

a) what % would you have purchased at paid music sites if they were not available through P2P

b) what % would you have purchased as part of a music CD if they were not available through P2P

After analyzing the answers to this question, I report on two key findings:

1. three out of every four respondents said that if P2P were not available they would have purchased some or all of the music which they downloaded; and

2. almost two-thirds of the ―hardcore‖ P2P downloaders (those who indicated in the survey that they only acquired music by P2P) said they would have purchased one-third of the tracks they downloaded if the songs were not available on P2P network. This is estimated to amount to an average additional expense of $168 per person, adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars in extra revenue for the music industry per year from this group alone.3

This analysis of survey data then suggests that P2P downloads have strong negative effects on legitimate music purchases and that P2P downloading acts as a substitute for legitimate music purchases. One might reasonably infer from this analysis that stronger copyright laws would substantially increase music purchases and music industry sales revenues and, by implication, increase artist income, industry employment, economic growth and government tax revenues in Canada. My analysis not only focuses on an important survey question which to date has not been analysed by the researchers hired by Industry Canada, it also contradicts the results of the original analysis of the data commissioned by Industry Canada, first published on Industry Canada’s website in a 2007 report entitled, “Don’t blame the P2P file-sharers: the impact of free music downloads on the purchase of music CDs in Canada”, and then subsequently republished with changes by the authors in the Journal of Evolutionary Economics in 2010.

The Barker study is consistent with the global findings of the IFPI published in the Digital Music Report 2012. The report noted that the new French Hadopi law has see P2P piracy levels decline by 26 per cent with a resulting positive impact on iTunes music sales in France. A study referred to in the report found that iTunes singles sales were 23 per cent higher than they would have been in the absence of the Hadopi law. The report also indicated that site blocking orders made in Belgium and Italy under Article 8(3) of an EU Directive had reduced visits to the foreign sites by 70-80 percent.

In the press conference announcing the Bill at the Ottawa office of software producer bitHeads Inc., Minister Paradis added “With the reintroduction of today’s legislation, Canadians will soon have a modern and responsive copyright law for the digital age that protects and helps create jobs, promotes innovation and attracts new investment to Canada”. In the House of Commons Minister Moore also said “we introduced a bill that is fair to everyone, both creators and consumers. What artists across the country need right now is copyright legislation that will make piracy illegal in Canada. That is what Bill C-11 will do.”

Bill C-11 is the fourth attempt to amend the Copyright Act since 2005 — to bring the Act into the digital age. The Bill will likely make good the promise made in the Conservative Party Platform on Copyright that, “A Stephen Harper-led majority Government will also reintroduce and pass the Copyright Modernization Act, a key pillar in our commitment to make Canada a leader in the global digital economy.” It will also likely deliver on the commitment made in the Throne Speech to swiftly pass “copyright legislation that balances the needs of creators and users.”

Bill C-11 contains the same proposed amendments as its predecessor, Bill C-32.  This was anticipated based on statements made by Minister Moore and others prior to its introduction. According to a press release announcing that Canada had signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the “bill informed and guided Canada’s approach to the ACTA negotiations.”

Along with Bill C-11, the Government released Fact Sheets, an FAQ, and a Backgrounder.[1] These are all available on the Government`s website: www.balancedcopyright.gc.ca.

The FAQ describe certain aspects of the Bill including the following summary that says the Copyright Modernization Act will:

• implement the rights and protections of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet treaties;
• give copyright owners the tools they need to combat piracy;
• clarify the roles and responsibilities of ISPs and search engines;
• promote creativity and new methods of teaching in the classroom by providing greatly expanded exceptions for education;
• encourage innovation in the private sector through exceptions for technical computer processes;
• provide legal protection for businesses that choose to use technological protection measures or “digital locks” to protect their work as part of their business models; and,
• give consumers the ability to, among other things, record their favourite TV shows for later viewing, transfer music from a CD to a digital device, and create a mash-up to post via social media.

I previous provided an overview of the Bill`s key provisions. See, Some thoughts on Bill-C-32: An Act to Modernize Canada’s copyright laws.

As I noted in My C-32 opening remarks to the Legislative Committee that studied Bill C-32, I support the government’s objectives. There are, however, areas where the Bill would have significant unintended consequences if passed without amendments consistent with those objectives. Many of these are technical. Perrin Beatty, President and CEO, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, referred to this in a press release when Bill C-11 was introduced on Sept. 29th:

While the Canadian Chamber supports the principles behind this copyright legislation, improvements still need to be made to the bill. As currently drafted, the bill still contains some possible unintended consequences that could prove problematic for business. We look forward to a rigorous review of the bill at committee stage that will make sure that it achieves the purposes for which it is designed.

In the Government background documents the Government stated that it will refer the Bill to a House of Commons committee and that the “work and testimony from the previous Parliament will be carefully considered and taken into account.” Minister Paradis also confirmed at the press conference that the Government “…will make any technical fixes necessary to achieve our objectives of taking meaningful action on copyright piracy, protecting right owners and promoting creativity, innovation and legitimate business models for the benefit of the consumers.” The Government`s objective remains to have the Bill passed by Christmas.

There has been considerable debate concerning some of proposed amendments. Some of the main issues that will be debated as the Bill winds its way through a House of Commons committee and, ultimately, into law are the following:

• Technological Protection Measures
• The Enablement Right
• The Non-Commercial User-Generated Content (UGC) Exception
• Statutory damages
• The Internet Service Provider and Search Engine Exceptions and Responsibilities
• The Fair Dealing for Education Exception
• The Copyright Exceptions to Encourage Innovation

Technological Protection Measures (aka digital locks or TPMs)

Bill C-11 will prohibit circumventing (hacking) of TPMs that control access to a work. It will also prohibit trafficking of tools or provision of services that can be used for this purpose. The Government background documents explained the TPM provisions and the rationale for protecting TPMs as follows:

Innovative companies, such as video game developers, will have the legal tools to protect the investments they have made in order to reinvest in future innovation and jobs.

Protecting digital locks gives copyright industries the certainty they need to roll out new products and services, such as online subscription services, software and video games, if they choose to use this technology. Not only will this promote investment and growth in Canada’s digital economy, it will also encourage the introduction of innovative online services that offer access to content. Such services are increasingly available in other countries.

The Bill recognizes that certain protections, such as restricted content on news websites or locked video games, are important tools for copyright owners to protect their digital works and are often an important part of online and digital business models.

Opponents of legal protection for TPMs — such as Michael Geist — have made inaccurate statements about the legal protection for TPMs. Michael Geist’s relentless misinformation campaign[2] against them makes it difficult and confusing for many Canadians to form informed views about the Bill’s TPM provisions. Michael Geist repeated some of the inaccurate or misleading statements in a blog post and in the media after the Bill was introduced. For example:

• He continues to suggest that “digital lock rules trump education rights”. However, since Bill C-11 does not prohibit circumventing copy control TPMs, it would be legal to hack a copy control TPM for an educational or any other purpose. Once hacked, a person would be able to make copies of the unprotected work under the new fair dealing for education exception, as long as the dealing is “fair”. However, a person could not bypass a technical control that protects a work against access the person is not entitled to in the first place.[3] The prohibition against hacking access control TPMs is not about “trumping education rights”. It is about ensuring that people who want to make copies of a work for an educational purpose obtain legal access to the work such as by purchasing or licensing a copy in order that the creator or other rights holder may be compensated.
• He also continues to argue that “digital lock rules extend far beyond those required for compliance with the WIPO Internet treaties”; that Canada can properly implement the WIPO Treaties by limiting the prohibition on circumvention to an infringing purpose; that the WIPO Treaties would permit hacking TPMs for the purpose of format shifting; that many of our trading partners have implemented the WIPO Treaties in these ways; and that “many of our trading partners have adopted more balanced digital lock rules”. He makes these arguments although they have been found to be completely inconsistent with the minimum requirements of the Treaties by the leading international expert , Dr. Mihaly Ficscor here, here, here, and here. Michael Geist’s proposals would, essentially, eviscerate the business and policy reasons for protecting TPMs.
• Further, he suggests that the U.S. DMCA’s TPM provisions “offer more flexibility than Canada”.  This statement is misleading as I have shown here, here, and here.

There is also considerable misunderstanding about the TPM provisions within the general public. For example,

• the National Post, Vancouver Sun, Winnipeg Free Press, Calgary Herald, and other newspapers just published an article stating that the TPM “provisions would make consumers liable for thousands of dollars in legal damages if they break the digital encryption on a purchased DVD or video game to make a backup copy for themselves.”
• the Montreal Gazette published an article stating that Bill C-11 contains a “blanket provision against breaking digital locks, even for purposes of personal use; The bill provides for $5,000 fines for even the smallest such violations. This provision was apparently included as a result of heavy pressure from U.S. authorities and in the interest of maintaining cross-border trade and exemption from protectionist measures that would prevent Canadian firms from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts.”

These statements are just plain wrong. The Bill does not prohibit hacking copy control digital locks for any purpose and there are multiple exceptions that permit circumventing access control TPMs. Moreover, Section 41.1(3) of the Bill expressly precludes an award of statutory damages against an individual who circumvents a TPM for his or her own private purposes. Accordingly, it is flat out wrong to claim that an individual could be liable for “thousands of dollars in legal damages” for hacking a TPM for personal purposes. Further, even if statutory damages did apply, which they do not, the Bill would limit such damages to a range, the maximum of which would be $5,000 for the most egregious case.

In my blog post, An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32, I tried to set the record straight on the following questions about the legal protection for TPMs to enable the public to make their own assessment of the TPM provisions in Bill C-32 based on correct information:

• Whether Bill C-32 properly implements the WIPO Treaties consistent with the practices of our trading partners
• Whether the Bill permits copying for fair dealing, educational, and other purposes
• Whether the circumvention exceptions in the Bill are flexible enough to deal with unforeseen or unintended consequences
• Whether Canada can properly implement the WIPO Treaties by limiting the prohibition on circumvention to an infringing purpose
• Whether other jurisdictions limit protection of TPMs to circumvention for an infringing purpose
• Whether circumvention of TPMs for the purposes of format shifting, time shifting, and making back-up copies for private purposes (private copying) ought to be permitted
• (Given that one of the legislative goals is to follow international standards) whether other jurisdictions permit exceptions for private copying to trump TPMs
• Whether an exception for private copying that permits circumvention of TPMs for such purpose would comply with the Berne Three Step Test
• Whether the WIPO Treaties which Canada has committed to ratify permit circumventing TPMs for private copying
• Whether Michael Geist`s two proposals for amending the TPM provisions in Bill C-32 (now Bill C-11) have international precedents.

Other posts such as the ones set out below also correct inaccurate statements made about legal protection for TPMs.

• Separating copyright fiction from facts about C-32’s TPM provisions
• Separating facts from hype about C-32
• Are the TPM provisions in C-32 more restrictive than those in the DMCA
• C-32 and the BlackBerry PlayBook: A reply to Michael Geist
• Dr. Ficsor TPMs and Flexibility (’The Ability of Bending Without Breaking’) – Why Should the TPM Provisions of Bill C-32 Protect Access Controls and Prohibit ‘Preparatory Acts”,
• Dr. Ficsor is right; Prof. Geist is wrong about the WIPO Internet Treaties
• Dr. Ficsor: An invitation to Canada to join the international community by ratifying the WIPO Internet Treaties
• Dr Ficsor Legends and reality about the 1996 WIPO Treaties in the light of certain comments on Bill C-32
• Dr Ficsor Only once more – and then Marry Christmas and Happy New Year to everybody, including Professor Geist and his devoted followers: the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference, the WIPO Treaties and the balance of interests
• Reflections on the liberal roundtable on the digital economy
• FACEBOOK FAIR FOR COPYRIGHT OF CANADA: REPLIES TO PROFESSOR GEIST
• ‘TPMs’’: A Perfect Storm for Consumers: Replies to Professor Geist

The Enablement Right

Section 27(2.3) of Bill C-11 would create a new cause of action referred to in the Bill as “enablement”. The Government background documents describe this new right and the rationale for it as follows:

The Bill gives copyright owners the tools to pursue those who wilfully and knowingly enable copyright infringement online, such as operators of websites that facilitate illegal file-sharing.

It recognizes that the most effective way to stop online copyright infringement is to target those who enable and profit from the infringements of others. By allowing copyright owners to pursue these “enablers”, such as illegal peer-to-peer file sharing sites, this Bill supports the development of significant legitimate markets for downloading and streaming in Canada. This supplements existing criminal punishments for those who aid and abet infringement.

The Government background documents also state that the “proposed legislation will ensure that services that enable infringement will not benefit from the liability limitations afforded to ISPs and search engines.”

From the appearances and submissions to the Legislative Committee that studied C-32, there is a consensus supporting the enablement provision. Michael Geist, however, opposes giving rights holders tools to go after pirate sites and services like IsoHunt calling into question the need for an enablement amendment. I responded to his contradictory posts on the state of Canadian secondary liability law in a blog post, Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist? I concluded that:

It is clear that Prof. Geist’s objective in this recent spate of activity is to persuade policy makers and the public that the new proposed enablement cause of action is not needed because Canada’s copyright laws are already robust enough to deal with what Minister Clement calls “the wealth destroyers” like IsoHunt. However, for years Prof. Geist has consistently and repeatedly been writing and telling the public that Canada’s laws related to authorization might not be effective against pirate sites and services and that Canada does not have contributory liability laws that can be used against these sites and services…

The only conclusion that can be drawn from a review of his writings is that he has either changed his long standing opinion about the state of Canadian law – now believing it is effective enough to shut down the wealth destroyers like IsoHunt- or that he is inaccurately describing what he believes Canadian law to be to oppose the amendments in Bill C-32 that are intended to give rights holders the tools needed to close down wealth destroyers.

While the new enablement right could be a very useful tool in fighting online pirate sites and services, it has some technical drafting deficiencies that need to be fixed to ensure that the new cause of action can be used as intended. Perrin Beatty of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce noted this in the Q&A at the press conference in Ottawa where he stated that the concept of “designed primarily to enable infringement” needed to be clarified and that this clarification is an “essential technical amendment to ensure that the bill in fact achieves the purpose for which it was intended.”

I addressed the drafting problems in My C-32 opening remarks to the Legislative Committee and in an article co-written with Dan Glover titled C-32 enablement remedy targets secondary copyright infringement. There we noted three of the technical amendments that are needed to ensure the Government`s objectives of targeting the “wealth destroyers” are met.

• First, Parliament must recognize that pirate sites and services often are “not designed primarily to enable” acts of copyright infringement. The design is very often neutral, but the site or service is operated to induce, aid or abet infringing activities, or is primarily operated or used for infringing purposes.
• Second, Parliament must ensure that this provision clearly trumps all of the online service provider exceptions to avoid a circumstance in which enablers like wealth destroying pirate hosting sites can avoid liability for enablement.
• Third, to provide an adequate and effective remedy against enablement, Parliament should confirm that rightsholders may rely on the full scale of statutory damages against those who are liable for enablement, regardless of whether such persons were operating for commercial purposes or not.

The Non-Commercial User-Generated Content (UGC) Exception

Bill C-11 contains a new exception that would permit individuals to use existing content to create new ‘user generated content’. The Government background documents describe this amendment and its objective as follows:

The Bill permits the use of legitimately acquired material in user-generated content created for non-commercial purposes. This applies only to creations that do not affect the market for the original material. Examples could include making a home video of your friends and family dancing to a popular song and posting it online, or creating a “mash-up” of video clips.

The Government background documents also state that the changes proposed are in “conformity with Canada’s international obligations”.

In My C-32 opening remarks to the Legislative Committee studying Bill C-32 I pointed out some of the unintended consequences of the draft wording in the UGC amendment stating the following:

This is an exception that, to my knowledge, does not exist anywhere else in the world.

From a technical drafting perspective, the exception is so widely cast that it would most likely violate Canada’s WTO TRIPS obligations. TRIPs mandates that exceptions must be subject to what is known internationally as the 3 step test.

The exception, as drafted, would permit individuals to do almost anything that the author could do with his/her work including creating translations, sequels, or other derivative works and publish them on the internet.

They could also create a “collective work” or “compilation” of works such as “the best” of a TV series or artists’ works, or iPod playlist and post those on the internet.

They can also do a lot more.

The result is that the author loses significant control over the uses of his/her work.

But, over and above this, there could be significant economic consequences to the author. The intention is to permit uses which have no effect on the market for the work. However, the drafting permits aggregate effects on the market for the work that could be very substantial.

Also, the individual’s use of the new UGC work must be non-commercial. But a web site operator can charge for disseminating the UGC work. But, the author gets none of that. They would however in other countries which don’t have this exception and which have let the market solve the problem.

I also highlighted some of the potential problems with the draft language of the UGC, format shifting, time shifting, and back-up copying exceptions in a speech on Bill C-32’s fair dealing and other new copyright exceptions at Osgoode Hall Law School’s professional development program on understanding Bill C-32.

Statutory damages

Bill C-11 would cap statutory damages against individuals who infringe copyright for non-commercial purposes to a range of between $100 and $5,000 for all works involved in the proceeding. It also specifically exempts persons who are liable under the new enablement provision from any statutory damages. The Government background documents describe this amendment and its objective as follows:

This Bill ensures that Canadians will not face disproportionate penalties for minor infringements of copyright by distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial infringement.

The Bill ensures that Canadians are not subject to unreasonable penalties by significantly reducing statutory damages for infringement for non-commercial purposes by individuals, providing the courts with the flexibility to award between $100 and $5,000 in total damages. Using the same example of five illegally downloaded songs, the individual would only be liable for a penalty of between $100 and $5,000 under the proposed changes. The Bill will ensure that courts take proportionality into account in awarding damages.

It appears that the rationale for capping statutory damages against individuals is to preclude large judgements against them when they engage in unauthorized downloading of copyright content over the internet. The underlying concern seems to stem from a fear that a Canadian court would award large damages such as have been awarded in the United States.

The existing Canadian and U.S. regimes are very different, however. In the U.S., the statutory damages per work infringed range from $750 to $30,000 for non-wilful infringements. This range can be increased to $750 to $150,000 for wilful infringements. Canada’s statutory damages range is lower- from $500 to $20,000- and cannot be increased even if the infringement is wilful. However, they can be reduced to a range of between $200 to $500 where a person, such as an individual, had no reasonable grounds to believe he or she was infringing. A Canadian Court also has the discretion to lower the damages to zero where there is multiple copying onto a single medium and the award would be grossly out of proportion to the infringement. The Canadian statutory damages regime, unlike the regime in the U.S., therefore already reflects a proportionality principle. Moreover, there has never been a case in Canada where a copyright owner has been awarded anything close to the maximum statutory damages against an individual who downloaded copies of copyright content from file sharing networks.

This Bill would accomplish the Government’s objectives of ensuring that Canadians will not face “disproportionate penalties for minor infringements of copyright by distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial infringement.” However, it does so in a way that undermines the Government’s objectives of deterring wide scale infringements and providing effective remedies against those infringements that can cause significant economic harm. For example:

• the proposal would cap the recovery of statutory damages against infringements undertaken by organized groups like those who trade in Warez – pirated copyrighted works distributed without fees or royalties and without any commercial purpose – in violation of copyright law.[4] This would effectively cap statutory damages at $5,000 for persons who cause large scale commercial damage, but who do so for reasons other than profit. Some of the most notorious pirates and pirate sites are operated for reputational rather than profit motives.
• the proposal would preclude recovery of statutory damages against any pirate site or service that was liable under the new enablement cause of action. If the site was operated for a non-commercial e.g. reputational, purpose statutory damages could be not be recovered. However, statutory damages would still not be recoverable even against a for profit pirate site or service because of the special exception for statutory damages according to such sites.[5] Ironically, under Bill C-11 a person who is liable for enablement – a “wealth destroyer” to use the words of former Industry Minister Tony Clement- would be subject to no statutory damages while an individual who causes minimal damage and who infringes for a non-commercial purpose would be.
• the proposal would cap statutory damages at $5,000 even though a person might copy, distribute, and make available over the internet hundreds of software, video games, e-books, movies, music and other copyright content that are downloaded by thousands of other individuals as long as these acts are done for “non-commercial purposes”; for example, it would enable individuals to copy and store entire libraries of works and to distribute them to all of the person’s friends, including all of the person’s friends on social networks, high school, university or work colleagues, and over file sharing networks like IsoHunt  to millions of potential downloaders, and the maximum statutory damages would still be $5,000.

In amending the statutory damages regime, the Government should not inadvertently undermine the usefulness of statutory damages which are necessary to ensure there are effective remedies against infringers, discourage infringement, reduce the costs of litigation, and encourage parties to settle litigation. When the statutory damages regime was enacted by the Government in 1997 (the same year Canada signed the WIPO Treaties), it explained the rationale for them as follows:

A copyright owner who commences proceedings for infringement must prove not only the infringement, but also the losses suffered as a result. However, it is often difficult, sometimes impossible, to prove such losses because evidence as to the extent of infringement is usually difficult and/or expensive to find. Statutory damages alleviate this difficulty by guaranteeing a minimum award of damages once infringement is established. They also ease the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in proceedings for infringement, deter future infringements, reduce the cost of litigation and encourage the parties to settle matters out of court.

The above rationale for statutory damages is still valid.

The Internet Service Provider and Search Engine Exceptions and Responsibilities

Bill C-11 contains four new exceptions referred to as the network service, caching, hosting, and information location tool (aka search engine or ILT) exceptions. The object of these exceptions is explained in the Government background documents as follows:

The Bill ensures that ISPs and search engines will not be held liable for the copyright infringements of their subscribers, to the extent that they are acting as neutral intermediaries (e.g., when they provide Internet access, allow users to download material they have stored in online personal storage space they control, or make temporary cached copies for network efficiency).

The bill will clarify that Internet service providers (ISPs) and search engines are exempt from liability when they act strictly as intermediaries in communication, caching, and hosting activities. The proposed legislation will ensure that services that enable infringement will not benefit from the liability limitations afforded to ISPs and search engines.

These provisions also require technical amendments to ensure the Government`s objectives are met. On March 22, 2010, TELUS, Bell and Rogers appeared before the Legislative Committee studying Bill C-32. who appeared for TELUS acknowledged that some technical amendments are needed to the ISP and ILT exceptions stating the following:

TELUS would support amendments that would give rights holders more powerful tools to go after those who actively enable infringement, and also amendments that would prevent the bad guys from taking advantage of the legal safe harbours intended to protect only the good guys…

TELUS does have some recommendations, but they’re relatively minor. They’re focused on making the notice and notice system work better, more efficiently, and more fairly for all the stakeholders involved. As I have also indicated, we recognize the concerns on the part of some rights holders that the provisions designed to protect innocent intermediaries may be drafted too broadly. They may allow not-so-innocent intermediaries to slip in underneath them. That’s not a desirable result, so we would certainly be open to amendments designed to tighten those up.

The Bill would also create a notice and notice regime. The process and its rationale are described in the Government background documents as follows:

The Bill formalizes the voluntary “notice and notice” regime currently used by Canadian ISPs. Under this system, when an ISP receives a notice from a copyright holder that a subscriber might be infringing copyright, it forwards a notice to the subscriber. The identity of the subscriber may then be released with a court order. This uniquely Canadian approach has been effective at discouraging infringement and is consistent with Canadian values.

A notice and notice process is somewhat useful in dealing with infringing activity across P2P networks and other transitory network communications. It should become part of Canadian law. Notice and notice is not effective, however, in permanently stopping online file sharing by users unless the individuals receiving the notices believe that sanctions could be imposed unless they stop such activity. We have had a de facto notice and notice system in Canada for many years and there is no empirical evidence that it materially changes people’s behaviour to stop illicit file sharing and purchase creative products from legitimate services. Research by our trading partners shows that while a simple notice may have a temporary effect in reducing online file sharing, only notices that have a threat of some sanction operate as an effective deterrent. I dealt with this issue in my submission to the Copyright Consultation in 2009 and in other blog posts including here and here.

Given the Government`s statements about copyright reform, it does not appear that any graduated response system will be put in place under any amendments to Bill C-11. However, as noted above in the testimony of Craig McTaggart some technical amendments are required to make the notice and notice system work as intended.

The Fair Dealing for Education Exception

Bill C-11 proposes to add education to the current list of fair dealing purposes. The Government background documents describe the proposed amendment and its objective as follows:

The Bill enables the use of copyrighted materials for the purpose of education, provided the use is “fair” (i.e., it does not harm the market for a work).

It expands fair dealing to recognize education in a structured context as a legitimate purpose.

As drafted, the proposed wording of the amendment would not accomplish the Government’s objective. The proposed amendment is not clearly limited to only enabling the use of copyrighted materials for the purpose of education “in a structured context”. Unlike all of the current educational purpose exceptions, the proposed amendment is not expressly limited to specific institutional beneficiaries. As well, the term “education” conveys a meaning that appears to go beyond any structured context.

Limiting the exception to dealings that are “fair” will also not ensure that the dealings do “not harm the market for a work. “Fairness” does not provide any assurance against this harm to rights holders. The courts in Canada have developed a list of six non-exclusive factors to assist in determining whether a dealing is fair. Of these six, the effect of the dealing on the work is only one factor to be considered. The Supreme Court in the CCH case stated that while the effect of the dealing on the market of the copyright owner is an important factor, “it is neither the only factor nor the most important factor that a court must consider in deciding if the dealing is fair.” This means that a court may be able to conclude that a dealing is fair even if it harms the market for a work. In contrast, in the United States, the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work is “the most important, and indeed, the central fair use factor”. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, (1985), Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens LP, (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010)

Prof. Giuseppina D’Agostino, a professor of Intellectual Property at Osgoode Hall Law School, in her testimony before the Legislative Committee stated the following in relation to the proposed new fair dealing exception:

This new purpose is too broad and invites years of litigation to clarify it, which will lead to access-to-justice issues and will force the courts to resolve matters that are for the government to legislate with confidence in so doing…

On fair dealing, one thing I haven’t talked about is my own analysis of the six factors. When you line up Canada with respect to the U.K. and the U.S., you see that the court says there are more or less six factors, and there could be more. At the same time, in terms of the effect of the dealing on the works–meaning the actual market considerations, the market substitute–the Supreme Court of Canada says that it’s not the only factor, nor the most important.

We know that this is not the case in the U.K. and not the case in the U.S. What we have in Canada with CCH is a broad and liberal interpretation of both the actual purposes and the fairness factor. Left unchecked, the way it’s configured now means that when you compound education plus CCH, you will have something broad, unless we are able to itemize exactly what we mean.

Ysolde Gendreau a professor of law at the University of Montreal and the President of Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI Canada) in her testimony before the Legislative Committee stated the following:

I would like to submit a few examples of this found in Bill C-32, which, in ALAI’s view, undermines the three-step principle, because these exceptions are too broad, because they are based on unrealistic conditions that, once again, make them too broad. Here we’re talking about fair dealing for the purpose of education, the new section 29. We’re talking about non-commercial user-generated content, private copying under section 29.22…

In a law review article on the subject of the proposed fair dealing exception Professor Gendreau also expressed the opinion that the term “education” would not be read to mean “education in a structured context” and that the proposed exception would likely not meet any of the steps in the Berne Three Step Test.[6]

Michael Geist published a series of blog posts commenting on the scope of this new exception including one entitled “Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion: Fair Dealing and Bill C-32”. He concluded that this amendment would not affect the balance between creators of educational materials and the users of such materials or negatively impact the market for publications. My colleague Dan Glover wrote a series of blog posts responding to the incorrect assertions made by Michael Geist and others and demonstrating the need for amendments to the new exception in order to meet Government’s objectives. The posts are:

• A Response to Professor Michael Geist’s Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion
• En réponse à Pour démêler la confusion à l’égard du droit d’auteur, du Professeur Michael Geist
• Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion (Part II)

The Copyright Exceptions to Encourage Innovation

Bill C-11 would create news exceptions for developing interoperable computer programs, encryption research, network security testing, and technological processes. The rationale for these exceptions is explained in the Government background documents as follows:

The Copyright Modernization Act aims to eliminate some of the uncertainty facing innovative businesses. Provisions aimed at the software industry permit the reproduction of software and the hacking of digital locks in order to engage in reverse engineering, security testing and encryption research. Such provisions support, for example, companies that test software for security flaws and then develop and sell patches. Where copyright owners believe these tools have been misused, they will have recourse to deal with any infringement or inappropriate hacking of digital locks. The Bill also clarifies that companies do not face any copyright liability for technical copies that are essential but incidental to a product or service they offer.

These amendments also need technical fixes to ensure that the Government`s objectives are met. The need for this was addressed by John Manley, the President and CEO of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, in his testimony before the Legislative Committee. After stating that he strongly endorsed “the overall thrust of this legislation” he said:

Having said that, I believe the committee may wish to consider certain technical changes to the bill so as to avoid unintended consequences. For example, important concerns have been raised with respect to the impact on Canada’s software industry of provisions dealing with encryption research, network security, reverse engineering and copying for interoperability purposes.

In addition, some of the language dealing with user-generated content and copying for private purposes may be too broad.

I also canvassed these amendments in a speech to the 14^th Annual IT.Can Conference titled Bill C-32’s impacts on the IT community.

Conclusion

After many failed attempts to modernize Canada’s copyright laws, it now appears there is a Bill before Parliament that will do this. The Copyright Modernization Act, however, still requires careful scrutiny to ensure that appropriate technical amendments are made so that the Government’s objectives are met and to avoid significant inadvertent consequences inconsistent with the Government’s objectives.

[2] Michael Geist accuses the book publishers of engaging in “a relentless misinformation campaign” against the fair dealing for education exception. His assertion is ironic since it is he that has engaged in this behaviour on copyright reform issues.

[3] See, James Gannon, TPMs: A comprehensive guide for Canadian copyright law

[4] See, Wikipedia, Warez http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warez

[5] Section 38.1(6)(d)

[6] Ysolde Gendreau Canada and the Three Step test: A Step in Which Direction? 15 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 309 (2011). In the article she said:

The purpose of education is introduced within the context of an exception, fair dealing, that does not have a statutory list of criteria for its evaluation. The fair dealing exception also entails that it applies to all categories of works and to all rights, reproduction rights as well as performing rights. Moreover, its application is not limited to educational institutions because of the following a contrario argument: the wording of the specific educational exceptions shows that they are intended for educational institutions while that of the fair dealing for the purpose of education makes no such mention. Consequently, the notion of education extends the application of this exception beyond educational institutions. Government representatives say that the exception is to be a test ground for exceptions that may eventually give rise to specific exceptions. However, they still maintain that it refers to education in a structured context.

It is easy to doubt such a statement because educational institutions do represent a structured context. Courts are likely to say that, in the absence of a specific reference to such institutions, the reference to “education” is not limited to structured contexts. So this new exception would introduce a very broad notion of education in a statute that does not include criteria for the appreciation of fair use either.

After discussing why the proposed exception would have difficulty passing all three of the three steps she concluded by saying:

Generally speaking, since the three-step test has become the standard by which to judge exceptions, I would say there is a fairly strong case for stating that the proposed provision on fair dealing for the purpose of education is so broadly drafted that it goes against the three-step test of the Berne Convention and of the TRIPS Agreement.

The UK Government also simultaneously published a series of  other reports including: Next steps for implementation of the Digital Economy Act, “Site blocking” to reduce online copyright infringement, Draft-Sharing-of-Costs statutory-instrument, Impact Assessment for the Sharing of Costs Statutory Instrument, Digital Economy Act Appeals Process: Options for reducing costs, International Strategy, and IP Crime Strategy.

The Government response makes it clear that intellectual property is of fundamental importance to economic growth, and that maximising its contribution relies on both enabling use of intellectual property and protecting it. The Government endorsed the Review’s view that it must  “not put our hugely important creative industries – or  any other IP-led business sector – at risk by what we do.  Managing that risk includes not only responding effectively to the challenges posed by technology, such as issues around enforcement of IP rights, but also seizing the opportunities for  growth that technology opens up.”

Several important plans are to:

• Bring forward proposals for an orphan works scheme that allows for both commercial and cultural uses of orphan works, subject to satisfactory safeguards for the interests of both owners of ‘orphan rights’ and rights holders who could suffer from unfair competition from an orphan works scheme.
• Bring forward proposals for extended collective licensing to benefit sectors that choose to adopt it, and look to maximise the benefits it could bring to smaller creative firms and individual creators in particular.
• Create “a limited private copying exception”; to widen the exception for noncommercial research, which should also cover both text- and data-mining to the extent permissible under EU law; to widen the exception for library archiving; and to introduce an exception for parody. These will be implemented “in ways that do not prejudice the provision of appropriate incentives for creation of works through the copyright system”.  No private copying levies are contemplated.

Following the successful defence of the Digital Economy Act provisions in judicial review, the Government is moving forward with the DEA initial obligations including plans to move ahead with the DEA notification system.

The Government decided not to bring forward regulations on site blocking under the DEA, at this time. Contrary to what has been widely reported, Ofcom did not rule out site blocking in the future and the Government stated it was “keen to explore the issues raised by Ofcom’s report and will be doing more work on what measures can be pursued to tackle online copyright infringement.”

Ofcom’s report concluded that blocking of infringing sites could potentially play a role in tackling online copyright infringement, but that the approach set out in the DEA was unlikely to be effective because the slow speed that would be expected from a full court process would provide site operators with the opportunity to change the location of the site long before any injunction could come into force. The Government noted that Section 17 and 18 of the DEA would not be faster than what is already available under section 97A of the UK CDPA. This process, which is required under Article 8(3) of the EU Copyright Directive, was just successfully used to obtain an order against BT to block access to the Newzbin file sharing web site in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) (28 July 2011) (summarized here).

The Government canvassed additional measures that could be used to block access to content besides those contemplated by sections 17 and 18 of the DEA. It concluded that additional effective measures include those available under section 97A of the UK CDPA, notice and takedown, domain seizures, squeezing site revenues, and search engine delisting.

According to the Ofcom report: Site blocking” to reduce online copyright infringement, the following additional processes are available:

Blocking injunctions: section 97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) gives the Court power to grant an injunction against a service provider “where that service provider has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright.” Such an injunction exists in addition to the power of the Court to grant an injunction in the context of an action for breach of copyright by a particular person.

Notice and take-down: where content is hosted in the UK copyright owners may ask the hosting service provider to take down the content at source. Where this happens the service provider can review the material and take its own view as to whether the content is infringing. YouTube offers a particularly interesting model of this. Where copyright owners identify content which they believe to be infringing, YouTube offers them tools to allow for the content to be taken down or actually monetised. The copyright owner can take a share of the advertising revenue on the page or use the page to promote the copyright owner’s own videos on YouTube. If the service provider chooses to remove the content then the party who has posted the content will typically be informed and given the opportunity to challenge the decision, with access to the content being re-instated if the service provider is persuaded that it is not infringing.

Under US law, there is a formal legal process for such a scheme, operated under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Service providers are provided with a safe-harbour, which grants them immunity from prosecution (under secondary infringement rules) where they operate within a specific framework in considering requests from copyright owners to block access to sites or to remove content where they are hosting it….

A notice and take-down scheme could provide a valuable complement to a technical blocking measure, essentially offering the service provider the opportunity to remove the content in question prior to a formal block being put in place. The opportunity for the site operator to remove infringing content ahead of a block being implemented could be helpful where the blocking technique carried a risk of over blocking. In this context, it is worth noting that the Italian communications regulator (AGCOM) is consulting on proposals for regulated notice and take-down scheme under which the regulator would have powers to require service providers to remove infringing content. That the removal of content was at the request of the regulator would, we assume, protect the service provider from liability.

De-listing from search index: some search engines, most notably Google, will de-list particular sites following the submission of evidence from a copyright owner that the site is infringing copyright. Application to de-list is submitted to Google via post or fax. Google will attempt to contact the site hosting the alleged infringing content and provide them with an opportunity to engage in the process before Google reaches its decision. De-listing can be an effective measure in so far as it makes it more difficult for users to find unlawful sites and it makes it easier to locate lawful alternatives, as they will appear higher on the search rankings than would otherwise be the case.

De-listing of infringing sites could increase the effectiveness of a blocking scheme. Whilst the operator of a site which has been blocked can move the site to an alternative IP address, URL or domain, if it cannot secure a listing for the new location on search engines then it will prove harder for users to find it and for the operator to effectively re-build its business.

Squeeze revenues: infringing sites can often appear legitimate to users and some are alleged to be successful at generating significant revenues. Some infringing sites charge a subscription fee, carry banner advertising for legitimate brands and often look more attractive to consumers than their lawful alternatives. It can be difficult for a consumer to know whether the site is indeed infringing. Many brand owners are unaware that their adverts are appearing on such sites until it is brought to their attention by copyright owners. Copyright owners have reported some success in persuading those brands to instruct their advertising agencies to withdraw ads from such sites. Similarly, credit card companies are reported by copyright owners as having been put under pressure to withdraw payment platform services from such sites. In addition to helping make the service appear less legitimate, the removal of payment platform services and advertising may make such sites less attractive to operate given the costs of bandwidth and storage required for operation, as well as the inconvenience caused by the disruption and from having to secure alternative payment platform services.

Domain seizures: a recent development in the U.S. has been the seizure of websites which were allegedly illegally streaming live content. In February, the U.S. Immigration and Customs and Enforcement (ICE) department executed a federal Court order in the Southern District of New York, seizing 10 websites. The websites were streaming coverage of National Football League, National Basketball Association and National Hockey League events. ICE has said publicly that further seizures will occur. Visitors to those sites were redirected to a banner advising that the domain name had been seized by the New York office of ICE because of criminal copyright violations. There may be a greater attraction to domain seizures in the US than would be the case in the UK, given that there are more significant domain registries with the US jurisdiction. We believe that such a measure, if implemented in the UK, would only be capable of a limited effect, given that it would only affect domains using “.uk” country code top-level domains. Site operators can respond to a seizure by registering their site in a different country. Whilst this is an inconvenience, it is not a significant barrier to the operation of unlawful sites. The approach could be made more effective through improved international cooperation amongst enforcement agencies, limiting the number of countries to which those subject to seizure orders can switch.

The Ofcom report concluded:

We believe that the measures outlined above could potentially play a role in support of a site blocking scheme, complementing the more technical approaches and, in some cases, helping to compensate for weaknesses inherent in the blocking techniques. A bill has been introduced in the US which would see many of these measures adopted to help the enforcement agencies and copyright owners to tackle infringing web sites based outside of the US. It is too early to predict the outcome for that proposal, but we believe there is value in considering further how such measures could be deployed to enhance the effectiveness of site blocking within the UK.

A main issue in the appeal was whether iiNet had an obligation to have and implement a policy to transmit notices of claimed infringement to its subscribers and to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers who used its systems and services to engage in file sharing. The trial judge had held that iiNet was not liable for infringement for refusing to do so. The appeal was rejected by a 2 to 1 majority, with Emmett and Nicholas JJ concurring in separate opinions that the appeal should be dismissed, and with Jagot J, who would have allowed the appeal.

All three judges were of the opinion that iiNet could have established and implemented a policy to forward notices of claimed copyright infringement to subscribers that could have included suspending and terminating the accounts of repeat infringers to avoid being liable for authorizing copyright infringement under Australia’s copyright laws. All three judges also held that iiNet’s obligation to act was premised on copyright holders providing cogent evidence of the alleged primary acts of infringement which took place using its services.

The main disagreement between the judges was whether iiNet had been provided with sufficient information to trigger the obligation to act. Jagot J. was of the opinion that iiNet was given everything required and in any event would not have acted irrespective of the information provided to it. Emmett and Nicholas JJ expressed the opinion that sufficient information had not been supplied. Nicholas J found that the fact that iiNet may not have acted irrespective of the information was “not to the point”.

Accordingly, while iiNet was exonerated on the facts, the opinions rendered in the case leaves it open for copyright holders in Australia to hold ISPs liable for authorizing infringement unless they take available steps to deal with infringements by their subscribers.

The decision is an important one for ISPs and rights holders in Australia. However, the decision also has global implications for policy makers that are concerned with finding practical and efficacious means of reducing the scourge of illegal online distribution of copyright content. I say this because in the course of giving reasons for decision, the judges of Australia’s appeal court canvassed the effectiveness of sending out notices of claimed infringement with warnings of potential account terminations and found they would be effective in reducing online file sharing. They also reviewed the reasonableness and practicality of requiring ISPs to implement a graduated response system including sending out these types of notices and adopting and implementing a process to terminate accounts of repeat infringers. They found such a process reasonable and workable.

As noted above, the main issue in the iiNet case was whether iiNet was liable for the authorizing infringement of its subscribers who used its systems and services to engage in illicit peer-to-peer file sharing. To make this determination the court canvassed a series of issues including whether its subscribers were liable for copyright infringement when they used the BitTorrent protocol to share movies and television programming and whether failing to implement a graduated response system rendered iiNet liable for authorizing infringement.

Liability of subscribers for copyright infringement

The first issue in the case was the extent of infringement by iiNet subscribers using BitTorrent to engage in file sharing of movies and TV programming. While iiNet had admitted that users had infringed copyright, it claimed that they only ever did so once and that there were no further infringements for iiNet to prevent. The trial judge had agreed. The trial judge had found that users of BitTorrent had infringed copyright, however the parties disagreed on the extent of infringements taking place and this was potentially relevant to the obligations that iiNet would be under to act on the infringements. The trial judge had also found that users of BitTorrent only ever infringed copyright once, the first time the file was shared with other users, irrespective of the duration the file was available to other BitTorrent users.

All of the appeal judges reversed the finding and found that the uploaders were liable for multiple infringements of copyright.

Australia has implemented the WIPO Internet Treaties. Accordingly, unlike Canada, its copyright laws include a right of making available a work to the public. All judges of the court accepted that when an individual uploads a file to make it available for sharing over a BitTorrent network, the person is liable for infringement under the making available right. The court also held that each time an individual connected to the internet, a separate act of making the work available to the public occurred.  All of the judges also agreed that the electronic transmissions made by subscribers as part of a BitTorrent swarm involved transmissions that were “to the public”. However, the judges disagreed as to whether the evidence before the court established that files or substantial parts of files were communicated to the public when transmitted by the BitTorrent protocol.

Authorization

The main issue in the case was whether iiNet was liable for the illegal file sharing of its customers under the theory of authorization. Section 101(1) of Australia’s copyright law establishes liability for authorization in Australia:

101 (1)  Subject to this Act, a copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part is infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or authorizes the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.

The Australian Act was amended in 2000 by inserting into s. 101 a new subsection 1(A) to provide a practical enforcement regime for copyright owners and to promote access to copyright material online.  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005); Universal Music Pty Ltd. v. Cooper, [2005] FCA 972 (Aust. F.C.). The provision states that in deciding whether a person has authorized the doing in Australia of any act comprised in the copyright, the matters that must be taken into account by the Court include:

(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act concerned;

(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the person who did the act concerned;

(c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act, including whether the person complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.

In the course of analyzing the above factors, and in particular factors (a) and (b), the judges canvassed whether iiNet had the power to prevent illegal file sharing by its subscribers and could take reasonable steps to prevent or avoid these infringements by implementing a graduated response system. The judges of the court expressed the unanimous opinion that iiNet had such a power and that taking steps to adopt and implement a graduated response system would be reasonable and likely effective to prevent repeat infringements by its subscribers – even though two judges found that on more limited grounds it was not unreasonable for iiNet not to act in this case (based on the knowledge iiNet had before the case had been filed).

Effectiveness of a notice and notice regime coupled with a threat of account termination

iiNet had argued in the appeal that it should not be required to send its subscribers notices of claimed infringement with warnings of potential account terminations because such notices would not be effective in stemming online file sharing. Some Canadian ISPs have had a de facto notice and notice system in Canada for years. Despite this, there is no evidence that it changes people’s behavior to stop illicit file sharing and purchase creative products from legitimate services. However, as I and others have pointed out elsewhere, research by our trading partners shows that a notice with a threat of some sanction will operate as an effective deterrent. Opinions rendered by the iiNet court provides added support for the that fact that notices are likely to be effective in reducing infringements when coupled with potential action such as suspension or termination of accounts of customers that fail to heed such notices.

Emmett J. expressed this opinion as follows:

There was no finding by the primary judge that infringing acts engaged in by iiNet users were engaged in, in circumstances where the customer whose account was being used knew, or had reason to suspect, that infringement was involved. It may well be that an iiNet user would not know that, by downloading the Films by means of the BitTorrent System, there was infringement. It may be that an iiNet customer was unaware that the service provided to that customer was being used for infringement. A warning, coupled with reference to the entitlement of iiNet to terminate the service, may well be sufficient to persuade a customer to desist from engaging in such conduct or to take steps to ensure all users of that customer’s service desist. It is one thing to be aware of a prohibition on infringement of copyright. It is another thing to be aware that specific acts engaged in actually constitute infringement.

It may be possible that some, or indeed many, customers would disregard a warning given by iiNet. However, it does not follow, from that possibility, that all customers would disregard a warning or even that most customers would do so. Even if many customers may disregard a warning, compliance by others would prevent further infringement involving the accounts of those customers from taking place. Every time a user of the internet leaves a BitTorrent swarm, the supply of copyright material made available online within the swarm would be reduced and the opportunity for other internet users to infringe copyright would therefore also be reduced.

Giving clearly worded and accurate warning to a customer whose account was thought to be involved in acts of infringement is a reasonable step that could have been taken by iiNet, regardless of whether the warning would have been heeded by every customer. There is no basis for concluding that all, or even a substantial proportion, of iiNet’s customers would permit their accounts to continue to be used for acts of infringement if they were properly warned that the acts constituted infringement and their attention was drawn to their contractual obligations and iiNet’s contractual right to enforce those obligations by suspension or termination.

Nicholas J expressed a similar opinion:

The primary judge seems to have come to the conclusion that the giving of a warning could not be a reasonable step for the purposes of s 101(1A)(c) because the mere giving of a warning is not a power to prevent. I would accept that the ability to give a warning is not in itself a power to prevent for the purpose of s 101(1A)(a). However, s 101(1A)(c) is concerned with a different matter namely, what “reasonable steps” the alleged authoriser might have taken to prevent or avoid any of the relevant acts of copyright infringement.

I am satisfied that the primary judge erred in holding that the giving of a warning could not be a reasonable step that might be taken to prevent or avoid the relevant acts of copyright infringement. If the ability to give a warning is supported by a power to terminate or suspend a subscriber’s account then there can be no doubt that the giving of a warning is capable of amounting to a reasonable step for the purpose of s 101(1A)(c).

So did Jagot J:

It is also difficult to accept that most people when notified of copyright infringement by them or a person using their service would simply ignore the notice unless threatened with termination. Not all people would be aware of the risk of acting unlawfully in downloading films and television shows from the internet. Not all people would be aware that their downloading activities can be monitored both by third parties (such as copyright owners using software like the DtecNet agent) and internet service providers. When confronted by a mere notice or warning with evidence both of copyright infringement (either by them or another person they permitted to use their internet service) and the ease with which it can be detected by third parties, it is difficult to accept that there would be no deterrent effect whatsoever. To the contrary, it could readily be assumed that many people on receipt of a mere notice or warning would be deterred from future infringements irrespective of termination. The fact is that by receipt of a mere notice or warning people would realise that activities they might have thought innocent or at least undetectable were in fact unlawful and open to scrutiny.

The judges also commented on the reasonableness of an ISP with a contractual right to terminate an account doing no more than merely posting a policy on a website warning customers about this policy. They did not view taking these steps as being sufficient to constitute a reasonable response to the infringements. Emmett J, for example, stated the following:

The language of s 101(1A)(c) requires an enquiry as to any steps that were taken by iiNet and whether there were reasonable steps that were not taken. The Infringement Notices specifically invited iiNet to cancel, suspend or restrict the accounts of the customers identified in the spreadsheets enclosed with them. Merely having a contractual provision relating to copyright infringement and drawing attention to the contractual provision on its website is hardly an effective step to prevent infringement, in circumstances where iiNet does not enforce the contractual provision.

Reasonableness  of account termination

The judges of the Full Court also canvassed in detail the reasonableness and practicality of iiNet adopting and implementing a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers. The primary judge had held that implementing such a system would not be reasonable, apparently under any circumstances. Critics of effective enforcement of copyright like Prof. Geist have relied on this holding to argue against requiring ISPs to ever take steps to suspend or terminate accounts of repeat infringers. However, the Full Court expressly disagreed with the primary judge on this issue and delivered a strong endorsement of such steps in order to prevent continuation of copyright infringement.

Emmett J. pointed out that iiNet terminated user accounts for other reasons. He also pointed out that terminating a user’s account where the user uses the account in violation of contractual terms of service to infringe copyright is reasonable and was exactly the step contemplated by the safe harbour provisions of the copyright law.

Even where a service provider such as iiNet has the benefit of the Safe Harbour Provisions, the Court is specifically empowered, under s 116AG(3)(b), to order termination of a specified account. It can hardly be concluded, therefore, that termination was, per se, unreasonable. Rather, the Copyright Act itself contemplates such a step. Accordingly, it must be regarded as a reasonable step, at least in some circumstances, including circumstances involving repeat infringements, to terminate or suspend an account of a customer.

Thus, iiNet had the capacity to control the use of its services by its customers and to take steps to prevent acts of infringement by the use of services provided to them. In some circumstances, iiNet did in fact exercise control over the provision of its services. The presence of such provisions amounted to a degree of power to prevent further acts of infringement that was significant, for the purposes of s 101(1A)(a). That power arose from the relationship between iiNet and its customers under the customer relationship agreements, the nature of which is significant for the purposes of s 101(1A)(b).

There is no reason to conclude that sending warnings would be unreasonable, given that iiNet’s business routinely involved sending warnings to users in a variety of circumstances, such as when fees were overdue. There is no reason to view a temporary suspension as unreasonable, particularly when iiNet had the right to terminate the service altogether. The period of a temporary suspension would be a matter for consideration in any given case. A very long suspension for a very minor infringement may be unreasonable. However, that is not a reason for concluding that no suspension could ever be reasonable…

iiNet says, nevertheless, that termination of an account was not a reasonable exercise of a power to prevent because it would involve disconnection of the customer from the internet. Disconnection would not, in itself, prevent infringement because of the possibility of the customer obtaining access to the internet through another carriage service provider. On the other hand, disconnection would do much more, in that the whole relationship between iiNet and its customer would be ended, thereby foreclosing all internet activity by that customer by means of iiNet’s service.

However, it is difficult to see why that consequence is unreasonable, if the customer, having been warned that the service being provided to the customer by iiNet was being used to engage in infringing acts, that to do so was a breach of contract and that continuing to do so may result in termination, nevertheless chooses to continue to permit the iiNet service to be used to engage in infringing acts. It may be unreasonable to terminate an account without warning. However, that is not the question.

Jagot J reached the same conclusion rejecting the contention that adopting and implementing a graduated response system was unreasonable.

Despite this, iiNet adopted and maintained thereafter a clearly stated position that the AFACT notices did not identify any actual infringing user and, in any event, that iiNet had no obligation to do anything in response. This first aspect of iiNet’s position was adopted despite iiNet knowing not only that it could match IP addresses to customer accounts but also that its policies for dealing with other forms of unlawful or abusive activity assumed that it would do so and thereby hold customers responsible for all use on their accounts…

Another reason I take a different view is that iiNet’s position on the use of its service in a manner infringing copyright was not only inconsistent with its approach to other management issues (such as customers not paying bills or exceeding their quota), but also inconsistent with its approach to other types of internet abuse (such as spamming). The unavoidable inference is that when its own interests were at stake, iiNet exhibited no hesitation in: – (i) using IP addresses to identify the relevant customer accounts, (ii) treating the customer as responsible for all use of the iiNet service on the customer’s account, and (iii) promulgating a regime of warnings, suspension and termination (albeit discretionary) of the customer’s account. However, when its own interests were either not at stake or, at worst, might have been adversely affected by taking action, iiNet adopted a contrary position…

…it is feasible for an internet service provider to respond to the receipt of credible evidence of copyright infringements by users of its service…there is no particular difficulty with an internet service provider holding a customer responsible for the use of that customer’s service (consistent, in this case, with iiNet’s CRA and other policies about internet use)…

An internet service provider is confronted by precisely the same problems when dealing with spamming and other forms of internet abuse. iiNet has been able to formulate (and presumably implement) its policy for dealing with network abuse…

I do not see the expense and complexity of implementing a policy or scheme of warnings and suspension or termination as insuperable difficulties rendering the taking of such steps as unreasonable. The trial judge considered that the complexity and expense of such a scheme “manifestly militates against the conclusion that such scheme is a relevant power to prevent” (at [435]). For the reasons given, I consider that this conclusion does not accord with either the factual reality (that iiNet was capable of implementing equivalent schemes to deal with other issues such as network abuse and spamming) or the legislative scheme (which, by the safe harbour provisions, contemplates schemes of this very kind at least for repeat offenders).

Nicholas J. reached a similar conclusion.

Nor do I think that the difficulties involved in establishing a system for giving warnings and, if necessary, termination or suspension of accounts, were likely to be as great as Mr Malone’s evidence might suggest. It is true that the respondent, if it was to take the step of issuing warnings in particular cases, would need to decide when it would be appropriate to do so. To that end, the respondent would need to decide, among other things, whether the available material was sufficient to satisfy itself that it was appropriate for a warning to be issued or for an account to be terminated. It is also true that the respondent would need to decide how many warnings should be given (unless it decided that no warnings need be given) before terminating or suspending service to a particular subscriber. These and like questions involve matters of judgment and degree. As I have already acknowledged, the decision as to whether or not to terminate a particular account may not be a simple one. But I do not accept that the adoption of some system providing for the issuing of warnings followed by termination or suspension is not a reasonable step which the respondent could have taken for the purpose of preventing or avoiding copyright infringement by users of its network.

Nicholas J, also expressed the opinion that in the absence of a industry code of conduct that iiNet had considerable flexibility as to how to design an effective and fair graduated response process.

Nevertheless, in the absence of applicable regulations or access codes which might guide an ISP’s decision making in relation to such questions, it seems to me that an ISP should be given considerable latitude when working out the detail of such a system. It is always possible to argue that a system for the issue of warnings and termination could be tougher than it is. But it would be difficult to criticise an ISP on that account if it acted in good faith to devise and implement a system that involved taking such steps against subscribers who the ISP was satisfied had used (or permitted others to use) its facilities for the purpose of committing flagrant acts of copyright infringement.

The knowledge of infringement requirement

All of the judges accepted that the reasonableness of iiNet being required to take steps to forward notices of claimed infringement and to terminate accounts depended on its having reliable evidence that an account was being used to infringe copyright. On the facts of the case, two out of the three judges expressed the opinion that the information given to iiNet was not adequate to meet the required standard. In the final analysis that was the chief (possibly sole) reason why the appeal was dismissed.

Nicholas J. stated that to trigger a graduated response by an ISP, a notice of claimed infringement sent to the ISP must contain an explanation of how the information about the subscriber infringement was collected. He also suggested that a notice addressed to an ISP should contain a statement verifying the accuracy of the data or the reliability of the methods used to collect it. Emmett J, stated that what is required is

unequivocal and cogent evidence of the alleged primary acts of infringement by use of the iiNet service in question. Mere assertion by an entity such as AFACT, with whatever particulars of the assertion that may be provided, would not, of itself, constitute unequivocal and cogent evidence of the doing of acts of infringement. Information as to the way in which the material supporting the allegations was derived, that was adequate to enable iiNet to verify the accuracy of the allegations, may suffice. Verification on oath as to the precise steps that were adopted in order to obtain or discern the relevant information may suffice but may not be necessary.

Emmett J, would also have imposed two additional requirements on copyright owners before requiring them to voluntarily adopt and implement a graduate response process. First, that the copyright owners had undertaken “to reimburse iiNet for the reasonable cost of verifying the particulars of the primary acts of infringement alleged and of establishing and maintaining a regime to monitor the use of the iiNet service to determine whether further acts of infringements occur. Second, that the copyright owners had also undertaken to “indemnify iiNet in respect of any liability reasonably incurred by iiNet as a consequence of mistakenly suspending or terminating a service on the basis of allegations made by the Copyright Owner.” Emmett J, was the only judge to have added these two requirements.

The issue of whether iiNet had sufficient knowledge of the infringements to act was a hotly disputed issue. However while the trial judge had held that even though iiNet did not have a complete understanding it had decided from the second notice that it would never act on the notices irrespective of the information supplied to it.  Despite the fact that this finding was unchallenged, the majority judges (Emmett J and Nicholas J) did not consider the decision of the ISP not to act was determinative.  In a strong dissent, Jagot J reached the opposite conclusion.

Some reflections on the iiNet case

Online file sharing is a major problem in Canada. Recent research in Canada and elsewhere demonstrates the adverse impacts and economic losses that result from illicit online file sharing in the film and music industries.

The findings of the Full Court in the iiNet case show that graduated response processes can be effective, reasonable, and fair mechanisms to reduce illegal file sharing. In fact, although not referred to in the decision, last year the Irish High Court in EMI Records & Ors -v- Eircom Ltd, [2010] IEHC 108 reach a similar conclusion. The Irish court held that a graduated response solution to illegal file sharing involving “detection, notification and termination” “is viable and proportionate”. Other academic research supports this view as well. See, Prof.Bomsel Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Graduated Response, Prof.Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers—Is the ‘‘Graduated Response’’ a Good Reply?, See also, Barry Sookman and Dan Glover Graduated response and copyright: an idea that is right for the times.

The iiNet decision provides useful guidance on how Bill C-32 could be amended to better achieve the stated objectives of the Government and the opposition parties. Bill C-32 already contains a notice and notice regime which requires online service providers to forward notices of claimed infringement to end users. The current proposed notice and notice process lacks efficacy, however, because the notices do not carry any threat of sanction for repeat infringers. The iiNet decision suggests that an additional requirement to mandate online service providers to adopt and implement a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers would be an efficacious and reasonable way to reduce online file sharing in Canada.

* Links updated Mar. 13, 2011

The slides include a summary of the following cases and statutory references:

Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia, 2010 SCC 4

Internet Broadcasting Corporation Ltd. v Mar LLC [2009] EWHC 844 (Ch)

Gammasonics Institute for Medical Research Pty Ltd v Comrad Medical Sysytems Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 267 (9 April 2010)

Kingsway Hall Hotel Ltd. v Red Sky IT (Hounslow) Ltd. [2010] EWHC 965

BSkyb Ltd v HP Enterprise Services UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 86 (TCC) (26 January 2010)

Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc., 2010 ONCA 29

Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v Anadisk LLC 2010 WL 565392 (S.D.Fla. Feb 18, 2010)

Defrontes v Dell Inc. 984 A.2d 1061 (Sup.Ct.RH.Isld.2009)

Major v McCallister (Miss.CT.App. Dec 23, 2009)

DC Laboratories, Inc. v. Hach Co., 2009 WL 2605270 (C.D.Ill.,Aug 25, 2009)

Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc. 668 F.Supp.2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

Tradecomet.com LLC v Google, Inc. 2010 WL 779325 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010)

Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 684 F.Supp.2d 313 (E.D.N.Y.2010.)

LTVN Holdings LLC v. Odeh 2009 WL 3736526 (D.Md.2009)

Brodsky v. Match.com LLC  2009 WL 3490277 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009)

Miller v. Facebook, Inc., No. 09-02810 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2010)

National Auto Lenders, Inc. v. SysLOCATE, Inc. 2010 WL 527866 (S.D.Fla.Feb. 10, 2010)

Carimate v. Ginsglobal Index Funds 2009 WL 3233538 (C.D.Cal.Sept.30, 2009)

Thomas & Anor v BPE Solicitors (A Firm) [2010] EWHC 306 (Ch) (19 February 2010)

Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61

Crookes v. Newton, 2009 BCCA 392, (leave to SCC granted)

Metropolitan International Schools Ltd. v Designtechnica Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB) (16 July 2009)

R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8

Review of the Internet traffic management practices of Internet service providers, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-657, Oct. 21, 2009)

Bill C-22 An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service

Notice Paper, May 25, 2010 – INTRODUCTION OF GOVERNMENT BILLS http://ow.ly/1OatI

Lucasfilm Ltd & Ors v Ainsworth & Anor [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 (16 December 2009)

Editions du Seuil v Google Inc, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 3ème chambre, 2ème section Ruling of December 18, 2009

Columbia Pictures Industries Inc v Fung  2:06-cv-05578-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2010)

Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v Reddy CS (OS) No. 894/2008 (H.C.Delhi. Nov. 23, 2009)

Sheppard & Anor, R v [2010] EWCA Crim 65 (29 January 2010)

PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-010 Report of Findings – Assistant Commissioner recommends Bell Canada inform customers about Deep Packet Inspection

Johnson et al. v. Microsoft Corp. (W.D. Wash., June 2009)

EMI Records & Ors -v- Eircom Ltd,  [2010] IEHC 108

PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-013 Publisher collected and used e-mail addresses for marketing without consent

R. v. Cuttell, 2009 ONCJ 471

Carter v. Connors, 2009 NBQB 317

Warman v. Fournier et al, 2010 ONSC 2126

Boring v Google Inc. 2010 WL 318281 (3rd.Cir.Jan 28, 2010)

PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-008 Report of Findings into the Complaint Filed by CIPPIC against Facebook Inc (July 22, 2009)

Poliquin v. Devon Canada Corporation, 2009 ABCA 216 (Alta.C.A.)

Bill S-4: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (identity theft and related misconduct) (in force Jan 8, 2010)

Bill C-28 Fighting Internet and Wireless Spam Act

BILL C-29 An Act to amend PIPEDA

SOCAN v. Bell Canada, 2010 FCA 123

Telstra Corporation Limited v. Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd. [2010] FCA 44 (8 February 2010)

RecordTV Pte Ltd v MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 287

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v  iiNet  Limited (No. 3) [2010] FCA 24 (4 February 2010)

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. Newzbin Ltd., [2010] EWHC 601 (Ch) (29 March 2010)

Arista Records LLC v Usenet.com Inc. 91 USPQ2d 1744 (S.D.N.Y.2009)

EMI Records & Ors -v- Eircom Ltd, [2010] IEHC 108

Columbia Pictures Industries Inc v Fung  2:06-cv-05578-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009)

Arista Records, LLC v Lime Wire Group  2010 WL 1914816 (S.D.N.Y.2010)

Sony BMG  Music Entertainment v Tenenbaum, 2009 WL 4547019 (D.Mass. Dec 7, 2009).

Brein v Mininova. B.V., District Court of Utrecht, 26 August 2009

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc. (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2010)

Autodesk, Inc v Dassault Systems Solidworks Corp. 2009 WL 5218009 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 31, 2009)

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v eBay Inc. 600 F.3d 93 (2nd.Cir.2010)

Google France v Louis Vuitton Malletier, Official Journal of the European Union 22.5.2010

Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp. 2010 WL 1713241 (Cal.App. 6 Dist.2010)

DOCS-#1270489-V10-Sookman TCLG 2010 Year in Review

Reasonable people should be able to discuss civilly what should be done about the problem of digital piracy in Canada. Attacks against CRIA and Minister Moore by Prof. Geist this week suggest, however, that the debates over copyright reform this spring are not going to turn out that way.

The IFPI report and the Heritge Committee

According to the IFPI, digital piracy remained one of the biggest obstacles for the recording industry in its efforts to grow the online music business. The availability of free unauthorised music undermined the incentive to buy legal products. Nearly one in four people who download music illegally never buy music. This has lead to significant losses in revenues and jobs.

According to the IFPI, weak IP protection in Canada has limited the development of new business models here. It claims that Canada has seen one of the biggest declines in music sales among the major music markets, with sales more than halving since 1998. This decrease is higher than that of any other top 10 market during this period, except for Spain. The major reason given for the decline is the inability of the digital sector to offset the drop in the CD business with digital sales. According to the report:

“Canada has one of the most advanced broadband markets and one of the highest per capita GDP rates in the world. Traditionally, the value of Canada’s physical market has been the equivalent of around 10% of the US physical market. Yet, its digital music market is only around 4% of the size of the US digital market and less than a third of the UK’s digital market size. This unfulfilled potential in the digital sector is a direct result of the lack of new entrants in the market, an extremely high online piracy rate and the lack of modern and robust IP protection for the digital space.”

The IFPI claims that Canada’s digital piracy rate is estimated at 96%, one of the highest levels of online piracy in the world. This translated into much lower per digital capita revenue than in other countries. It also claimed that Canada is a major source of the world’s digital piracy problem, with a disproportionate number of illegal sites being in Canada. The IFPI attributes this, in large part to, the fact that Canada has weak and ineffective laws to protect creative products including our failure to enact legislation to enable Canada to ratify the WIPO Treaties.

The IFPI also linked Canada’s weak IP frameworks to the failure of digital retailers to launch innovative services desired by consumers in Canada such as AmazaonMP3, MySpace Music, Nokia Come with Music, Spotify and Deezer.

The IFPI report echoed many of the submissions made to the Heritage Committee last week by Darlene Gilliland director of business development for Universal Music Canada, Charlie Millar the director of digital business development for Warner Music, Loreena McKennitt a world famous artist and an owner of a Canadian independent label, and Graham Henderson the president of CRIA.

Darlene Gilliland told the committee about the problems that digital piracy were causing to the Canadian music business:

“Despite our efforts, despite managing to grow our digital business slightly every year, our digital marketplace in Canada is on track to cap out well below our market potential, and well below the level that other developed markets will reach…

We attribute it, in large part, to the lack of a robust copyright regime and protection for creators’ works in our country, especially when we stack Canada up beside our international peers. Our peers have had these protections for a long time.

When technology companies see the piracy that flourishes here in Canada, and the uncertainty in our laws, they are apt to invest elsewhere-and they do. The result is that Canadian creators and consumers miss out on innovative music services that are launching elsewhere in the UK, in France, in Sweden, and in the United States. We miss out on the jobs, revenue, taxes, and consumer choice that come with them.”

She also pointed out that her label invests in music and in Canadian talent and culture. But our laws create a climate in which the product of our investment competes with “free”. She stressed that the industry can’t compete without the government assistance in “making sure creators’ work product receives the same level of protection through copyright as a technology company receives through the patent on its touch screen on their phone.” That is because “All intellectual property industries depend on mechanisms put in place by government to foster innovation, encourage investment, and protect creators. We are no different.”

Charlie Millar advocated for creating a legal environment to deter piracy and to facilitate doing business digitally. He said:

“In summary, how can government help? From a sales perspective, from a digital business development perspective, assistance with deterring pirate lean forward behaviour. Two, implementing ubiquitous government deterrent measures so that Canada and all its provinces can become an environment for digital entrepreneurship and service. Specifically, creating a location for foreign direct investment and/or domestic next generation technology. And I hope we can do it so it’s export ready.

From a free market perspective, industry is willing and able to sell Canada to the world, but it is essential for government to set up appropriate ground rules for the digital business, the digital music business, to be successful.” He also told the Committee that “Because of the lack of copyright reform in this country we’re watching foreign direct investment diminish. We’re watching technology at the next generation level go elsewhere.”

Loreena McKennitt discussed the difficulties with making investments in Canada given our weak copyright laws and described the impacts of piracy on the cultural industries and the wider economy. Talking about her own personal experience she stated:

“In my company, we confront the new realities every day, and we have been hard at work trying to offer new products in new ways and fully leverage the new technologies, but I am here to tell you that making predictions and investments is impossible without some stability in the fundamental recognition and protection of intellectual property.

And it is not just my own revenue stream that is affected, but the jobs of many talented people I have employed over the years. I would like to just give you a sample. They include many recording studios that no longer exist, engineers who specialize in recording classical or acoustic instruments, technicians, their suppliers and administrative staff, graphic artists, photographers, makeup artists, mastering companies, CD manufacturers such as Americ Disc in Quebec, retailers large and small, many now defunct such as Sam the Record Man, or printers such as the Stratford Beacon Herald, publicists, travel agents, airlines, musical equipment suppliers, insurance companies, and local media advertising outlets, caterers, and on it goes….

It may be fashionable in some corners to say the arts don’t really provide much employment or revenue to society, but when I look at my small company which once had 15 employees and now has 5, and then extrapolate that to the whole industry, the scope of this calamity which presently exists cannot be underestimated.”

She also warned against buying into the “free culture” mentality being advocated by those sitting in ivory towers and creating public confusion about what really is at stake:

“It is essential that Canada not be considered a pirate nation when it comes to both regulating and realizing the full advantage of all the advantages of new media…

Nor must we allow clever manipulation of language and media to create confusion in the minds of the public as to what the real issues are, especially by those who have hidden vested interests, or who operate in theory and not in the reality of actual business.

The watchdogs must be able to see through the smokescreen created by those who operate, not by permission, not even by forgiveness, but from a strategy of taking what they can get away with before someone gives notice and takes them down.”

Graham Henderson also criticized the view espoused by opponents of effective copyright reform that we don’t need new or effective measures to help our digital businesses. He called for the Government to support “the sort of rule based environment that practically everybody else in the world has.”

Attacks against CRIA and Minister Moore by Prof. Geist

In response to Mr. Henderson’s appearance before the Heritage Committee, Prof. Geist posted a blog in which he accused CRIA of refusing “to actually specify what reforms it supports” and that it said “virtually nothing specific about what it actually seeks”at the Committee.

This is an unfounded claim since Mr Henderson actually did discuss what reforms CRIA believed are needed at the Committee. He talked about notice and notice, graduated response, notice and takedown, implementation of the WIPO Treaties, and the pros and cons of further copyright levies. For example:

Expanded Copyright Levies: Mr Henderson stated that his members were not against an expanded levy, but did not want to see it expanded in a way that would undermine “a thriving, legitimate digital music market in Canada in which everybody can be fairly compensated.” He stated that “We do not support levies that have the effect of laundering illegally acquired music into legal copies which would have the effect of destroying our marketplace.”

WIPO Treaties: Mr Henderson advocated that Canada should implement the WIPO Treaties. He said, referring to the World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties, “One solution–the best solution… is to implement a set of laws or rules which will provide an environment that will encourage creation and investment.That is what the intellectual property organization treaties were designed to do,and when you see them implemented then you very clearly see a migration from illegal back to legal”. (emphasis added) He reiterated the need to implement the WIPO Treaties again when discussing graduated response. (See below)

Notice and Notice: Mr. Henderson stated that notice and notice is useful as an educational tool, but is not effective by itself to stem online piracy. He said: “So do I like notice and notice regimes? I think they could be a fantastic educational tool. Are they the solution? Do they work? Practice has shown that they simply don’t work.” What is needed is a system of giving notices that have consequences for not stopping illegal behaviour: “Notice and notice can be a fabulous educational tool, but without consequences it can pose a long-term problem”.

Graduated Response: Mr Henderson stated that we are “at a stage in our copyright evolution that contemplating something like a graduated response” is necessary. He specifically referred to the developments in other countries like France, South Korea, and England which “are taking very aggressive stances to protect their creators.” He then stated that the first step is to complete the agenda started with Bills C-60 and C-61. “We’re nowhere near taking the steps that France has to protect its creative class and, in fact, its business community. But I would argue that to simply, as a very baseline, implement the intellectual properties treaties as contemplated by, for example, C-61, or before that Bill C-60 is the first step on that road.”

Notice and Takedown: Mr Henderson also endorsed notice and takedown as an important tool for dealing with infringing content hosted by service providers. He said: “As for notice and take-down…everybody else in the world seems to have it and they don’t seem to have a problem with it.”

Based on his claim that CRIA was not forthcoming before the Committee, Prof. Geist then accused CRIA of relying “on the sort of backdoor, lobbyist-inspired meetings that are the talk of Ottawa due to the Rahim Jaffer situation.” Comments on this statement on his blog expressed amazement at the offensiveness of the allegation. One commentator said “Wow, a mudslide.” Another said “I think the Rahim Jaffer/backroom deal reference in Mr. Geist’s piece is sleazy.” Chris Castle also did a specific blog post on the statement ,Geist goes after Canadian labels group for “access”.

This week Prof. Geist also launched a broadside against Minister Moore suggesting he might be called the The iPadLock Minister. This attack was supported by nothing more than his claim that “according to the scuttlebutt throughout the copyright community, Moore may be less iPod and more iPadlock”. No particulars were given as to what lead Prof. Geist to come to this conclusion or the source of the scuttlebutt.

The attack on Minister Moore also is also unfounded. Minister Moore along with Minister Clement worked tirelessly throughout the copyright reform consultations last summer to understand the issues and listen to Canadians. They attended rountables and townhalls. They were genuinly engaged. After such devotion to the process does Minister Moore deserve to be attacked based on mere “scuttlebutt”?

If the attacks on CRIA and Minister Moore this week are any indication, it sure looks like the dialog about copyright this spring is going to be unpleasant.

The abstract of the article states the following:

“Legal context: The prohibitively high cost of civil litigation is inefficient against millions of online infringers; it is virtually impossible to stop online infringement. The establishment and maintenance of a social norm which makes people willing to conform to pro-copyright norms independent of any consideration of legal incentives is indispensable in the fight against online infringers. It requires a credible enforcement mechanism to tell people that online infringement will not be socially acceptable and to increase copyright compliance; but the efficiency of such an enforcement mechanism is a function of transaction costs of copyright enforcement. The debate on the three strikes law should be viewed from its potential impact on our social and economic well being. I suggest that the infringing subscribers, not copyright owners or OSPs, should bear the cost of enforcement. Reducing transaction costs of enforcement is the key factor in designing any three strikes law if there is any reasonable chance that it will work.

Key points: To find a least cost solution to online infringement requires a good understanding of the relationship between the principles of externality and of ‘least cost avoider’. The concept borrows from Tort Law.

Practical significance: The reduction of transaction costs of copyright enforcement in the networked environment increases the credibility of the copyright system, if any design of copyright rule such as three strikes law takes the transaction costs of enforcing copyright in the networked environment and the principle of least cost avoider into consideration, it will change the way we formulate copyright policy.”

The article is one of several recent ones to argue that graduated response systems can be justified on economic as well as other grounds. Other articles include: Prof. Bomsel Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Graduated Response, Prof. Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, Prof. Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers—Is the ‘‘Graduated Response’’ a Good Reply?, Barry Sookman and Dan Glover Graduated response and copyright: an idea that is right for the times.

The background to the case involves a settlement agreement between Eircom and various rights holders that requires Eircom to implement an agreed to protocol to reduce illegal file sharing by Eircom’s customers. It involves collection of IP addresses by rights holders that are associated with online infringements. The IP addresses will be sent to Eircom which in turn will send out a series of notices designed to educate users about unauthorized file sharing and give them ample opportunities to stop or face possible sanctions including account disconnection. This remedy can only be applied following three notices and a review of individual circumstances and mitigating factors by Eircom.

The copyright holders had pressed for the settlement because of the significant losses being suffered due to unauthorized file sharing. The judge recognized this, finding that remuneration to rights holders is “shrinking by reason copyright theft over the internet” and that the interests of creators is being “utterly disregarded” by this activity.

The judge pointed out that the “attraction of free, but illegal, downloading of the latest songs and videos made the sale of internet access attractive.” Everyone from users to ISPs were free riding from unauthorized file sharing resulting in losses to artists and the creative community.

The Data Protection Commissioner had raised several questions about the settlement. The first two were the following:

“1. Do data comprising IP addresses, in the hands of EMI or its agent(s), and taking account of the purpose for which they are collected and their intended provision to Eircom, constitute “personal data” for the purposes of the Data Protection Acts, 1988-2003, thereby requiring that the collection of such IP addresses by EMI or its agents must comply with the specific requirements of each of section 2, 2A|, 2B, 2C and 2D of the Data Protection Act, 1988 as amended?

2. Having regard to section 2A(1) of the Data Protection Act, 1988 as amended, and assuming for current purposes that the processing by Eircom of “personal data” in the context of the third of three steps envisaged by the graduated response scheme proposed under the terms of this settlement, (i.e. the termination of an internet user’s subscription) is “necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by [Eircom]”, does much processing represent “unwarranted [processing] by reasons of prejudice to the fundamental rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject”?

Is an IP address “personal data”

This question was easily answered in the negative by the trial judge. The Data Protection Act 1988 defines “personal data” as “Data relating to a living individual who is or can be identified either from the data or from the data in conjunction with other information that is in, or is likely to come to into, the possession of the data controller.” The IP addresses collected by rights holders did not personally identify any living person who is infringing their copyright. According the court:

“Nothing in these provisions changes one basic fact. Neither DetectNet, or any similar service of detection, nor any of the plaintiffs whose copyright material is being infringed would ever know through this process that the infringer is a particular person living in a particular place in Ireland. What they do know is that a particular IP address has been involved in the downloading. An IP address is the number given to a computer from an internet service provider when it receives internet access. The IP number electronically identifies the user of the internet. Banks of numbers for IP addresses are produced by an international organisation and these, in turn, are provided to internet service providers. One can find out by looking at the IP number, I understand, who the internet service provider is. What internet service provider is given what bank of thousands or millions of IP numbers is not kept a secret anywhere. Since each internet service provider will have, in turn, many thousands of customers, one is not moving much closer to finding out the identity of an internet abuser by knowing the copyright infringing IP address was assigned to that company. That number will probably give you no more than an indication of the domicile of the computer. Further, I am convinced, on the basis of the affidavit evidence before me, that the plaintiffs have no interest at all in using this process to find out who the copyright infringers are. Rather, what they are interested in having the protocol work so that the plague of copyright infringement may be undermined…

I conclude, that none of the plaintiffs have any interest in personally identifying any living person who is infringing their copyright by means of the settlement and protocol. I do not regard it as at all likely that they will attempt in any way to use the IP address as supplied to them by DetectNet of those engaged in illegal downloading in order to find out their names and addresses. Further, since, on the affidavit evidence before me, the plaintiffs had previously engaged in expensive litigation against Eircom in order to find out who they are, there seems no legal avenue open to them to get that information apart from an application for the names and addresses of the copyright thieves to the internet service provider. It is proved to me to be close to impossible that they could have recovered them by any easier or less pricey means. Nor do any of the plaintiffs have any intention of engaging in any illegal activity. Rather, the entire purpose of this litigation is to uphold the law. The first question is therefore answered no.”

Can a graduated response system that involves account disconnection be justified?

The second question before the court asked, essentially, whether the graduated response protocol which included the possible termination of an internet user’s subscription, is necessary for legitimate purposes and whether it represents unwarranted processing of personal data by reason of prejudice to the fundamental rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of users, the data subjects. The court resoundingly found that the protocol was necessary and justifiable.

In giving reasons, the court made some important holdings and observations which are canvassed below.

The Judge started his judgment by emphasizing the importance of copyright. He stated:

“Copyright is a universal entitlement to be identified with and to sell, and therefore to enjoy, the fruits of creative work. It applies to everyone who manages to produce anything copyrightable from a song, to a telephone directory, to a symphony, to a film. Were copyright not to exist, then the efforts of an artist could be both stolen and passed off as the talent of another. Were the artist not entitled to exploit her or his creation by preventing others from copying it without permission, usually for a fee, then the fruits of moments of inspiration worked out through weeks of endeavour and representing, sometimes, the distillation of some fundamental experience of life would bring no reward, perhaps not even applause. Even if an artist won acclaim, it alone would not keep body and soul together. Examples of what can occur where copyright protection is absent used to be found as notorious examples of unfairness in history rather than as a contemporary situation that has developed because of the abuse of the internet. When Jan Sibelius, a Finn, penned his Valse Triste, Finland was part of the Russian Empire, not a party to the copyright convention, and the great composer received nothing for what was then his most popular work. The three early ballets of Igor Stravinsky, a Russian, suffered the same fate; though on moving to the West, the composer re-orchestrated them and republished them gaining copyright but only in that form. No reasonable person doubts the injustice of that situation. The law does not doubt it either.”

Justice Charleton also explicitly recognized the right to be identified with and to reasonably exploit one’s own original creative endeavour as a human right protected under the Constitution of Ireland. On this he said:

“In dealing with this aspect of data protection entitlement, I feel I must return, for a moment, to some basic principles of law. There is fundamental right to copyright in Irish Law. This has existed as part of Irish legal tradition since the time of Saint Colmcille. He is often quoted for his aphorism: le gach bó a buinín agus le gach leabhar a chóip (to each cow its calf and to every book its copy). The right to be identified with and to reasonably exploit one’s own original creative endeavour I regard as a human right. Apart from legal tradition, the rights now enshrined in the Copyright and Related Rights Act, 2000 were, under their previous legislative incarnation, identified in Phonographic Performance Ireland Limited v. Coady, [1994] I.R. 504 by Keane J. at 511 has having a pre-legislative origin and super-legislative effectiveness as part of the unenumerated fundamental rights under the Constitution:

‘The right of the creator of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work not to have his or her creations stolen or plagiarised is a right of private property within the meaning of article 40.3.2 and article 43.1 of the Constitution of Ireland, 1937 as is the similar right of a person who has employed his or her technical skills and/or capital in the sound recording of a musical work. As such, they can hardly be abolished in their entirety, although it was doubtless within the competence of the Oireachtas to regulate their exercise in the interests of the common good. In addition and even in the absence of any statutory machinery, it is the duty of the organs of the State, including the courts to ensure, as best they may, that these rights are protected from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicated.’”

The judge then pointed out that the Internet is not a special case where the law does not apply. The Internet has not changed fundamental values and rules. As the judge pointed out: “There is nothing in the criminal or civil law which legalises that which is otherwise illegal simply because the transaction takes place over the internet. Child pornography, for instance, remains child pornography whether sent by post or digitally transmitted.”

Further, the judge observed that although the Internet has many postive attributes it also has a dark side. This includes illegal online file sharing which is subject to the law notwithstanding the free culture attitude of entitlement among online file sharers:

“When the internet gained wide currency in the 1990s many of its adages began to believe that a new form of reality had been created. Some felt that it should be subject to no rules since, as it was not based in a particular country, but as its name implies is a world-wide web of communication, unlike the previous means of communication through the post, by telephone, through television or through films, it seemed to be impossible to subject to local regulation. That is not so. Nor should it be. In common with other aspects of life, the internet has a positive and dark side. On the positive side, its aids free communication; it opens up avenues of knowledge so that it has become a centre of learning in itself; it furthers public debate; and has established the swiftest and most far reaching form of communication that humanity has known. It is, on the other hand, also thickly populated by fraudsters, pornographers of the worst kind and cranks.

The internet is only a means of communication. It has not rewritten the legal rules of each nation through which it passes. It is not an amorphous extraterrestrial body with an entitlement to norms that run counter to the fundamental principles of human rights. Since the early days of the internet, and increasingly as time has gone on, copyright material has been placed on world wide web by those with no entitlement to share it. There, it is downloaded by those who would normally have expected to pay for it. Among younger people, so much has the habit grown up of downloading copyright material from the internet that a claim of entitlement seems to have arisen to have what is not theirs for free.”

On the specific issue of whether the graduated response protocol was justified, the judge recognized that disconnection of an internet account was a serious sanction. He noted that “Some would argue that it is an imposition on human freedom.” He rejected this assertion pointing out that “There is no freedom, however, to break the law.” Then, after adverting to the right to obtain protection for “one’s own original creative endeavour” “as a human right” under the Irish Constitution, he held that the graduated response protocol was fully justified to vindicate this important human right. According the the court:

“The courts under the Constitution are obliged to supply, even in the absence of legislative intervention, appropriate remedies for the undermining of rights within the scheme of fundamental law that the Constitution represents. As has often been said, the powers of the courts in that regard are as ample as the Constitution requires. I am therefore obliged by Constitutional imperative to protect, as best I can, the rights of copyright owners from unjust attack or, where that sort of attack has taken place, to vindicate their rights through an appropriate order. There is ample expression of statutory remedies in the laws passed by the Oireachtas under the Constitution. Section 37 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 provides that the owner of the copyright in work has the exclusive right to undertake or authorise others to make that work available to the public. This legal entitlement is being flagrantly violated by peer-to-peer illegal downloading. I can see no other way of looking at the problem. More than one of the conditions in s.2A of the Data Protection Act, 1988 as amended is met as to both the legitimate interests of Eircom, as a responsible company, and that of the community in general. The most important of those interests is that of abiding by the law. It is completely within the legitimate standing of Eircom to act, and to be seen to act, as a body which upholds the law and the Constitution. That is what the court expects of both individuals and companies. That expectation is derived from the rights protected under the Constitution and the general pact which the people of Ireland mutually made in founding a legal system, as the Preamble to the Constitution clearly declares, that is dedicated to attaining true social order. The insertion of express conditions by Eircom in the user – internet service provider contract, as quoted above, against the use of the internet as a facility for transmitting obscene images and against the infringing the copyright of others is a step taken in pursuance of a corporate policy that is no less than lawful and proper. It is abundantly clear that the data subject has given his or her consent, in return for obtaining internet access. Under contract, if any of these conditions be breached, then their access can be terminated. It may be that internet access is available elsewhere from other internet service providers on lesser conditions. If that is so it is hard to see, however, how conditions of a contract can validly avoid the law. These, however, are the conditions that apply here. A contract for service, involving termination for breach as a consequence on the operation of a condition is present by consent. That is not all. Furthermore, such processing, involving sifting the data from the plaintiffs, warning Eircom customers and, ultimately, cutting them off, is necessary for both the performance of a contract and for compliance with a legal obligation cast upon the courts, among other organs of the State, to defend the Constitution and the laws of our society. No one in the community can escape the law, as to the obligations that it imposes or the rights that it declares. The means of infringement, or the ideology that may grow around a medium of infringement, are not germane. Otherwise, the law lacks legitimacy.

Even if only s. 2(a)(1)(b) of the Data Protection Act was operative, it is legitimate for Eircom to have a corporate policy whereby the facilities that it hires out to the people of Ireland are used for lawful purposes only. Having that policy, they are entitled to pursue it by means of conditions in contract that incorporate an enforcement modality. The protocol is merely a more complex means to that end. I find it impossible to imagine that such interference is unwarranted because there is some fundamental right or freedom or legitimate interest in the data subject whereby, in contrast to those who engage in other forms of unlawful copyright theft which may leave them more readily subject to the law, the internet is used for the violation. There cannot be a right to infringe the constitutional rights of others, absent some argument as to a genuine and compelling competing right. In some instances, the purpose for which a right is asserted undermines its character as a right. There could not be, for instance, a constitutional right to privacy that extended to the organisation of a violent crime over the internet or by telephone. There is nothing disproportionate, and it is therefore not unwarranted, about cutting off internet access because of three infringements of copyright. The exceptions in the protocol, to which I have already referred in detail, provide for upholding relevant rights to medical care, to livelihood and to business use in appropriate circumstances. The protocol, at the relevant stage, is not inhumane or arbitrary. Rather, there is a right to make representations and these will, I am assured and I believe, be listened to if sensible and credible.”

The decison will now permit Eircom to implement the graduated response protocol worked out with rights holders. Ireland will now join France, UK, New Zealand, South Korea and other countries who have enacted or are in the final processes of enacting graduated response systems to help stem illegal online file sharing and to promote legitimate markets for the sale of creative products and services.

Consider the following summary by Prof. Geist in yesterday’s Toronto Star article which was re-published in his blog this morning. Prof. Geist says:

“the text confirmed many fears about the substance of ACTA. If adopted in its current form, the treaty would have a significant impact on the Internet, leading some countries to adopt three-strikes-and-you’re-out policies that terminate subscriber access due to infringement allegations, increasing legal protection for digital locks, mandating new injunction powers, implementing statutory damages provisions worldwide, and engaging in widespread data sharing across national borders.”

Here again, Prof. Geist is misrepresenting what the actual published text of the draft treaty says. As I have pointed out in two previous articles, Fear Mongering and Misinformation Used to Slag ACTA and A reply to ACTA critics, the draft text would not mandate any “countries to adopt three-strikes-and-you’re-out policies that terminate subscriber access due to infringement allegations”. This is pure scaremongering.

The draft treaty would require contracting countries to provide legal protection for technological measures, but these measures have already been implemented around the world throughout the EU and elsewhere in order to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties. Of course, ACTA would require Canada to “increase” protection for TPMs. We don’t have any protection for TPMs now and we are the only G20 country not to have any such protection.

It is also hard to understand Prof. Geist’s criticism of international cooperation including sharing of information to combat counterfeiting. Prof. Geist was an ardent supporter of Bill c-27, the Electronic Commerce Protection Act. That Bill would have given the Canadian Government extensive rights to share data with other countries to fight SPAM. Prof. Geist endorsed these provisions in that Bill, even testifying before the Parliamentary Industry Committee studying the Bill supporting international data sharing to fight SPAM. (See, Lines 1715-1722 of his testimony). It is well known that organized crime is extensively involved in counterfeiting activities. It is puzzling that Prof. Geist believes that international cooperation is essential when dealing with SPAM but not counterfeiting. SPAM may clutter our in-boxes and cause economic harm. But, as two Parliamentary Standing Committees recently found, counterfeiting causes economic harm and also poses serious health and safety issues for Canadians. See, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Counterfeit Goods in Canada – A Threat to Public Safety (May 2007), Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Counterfeiting and Piracy Are Theft (June 2007)

As the debate about ACTA continues, the public should realize that simply relying on secondary and tertiary summaries of the draft treaty will not provide an accurate assessment about what the treaty is really about. You really need to check your sources.

The article discusses the dynamics of why ISPs and rights holders should be motivated to work together to solve the problem of online file sharing. Apart from good business reasons, she points out that today ISPs are increasingly deploying “smart” technologies within broadband networks. Technologies like deep packet inspection (DPI) have given operators an unprecedented level of control over the content that flows through their pipes. These enhanced capabilities of ISPs may also increase their exposure to copyright liability as they are less and less “dumb pipes”.

Prof. Bridy proposes a set of principles to guide the implementation of private graduated response regimes. She contends that ISPs and rights owners “must take it upon themselves, in the interest of the customers they aim to get and keep, to ensure that their private arrangements for enforcing copyrights online are both adequately transparent and meaningfully consumer protective.”

The article proposes that privately implemented graduated response regimes be designed to minimize the likelihood of mistaken responses, to maximize opportunities for consumer compliance before the imposition of any sanction, and to limit the duration of any access-related sanction imposed in the absence of a neutral adjudication of infringement. In this regard, the following principles are suggested:

• Users should be given an opportunity to contest notices of infringement with their ISPs as the notices are received and before any sanction is imposed.
• When it comes to adding up strikes, ISPs should count a single notice of infringement that alleges multiple instances of infringement as only one ―strike against the subscriber receiving the notice.
• The principle underlying graduated response is that sanctions should escalate as infractions accrete. The disciplinary approach is an incremental one, and in the interest of consumer protection, there should be more, rather than fewer, increments when it comes to the nature and duration of access-related sanctions. To maximize opportunities for Internet users to comply, ISPs that agree to implement a graduated response regime should graduate the access-related sanctions they impose, beginning with a speed sanction after three uncontested notices and graduating to a brief suspension of access with the fourth.
• Broadband providers should provide full disclosure of their copyright enforcement practices to prospective and existing customers.

Others including professors Alain Strowel and Olivier Bomsel have separately made strong arguments for graduated response systems. Prof. Bridy’s article provides an analysis of the legal liability reasons why ISPs and content owners should work together. While the analysis flows from the copyright liability regime in the US, her analysis could well resonate in Canada in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Society of Composers, Authors, and Music Composers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, [2004]  S.C.R. 427, 2004 S.C.C. 45 which conditioned certain ISP immunities on ISPs being a dumb pipe and being unable to discern the nature of the content flowing through their systems.

The article also provides practical insights into how a voluntary graduated response system might be implemented.